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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to understand and explain ‘deviant autocracies’, which are an 
overlooked and under-researched theme in the democratisation literature. Two major 
approaches, i.e. structural and process-driven explanations, have dominated the 
debate on and studies of democratisation. However, over the past few decades, there 
have been an increasing number of cases that have not made the transition to 
democracy. These cases, which I refer to as ‘deviant autocracies’, are the primary 
focus of this thesis. Deviant autocracies are countries that have a high level of 
economic development but are still governed by non-democratic regimes. Based on a 
large-N analysis of a dataset from 1960 to 2011, this thesis shows that since the 1970s, 
increasing numbers of high income countries have not made the transition to 
democracy. To understand the emergence and consolidation of deviant autocracies, 
an analytical framework, the neo actor-based approach, is developed. This approach 
synergies with the lens of existing actor-based approach, elite theory, models of the 
elite bargaining process and the elite-structure paradigm to examine the interactions 
of international actors, local elites and state capacity. Based on this analytical 
framework, two small-N case studies were conducted to examine the identified 
deviant autocracies, Singapore and Hong Kong, to understand why they have not 
made the transition to democracy. At the analytical level, this thesis aims to offer an 
explanation of the non-transition of deviant autocracies based on a middle-range 
theory that focuses on elite interactions during the transitional period. At the 
empirical level, it contributes to our empirical knowledge of why Hong Kong and 
Singapore have not made the transition to democracy despite favourable 
circumstances and structural factors. By focusing on understanding why these cases 
remain stable deviant autocracies, I hope to open up a new research agenda for 
scholars of democratisation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In recent years, pro-democracy protests and movements have occurred frequently in 
high-income autocratic countries. In 2014, an unprecedented 79-day series of protests 
and incidents of civil disobedience, collectively known as the Umbrella Movement, 
was launched by students, scholars and politicians in Hong Kong in a call for 
democratisation. Singapore’s autocratic ruling elites have also suffered significant 
setbacks in recent general elections. In 2011, the opposition party, the Workers’ Party, 
won the first Group Representation Constituency (GRC) in Singapore’s history. In the 
2015 general election, the Workers’ Party candidates were re-elected in the Aljunied 
GRC. Due in part to Singapore’s highly gerrymandered electoral laws, members of the 
People’s Action Party (PAP) held all parliamentary seats from 1968 to 1980 and more 
than 95% of the available seats from 1984 to 2010 (see Elections Department 
Singapore 2015). The increasing popularity of the opposition party not only reflects 
voters’ dissatisfaction with the performance of the PAP, but indicates a growing 
demand for democracy in Singapore. 
The above cases of Hong Kong and Singapore are idiosyncratic. High-income 
countries generally exhibit fairly democratic forms of government. An ongoing 
struggle for democratisation is very uncommon among countries with a high level of 
socio-economic development (see Chapters 2 and 3). The existence of those deviant 
cases, or ‘deviant autocracies’, creates an interesting research puzzle for scholars of 
democratisation and comparative politics. The aim of this thesis is to understand and 
explain deviant autocracies, which have been overlooked and under-researched in the 
literature on democratisation so far.  
Two major approaches have dominated scholarly and other debate on 
democratisation: a structural approach and a process-driven approach (see 
Doorenspleet 2004: 310; Hadiz 2009; Kitschelt 1992; Posusney 2004: 128; Zhang 1994: 
110). Structural explanations have been prevalent in studies of democratisation for 
more than half a century (see Barro 1996; Bearce and Hutnick 2011; Boix 2011; Boix 
and Stokes 2003; Bollen and Jackman 1985, 1990; Colaresi and Thompson 2003; 
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Cutright 1963; Doorenspleet 1997, 2004; Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen and 
O’Halloran 2006; Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 1997, 2012; Huber et al. 1993; Jensen 
and Shaaning 2012; Lipset 1959, 1960, 1994; Lipset et al. 1993; Moore 1966; Narayan, 
Narayan and Smyth 2010; Ravich 2000; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Papaioannou and 
Siourounis 2008; Przeworski and Limongi 1993; Rost and Booth 2008; Rowen 1995; 
Smith 1969; Teorell 2010). Proponents of the structural approach use key structural 
variables, especially level of economic development, to explain the transition to 
democracy and democratic consolidation; methodologically, this approach is usually 
based on cross-national statistical analysis. Meanwhile, researchers adopting the 
process-driven approach place less emphasis on structural factors, instead focusing 
on transition processes and strategies of specific political actors. For example, scholars 
have investigated the influence of the interaction of rulers, military bodies and 
democrats on the choice of mode of transition, which is critical to the stability of the 
resulting system, or in other words to democratic consolidation (see Burton and Higley 
1987; Friedheim 1993; Hawkins 2001:441; Higley and Burton 1998, 2006; Karl 1990, 
2005; Karl and Schmitter 1991, 1995; O’Donnell 2002; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; 
O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986a; O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 
1986b; O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986c; Petsinis 2010; Rustow 1970; 
Schmitter 2010; Schmitter and Karl 1994). In Chapter 2, these approaches are 
described in more depth in relation to the debate on democratisation. 
The common aim of the structural and process-driven approaches on 
democratisation is to determine why and how countries made a transition to 
democracy and pursue democratic consolidation. One of the central claims made by 
proponents of the structural approach is that a country makes a transition to 
democracy, once a certain socio-economic threshold has been crossed. However, this 
raises the following intriguing question: why do some countries fail to complete this 
trajectory? Over the last few decades, a number of countries have made significant 
socio-economic advances, especially in terms of gross domestic product per capita, 
without transitioning to democracy. These cases, which I will call ‘deviant autocracies’, 
are the central focus of my study.  
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In light of the above question regarding the emergence of deviant autocracies, 
the structural approach seems to be rather overdetermined while the actor-oreiented 
approach is underdetermined. Contrary to the prediction delivered by the structural 
approach, the number of deviant autocracies worldwide has increased rapidly in 
recent decades, as shown in Chapter 3. Meanwhile, the focus of the actor-based 
approach is the interaction of a small number of internal elites, which is used to 
explain the success of countries’ transition to democracy and the stability of political 
regimes in the aftermath of transition. Additional critical lenses and examination of 
more actors are required to understand deviant autocracies (see Chapter 4).  
In Chapter 3, based on a large-N statistical analysis covering 167 countries from 
1960 to 2011, I select outliers from a structural perspective, identified as deviant 
autocracies. In the rest of the thesis, I focus on two cases of deviant autocracy in Asia: 
the political regimes of Singapore and Hong Kong. The aim of the thesis is to 
understand and explain why these cases have failed to make a transition to democracy 
despite their high levels of socio-economic development. I argue that the reasons for 
this failure lie in the ways in which independence was enacted, and thus focus on the 
periods surrounding their attainment of independence (Singapore) and transfer of 
sovereignty (Hong Kong). In each case, bargaining between international actors and 
local elites is shown to have had an important effect on political development in the 
uncertain transitional period. 
It may be argued that as Hong Kong is not a sovereign state, it should not be 
included in research on democratisation. However, recent studies have suggested that 
sovereignty and democracy are not mutually exclusive, as democratic transitions can 
take place in the absence of sovereignty (see Tansey 2010; Voller 2015). In other 
words, both Singapore, as a sovereign state, and Hong Kong, with a high degree of 
autonomy under the sovereignty of China, are able to determine their own forms of 
government. 1  Democratic and opposition parties in both countries can use 
                                                          
1 Hong Kong, with its ‘mini-constitution’, the Basic Law, is a de jure political entity that enjoys a high 
degree of autonomy and exhibits a political structure distinct from that of mainland China, under the 
framework of ‘one country, two systems’. In addition, Articles 45 and 68 of the Basic Law stipulate that 
Chief Executive and Legislative Council members should ultimately be elected by universal suffrage and 
in accordance with democratic procedures. 
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institutional and non-institutional mechanisms to change the existing political system. 
In a later part of this chapter, I will justify the use of a small-N case selection method. 
The study of outliers is not a new research domain in democratisation studies. 
The first type of outliers, the group of deviant democracies has been vividly discussed 
in recent literature (see Booth 2008; Doorenspleet 2012; Doorenspleet and Kopecký 
2008; Doorenspleet and Mudde 2008; Fritz 2008; Gisselquist 2008; Good and Taylor 
2008; McMillan 2008; Seeberg 2010b, 2012, 2014a, 2014b). However, this type of 
research is still very recent and there is still a lot of work to be done in this field, and 
still a lack of studies and knowledge (see Chapter 2). The second type of outliers, the 
groups of deviant autocracies, deserves much more attention from theorists of 
democratisation (see Doorenspleet 2012: 202; Seeberg 2012: 29, 2014b: 648). Several 
attempts have been made to explain the failure of highly economically developed 
countries to transition to democracy using factors derived from structural or process-
driven studies, such as the electoral system, government performance, the colonial 
legacy and business hegemony (see Sing 1996, 2004; So 2000; and Myhre 2010). 
However, these studies have usually investigated a single case and provided thick 
descriptions of factors that may delay the transition to democracy. The results of my 
large-N quantitative analysis, reported in Chapter 3, show that the number of deviant 
autocracies has increased over the last few decades. To understand this type of outlier, 
a more comprehensive analytical model supplemented by carefully designed small-N 
analysis is necessary. To this end, I develop a theoretical model in Chapter 4 and 
empirically apply this model with process tracing to case studies of deviant autocracy 
in Singapore (Chapter 5) and Hong Kong (Chapter 6). The data analysed are drawn 
from recently declassified internal government archival documents, the memoirs of 
major ruling elites and secondary sources.  
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Argument in Brief 
 
To overcome some of the limitations of existing scholarly approaches to 
democratisation, I will develop a neo actor-based approach in Chapter 4 to examine 
deviant autocracies in Asia. The middle-range theoretical framework is inspired by 
previous researchers’ process-driven explanations of democratisation with insights 
from elite theory (Bermeo 2010; Burton et al. 1992; Burton and Higley 1987; Etzioni-
Halevy 1993; Greenwood 2008; Higley and Burton 1998, 2006; Mosca 1939; Pareto 
1963 [1935]; O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999; Prewitt and Stone 1973; Singh 2016), 
models of the elite bargaining process (Case 1996, 2005, 2009b; Croissant 2014; 
Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007; Silva 1996; Sklair 2002; Thompson 2012; Tolstrup 2013) 
and elite-structure paradigms (Alexander 2008; Levitsky and Way 2002b, 2013; 
Lundquist 1987). To shed light on the genesis and consolidation of the deviant 
autocracies of Singapore and Hong Kong, I develop a neo actor-based analytical 
framework to analyse the interplay between international actors, domestic actors and 
state capacity in each region over time, with a particular focus on transitional periods 
involving decolonisation and a movement towards independence/transfer of 
sovereignty.  
The findings of this thesis show that three major factors explain why the two 
deviant autocracies under study have remained nondemocratic. First, international 
actors bargained with each other to shape the political institutions of the two 
transitional regions, influenced by both the imperative of decolonisation and the Cold 
War mentality. The resulting lack of democratic institutions weakened state capacity. 
In both cases, the institutional political framework was designed to discourage 
opposition parties from taking power via elections. In addition, constitutional 
provisions were made to limit the capacity of oppositional parties to change the 
institutional framework. Finally, local business and professional elites seized the 
opportunity to advance their own interests during the international bargaining in the 
transitional period. Unlike Western educated middle classes, who are conventionally 
understood to support democratic development, elites in the deviant autocracies of 
Singapore and Hong Kong sought to empower themselves and consolidate their own 
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influence through nondemocratic means during the uncertain transitional period. In 
both cases, the resulting political system was dominated by nondemocratic, self-
interested business and professional elites. 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature on democratisation by setting 
a new research agenda for scholars interested in democratic transition versus non-
transition and deviant autocracy in Asia. As previously noted, several excellent 
qualitative single case studies have already focused on such outliers; however, I will 
not only compare case studies, but will also propose a new theoretical framework for 
analysis of the absence of democratic transition. As will become clear in my thesis, 
dozens of excellent quantitative studies have also been produced in this area, but 
researchers have tended to neglect outliers and have not been particularly interested 
in characterising or explaining so-called deviant autocracies. The aim of my thesis is to 
contribute to existing literature on democratisation by addressing an empirical puzzle, 
i.e. absent of democratic transition in deviant autocracies, and using up-to-date 
quantitative cross-sectional data to detect outliers.  
Another contribution is analytical, as the thesis offers an explanation of the 
absence of democratic transition in cases classified as deviant autocracies based on 
the findings of middle-range theoretical analysis of elite interaction, state capacity and 
international bargaining during the transitional period. Examining the negotiation 
process yields insights into the interests and agendas of various major political elites, 
both internal and external, during the decision-making process. This analytical tool 
may help future researchers to analyse other deviant autocracies.  
Finally, the thesis contributes to empirical knowledge of the political 
development of Hong Kong and Singapore, especially their failure to transition to 
democracy – despite the presence of structural factors conducive to democratic 
development – and their emergence instead as stable deviant autocracies. Two small-
N case studies based on recently declassified archival data are used to study the 
outliers, the deviant autocracies of Hong Kong and Singapore, to understand the 
factors responsible for their absence of democratic transition. Most of the declassified 
government documents used in the case studies have only very recently been released 
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to the public, and thus offer important empirical insights into the puzzle of Hong Kong 
and Singapore’s lack of democratisation.    
 
Methodological Considerations 
 
To fully answer my research question, a mixed research methodology (combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods) is developed (see Goertz and Mahoney 2012: 
110; 2013: 247-248; Ho and Fung 2015: 46-47; Humphreys and Jacobs 2015; 
Lieberman 2005). Cross-country quantitative analysis is used in Chapter 3 to identify 
the particular characteristics of the deviant autocracies of Singapore and Hong Kong. 
The quantitative analysis has two major goals. First, to replicate the assumptions of 
the structural approach, particularly the premise that economic development is 
significantly positively related to democratic development. Second, to investigate the 
increase in outliers, specifically deviant autocracies, to pave the way for further 
analysis in the subsequent chapters. The quantitative analysis is based on a self-
compiled cross-country dataset covering 167 countries from 1960 to 2011. Chapter 3 
provides a comprehensive discussion of the operationalisation and conceptualisation 
of the large-N analysis, along with methods of data collection and data analysis. Once 
the deviant autocracies have been characterised, small-N analysis is conducted to 
examine the two selected cases of deviant autocracy in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively, 
using the proposed analytical framework. The findings complement those of the 
quantitative analysis, capturing the essence of elite interaction, state capacity and 
bargaining during the transitional period to account for the emergence of deviant 
autocracies. 
In the small-N analysis, two case studies of deviant autocracies are examined 
using process tracing, with particular reference to the influence of elite interaction on 
the political regimes of deviant autocracies. Process tracing is a newly developed 
qualitative tool used to identify the causes of a specific outcome in a particular case 
(Bennett 2001, 2006, 2008; Bennett and Elman 2006; Blatter and Haverland 2012: 80; 
Collier 2011; Collier et al. 2010; Della Porta and Keating 2008: 13; George and Bennett 
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2005; George and McKeown 1985; Kittel and Kuehn 2013: 3; Mahoney 2012: 571; Van 
Evera 1997; Vennesson 2008: 224). The method is ideally suited to investigation of the 
involvement of actors in institutional change and highly contingent events. According 
to Vennesson (2008), process tracing ‘provides a way to learn and evaluate empirically 
the preferences and perceptions of actors, their purposes, their goals, their values and 
their specification of the situations that face them’ (p. 233). Interestingly, most of the 
deviant autocracies identified in Chapter 3 were influenced by the same highly 
contingent historical developments, such as a disputed process of decolonisation from 
British rule and a Cold War mentality. Indeed, the fact that authors see a positive 
relationship between British colonisation and democratisation makes this puzzle the 
more intriguing (see Barro 1996: 19; Huber et al. 1993: 9; Jensen and Skaaning 2012: 
1129; Lipset et al. 1993: 160). The combination of neo actor-based analysis and 
process tracing sheds light on the interaction of and conflict between international 
actors and local elites and their role in shaping deviant autocratic political systems. 
To identify and study the deviant autocracies with mixed methods, an 
important issue, the methodological hierarchy of quantitative and qualitative 
methods, must be discussed. This issue has been highlighted since the 1970s (see 
Denzin 1970, 2012; Howe 2004). Denzin and Howe both argued that quantitative 
methods should be in addition to qualitative enquiry. This debate is indeed rooted in 
two fundamental issues related to mixed methods, that is, what is the mixed method, 
and how should it be implemented. With regarded to the first issue, there is little 
controversy over the idea of mixed methods. In recent years, there has been 
consensus on how mixed methods is defined: ‘a primary or core method combined 
with one or more strategies drawn from a second, different method for addressing 
the research question by either collecting or analysing data’ (Morse and Niehaus 2009: 
14). The justification of using mixed methods is also well discussed in the literature to 
address the issues related to its epistemology, distinctive philosophical foundations 
and merits (see Coppedge 1999: 465; Geertz 1973: 6; Guba 1990; Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1995: 10; Hesse-Biber 2010; Smith and Heshusius 1986; Wilson and Butler 
2007: 122). Hence, many excellent academic research studies have adopted both 
quantitative and qualitative methods (Borkan 2004; Caracelli 2006; Chen 2006; 
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Coppedge 2005; Creswell, Fetters and Ivankova 2004; Currall and Towler 2003; Greene, 
Benjamin and Goodyear 2001; Johnstone 2004; Morgan and Stewart 2002; Ridenour 
and Newman 2008; Twinn 2003). 
However, the controversy is related to the implementation of the mixed 
method. Lieberman is one of the pioneers and published an article in American 
Political Science Review in 2005 that suggested a systematic way to conceptualise the 
actual operation of mixing quantitative and qualitative methods. It provides a handful 
of guidelines for the use of ‘mixed methods’ or ‘nested analysis’ to join ‘intensive case-
study analysis with statistical analysis… statistical analyses can guide case selection for 
in-depth research, provide direction for more focused case studies and comparisons’ 
(Lieberman 2005: 435). Since then, many scholars have discussed the application of 
mixed methods (see Johnson et al. 2007; Shannon-Baker 2016). The article of Morse 
and Niehaus (2009: 29-34) is more relevant to the issue of methodological hierarchy 
of quantitative and qualitative methods. They suggest two major types: ‘QUAN – Qual’, 
i.e., quantitatively-driven, qualitative supplemental design, and ‘QUAL-quan’, i.e., 
qualitatively-driven, quantitative supplemental design. 
This thesis is adopt the QUAN – Qual approach for the following reason. As 
researcher, the prime goal is to understand the social issues and phenomena. To 
understand the problem of deviant autocracies, I would like to take a pragmatic 
approach, that is, to adopt the method that can help me to answer the underlying 
research question (see Burnham et al. 2004; Hammersley and Atkinson 1995; 
Shannon-Baker 2016). This study aims to explain deviant cases with reference to the 
empirical puzzle based on the major notion of structural explanation originally derived 
from quantitative analysis. Hence, I agree that the best way to identify deviant 
autocracies is to follow the principle of hierarchical sequencing of first structural 
(quantitative) and then agential (qualitative) approaches. Thus, I have replicated the 
major notion of structural explanation with the quantitative method in Chapter 3 and 
map out the deviant autocracies before moving toward qualitative deviant case 
studies with a neo actor-based approach (see Chapter 4) to analyse the selected cases 
in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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It is methodologically important to identify a suitable tool for small-N analysis 
of the deviant autocracies. The small-N research method has a relatively long history. 
In some influential studies, cases have been compared systematically. The method of 
agreement and difference advocated by John Stuart Mill significantly influenced the 
development of small-N analysis (see Mill 1893). As Lijphart (1971) noted, ‘Mill’s 
method of concomitant variations is often claimed to be the first systematic 
formulation of the modern comparative method’ (p. 688). In the early 1970s, small-N 
qualitative analysis developed rapidly (see Eckstein 1975; Lijphart 1971, 1975; 
Meckstroth 1975; Przeworski and Teune 1970). Proponents of comparative method 
proposed a refined strategy enabling researchers to control variables in non-statistical 
or non-experimental situations using cross-case techniques such as identifying the 
Most Similar Systems (MSS) and the Most Different Systems (MDS) designs (see 
Anckar 2008: 394-396; De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 1994: 198-199; Frendreis 1983: 
260; Kohli et al. 1996: 17; Lijphart 1971, 1975; Przeworski and Teune 1970; Sartori 
1994: 16; Skocpol 1984). Nevertheless, implementation of traditional cross-case 
methods encounter many problems and challenges. One problem is that of ‘too many 
variables, too few cases’ (see Collier 1993: 107; Lijphart 1971: 686, 1975; Tarrow 2010: 
235). Those designs also encounter the problem of overdetermination, fail to 
eliminate other explanations, and subject to the availability of cases and data for 
comparison (see Burnham et al. 2004: 93; Collier 1993: 111; Hall 2006, 2008; 
Przeworski and Teune 1970: 34-35; Tarrow 2010: 234-235). 
To overcome the limitations of existing small-N comparison methods, a new 
perspective on the case-study method, known as process tracing, provides an ideal 
analytical tool for investigation of deviant autocracies. It is an innovative means of 
conducting small-N analysis by tracing the process of an event and the influence of 
various factors on the event. Process tracing offers an alternative method of making 
within-case causal inferences by integrating positivist and interpretivist research 
designs and analysing the effects of different conditions on the outcomes (see Blatter 
and Haverland 2012: 82; George and Bennett 2005: 214; Mahoney and Goertz 2004; 
Vennesson 2008: 224, 232-236).  
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This qualitative method has gained popularity since its introduction by George 
and Bennett in a 2005 monograph (see also Campbell 1975; George and McKeown 
1985; Kittel and Kuehn 2013: 1; Van Evera 1997). Process tracing has become one of 
the most frequently used research methods in the disciplines of international relations 
and political science, and has been widely accepted by scholars since 2005 (see Collier 
1993: 110-112; Gerring 2004; Kittel and Kuehn 2013: 1-2; Tilly 1997: 48; Vennesson 
2008: 225). The method has since been further developed, elaborated and 
conceptualised to provide ever more solid ontological and epistemological grounds 
for causal inference (see Blatter and Haverland 2012: 83; Collier et al. 2010: 184-196; 
Hall 2006, 2008; Kittel and Kuehn 2013; Mahoney 2012; Vennesson 2008: 228-232).2  
The aim of this thesis is to understand deviant autocracies by conducting 
exploratory case study analysis complemented by process tracing. However, given the 
diverse interpretation of process tracing and its application (see George and Bennett 
2005; Gerring 2007; Hall 2006, 2008; Kittel and Kuehn 2013: 3; Mahoney 2007, 2012: 
572), an explanation of its use in this thesis is required. Process tracing is a qualitative 
method in its own right; its use in this thesis is confined to ‘uncovering a specific set 
of historical conditions (e.g. social and institutional context, actors’ preferences and 
strategies)’ (Kittel and Kuehn 2013: 3) and obtaining ‘a historical explanation of an 
individual case’ (Bennett 2008: 704). It is worth noting that the process-tracing 
method has been widely accepted and used to explain issues related to democracy 
(see Bunce 2000; Kittel and Kuehn 2013: 6). 
In the current thesis, cases of deviant autocracies are chosen based on the logic 
of information-oriented selection3 (see Flyvbjerg 2006: 230; Vennesson 2008: 227). 
The benefits of deviant case analysis to investigation of theoretical anomalies have 
                                                          
2  The introduction of this new method also triggered lively debate on epistemological and 
methodological issues relating to the analysis of causal mechanisms (see Blatter and Haverland 2012: 
94-98; Gerring 2007, 2010; Goertz and Mahoney 2012: 101-106; Levy 2007: 203-205; Ragin 2000; 
Schneider et al. 2006; Vennesson 2008: 228-232). Proponents of the process-tracing approach have 
also rigorously discussed methods of hypothesis testing (see Bennett 2008: 706; Blatter and Haverland 
2012: 143; Collier 2011: 825; Mahoney 2012: 571-572; Van Evera 1997: 31-32). 
3 According to Lijphart (1971: 682-683, 1975: 162), comparative, experimental, statistical and case 
study methods are all regarded as basic methods in social sciences disciplines. One of seven commonly 
used case-selection procedures, comprising typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, most similar 
and most different (see Seawright and Gerring 2008: 296-297). 
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been widely discussed (see Flyvbjerg 2006: 229; Lijphart 1971: 691; Tarrow 2010: 248-
249). According to Seawright and Gerring (2008), ‘[t]he purpose of a deviant case 
analysis is usually to probe for new—but as yet unspecified—explanations… [it] is an 
exploratory form of research’ (p. 302). Deviant case analysis is ideally suited to 
exploratory research designed ‘to probe new explanations for Y [effect]’ (Seawright 
and Gerring 2008: 297). It thus works perfectly with process tracing, which can be used 
to explain deviant cases when the established theory – in this case structural 
approaches such as in particular modernisation theory – cannot predict or explain the 
outcome adequately; in this research, however, the evidence obtained from the 
deviant case analysis can help us to explain deviant autocracies (see Bennett 2008: 
705; George and Bennett 2005: 215). 
Some concerns have been raised about case selection. Gerring (2010: 1502) 
argued that a single case study is insufficient to determine a causal path. Therefore, I 
follow recommendations for conducting a paired comparison, such as expanding the 
methodological plurality, localising the theoretical framework used and 
supplementing the analysis with process tracing (see Tarrow 2010: 239, 250-252). 
Selecting two cases and focusing on a specific historical period, i.e. a transitional 
period, enhances the power of neo actor-based analysis to explain deviant autocracies. 
This procedure also removes the risk of confirmation bias associated with the use of a 
single case study (George and Bennett 2005: 217, 220; Tarrow 2010: 246). 
A justification for selecting two cases is also provided by the results of the 
large-N analysis, presented in Chapter 3. The large-N analysis reveals that the 
abnormal features of the deviant autocracies under study, i.e. the major factors 
addressed using the structural approach, cannot account for their failure to transition 
to democracy. Collecting empirical evidence on a list of deviant autocracies helps to 
avoid the problem of non-representativeness in the selection of cases for small-N 
analysis in Chapter 5 and 6 (see Geddes 1990; Tarrow 2010: 247). It may be argued 
that selecting two cases of deviant autocracy violates the imperatives of traditional 
case-selection methods, i.e. to avoid selecting dependent variables and to select both 
positive and negative cases. However, these imperatives have been extensively 
discussed in recent literature and shown to be misleading (see Bennett and Elman 
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2006; Blatter and Haverland 2012: 100; Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright 2004; Dion 
1998; Geddes 1990). Indeed, scholars have widely agreed that it is appropriate to 
select dependent variables for use in qualitative research (see Braumoeller and Goertz 
2000; Dion, 1998; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Mahoney and Goertz 2004: 653). 
Unlike traditional cross-case comparison, process tracing relies on within-case analysis. 
It provides more flexibility in selecting cases. The only criterion for the selection of 
cases for the tracing method is the availability of the empirical information required 
to make causal claims (Blatter and Haverland 2012: 102). Blatter and Haverland (2012) 
also noted that the ‘logic of case selection depends on the specific goals that we want 
to pursue’ (p. 99). Nevertheless, it is possible to draw out generalisations from the two 
cases (see Chapter 7). I argue that to attain the goal of understanding deviant 
autocracies, Singapore and Hong Kong offer suitable cases for deviant case analysis 
with process tracing, for the following reasons. 
Among the outliers identified in Chapter 3, Hong Kong and Singapore possess 
similar demographic and socio-economic characteristics and share a colonial history. 
In addition, internal and external elites are structured similarly in the two societies. 
During their transitional decolonisation periods, both regions were influenced by the 
same external actors, namely Britain and Communist China. Historically, both Hong 
Kong and Singapore were colonies of Britain. Singapore was colonised in 1826 as part 
of the Straits Settlements, while Hong Kong was ceded to Britain in 1842 after the 
Anglo-Chinese War. Therefore, both regions had experienced more than 150 years of 
British colonial rule at the point of their decolonisation; due to this colonial legacy, 
their cultures were roughly the same. Even more importantly, their shared British 
colonial history ensures that in both cases important historical records are available 
in government archives. Demographically, Singapore and Hong Kong have similar 
population structures; for example, the population of Hong Kong was about 7.3 million 
in 2016 (Census and Statistics Department 2016) and that of Singapore was 5.5 million 
in 2015 (Department of Statistics Singapore 2016). Both cases are small states or 
territories: Singapore occupies only 719.1 square kilometres of land (Department of 
Statistics Singapore 2016), while Hong Kong covers 1,104 square kilometres 
(Information Services Department 2011: 285). Notably, Veenendaal and Corbett (2015) 
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argued for the importance of studying small states to address large questions in 
comparative politics. In addition, Chinese constitute the majority of the population in 
both cases: 93.1% and 74.2% in Hong Kong and Singapore respectively (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2014). Finally, Hong Kong and Singapore have exhibited similar 
economic-development trajectories with rapid economic growth since the 1960s.4 
Given these significant similarities, the lack of comparative work on the two cases is 
surprising. Only a few researchers have paired Hong Kong and Singapore as case 
studies to investigate democracy, political economy or political context (see Barro 
1996; Bell 2006; Cheung 2008; Grenville 1994; Jones 1997; Lim 1999; Lee and Haque 
2006; Lee and Yu 2012; Ortmann 2010a, 2010b, 2014a; Thomas 2014; Wang 1994). 
For the above reasons, Hong Kong and Singapore are ideal cases for small-N analysis 
in the current research. 
Archival research provides essential empirical data for the analysis and process 
tracing of deviant autocratic development. Archival materials have been successfully 
used in previous paired case studies (see Tilly 1984; Wood 2002). To implement 
process tracing, Blatter and Haverland (2012) suggested that ‘comprehensive 
storylines’ are crucial. ‘[T]he overall process is sectioned into different sequences that 
are separated by decisive situations and phases of transformation… [this] allows for 
identifying “turning points” and “phases of transformation” for these conditions and 
outcomes’ (pp. 111-112). Archival materials offer a vivid illustration of chronological 
historical development, and enable us to determine why an outcome occurred at a 
particular time and in a particular place (see George and Bennett 2005: 6; Hall 2008: 
306; Vennesson 2008: 228-232). Yom (2015: 628) also recommended using 
comparative historical analysis in the form of process tracing to analyse the actors and 
variables responsible for outcomes. Therefore, the small-N analysis in Chapters 5 and 
6 is conducted with reference to three periods. Whilst the transitional period provides 
the main ‘storyline’, pre-transitional and post-transitional periods are also analysed to 
observe the influence of the interaction of international actors and local elites on the 
pace and direction of democratic development in Singapore and Hong Kong. In 
                                                          
4 It also triggered academic debates on approaches to development (see Berger and Beeson 1998; Hout 
1993, 2009, 2016; Hout and Meijerink 1996; Hutchison, Hout, Hughes and Robison 2014; Krugman 1994; 
Rodan et al. 2001; Stiglitz 1996; Wade 1990, 1993; World Bank 1993). 
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Chapter 4, the methods of data collection and archival research for the small-N 
analysis are described and justified in greater detail. 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
In Chapter 2, I review the development of literature in the field of democratisation to 
highlight the understudied area of deviant autocracy. Systematic research on 
democratisation began in the 1950s, with a particular focus on the role of structural 
factors, especially the level of economic development, in explaining democratic 
consolidation in Western Europe and North America. Numerous researchers have 
attempted to explain the increase in the number of countries transitioning to 
democracy in South America, Southern and Eastern Europe since the 1970s. There are 
two widely recognised approaches to explaining democratic transition: the structural 
on the one hand, and the process-driven approach on the other hand. Proponents of 
the structural approach have tended to perform large-N analysis, essentially based on 
the argument made in the 1950s that economic development is significantly positively 
related to democratic development. In contrast, the process-driven approach usually 
involves small-N analysis of successful cases of democratic transition to elucidate the 
role of the interaction of internal actors in shaping political regimes. The controversies 
and debates related to these approaches are further discussed in this chapter.  
The changing focus of recent studies of democratisation and autocracy has 
highlighted the need to study deviant autocracies. Increasing concerns have been 
raised about countries that fail to establish democracy after transitioning from an 
authoritarian regime and remain ‘stuck’ between democracy and authoritarianism. 
These are also known as hybrid regimes. A significant number of researchers have 
developed typologies to conceptualise hybrid regimes and studied the problems 
associated with this type of regime. A new focus of democratisation research is on 
deviant democracies. Most studies in this area have investigated cases of successful 
democratisation against the odds; i.e. in the absence of favourable structural 
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conditions. Another important set of studies has been produced on the persistence of 
autocracy; that is, how authoritarian leaders manage to stay in power through various 
institutional arrangements and strategies for repressing and co-opting elites. However, 
my literature review reveals that countries with favourable structural conditions for 
democratisation that nevertheless retain non-democratic or autocratic regimes are 
still understudied. The objective of my thesis is to fill this gap in the literature by 
solving the puzzle of deviant autocracy. 
To empirically identify cases of deviant autocracies, I conduct large-N analysis 
in Chapter 3 to replicate the major tenets of the structural explanation and identify 
outliers, namely deviant autocracies. This chapter begins with a rigorous discussion of 
the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘autocracy’. 
A minimalist approach is used to characterise democratic and autocratic regimes. Next, 
I provide a brief overview of the major structural factors identified in previous 
literature, such as economic development, social homogeneity, oil exportation, 
religious beliefs, economic aid, diffusion via democratic neighbours and colonial 
influence. The data, which cover 167 countries from 1960 to 2011, suggest that 
economic development is still the most important predictor of democratic transition, 
with a significantly positive effect on democratisation. Even more importantly, the 
data show that the number of deviant autocracies has increased since the 1970s. 
Among the outliers are Bahrain, Brunei, Equatorial Guinea, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Macau, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. 
In Chapter 4, I construct a middle-range analytical framework, neo actor-based 
analysis, to investigate the interaction of state capacity with international and 
domestic actors in deviant autocracies in Asia. To overcome the limitations of a 
process-driven explanation, as discussed in Chapter 2, the proposed framework not 
only accommodates the history of elite domination in Asia but draws on the actor-
based approach used in previous democratisation studies. Insights from elite theory, 
models of elite bargaining and elite-structure paradigms are used to characterise the 
political systems that emerged in the post-transitional society. The transitional period 
in each case is defined as the period of decolonisation and change of sovereignty. The 
geopolitical situation, together with the influence of Communism, diaspora linkage 
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and/or future sovereign powers, led to conflict between important external actors 
during the troubled transitional period. Tracing the process by which post-transition 
ruling elites have gained political power in deviant autocracies sheds light on how 
political regimes become autocratic in the first place. This analytical framework also 
aids examination of the negotiation between agencies, including international and 
domestic actors, and how this negotiation directs coercive state capacity towards 
autocracy. To provide some background information on the deviant case studies 
analysed with process tracing in Chapters 5 and 6, I briefly describe elite bargaining 
activities and state capacity in Hong Kong and Singapore in Chapter 4. I also describe 
and justify the process of data collection for the small-N analysis.  
Chapter 5 presents a small-N case study of Singapore. Neo actor-based analysis 
is used to trace the emergence of Singapore’s autocratic regime during the transitional 
period. Three important factors are identified: 1) domestic elites, such as business and 
professional elites and opposition parties; 2) state capacity, i.e. how ruling elites have 
empowered themselves and monopolised coercive state capacity; and 3) the 
international bargaining situation, which involved actors such as Communist China, 
ruling elites and Communist insurgency groups in Malaysia. The above three factors 
are analysed in chronological order: first, in the pre-transitional period, before 
Singapore’s decolonisation in the 1950s; second, during transition in the 1950s and 
1960s; and third, in the post-independence period after 1965. This chapter is based 
on data drawn from approximately 8,000 pages of declassified archival documents 
from the United Kingdom, Singapore and the Federation of Malaya. I show that the 
interaction of the above three factors, especially during the transitional period in the 
1950s and 1960s, paved the way for the People’s Action Party (PAP) and its leader to 
gain political power in Singapore. The findings help us to understand and explain the 
emergence of deviant democracy in Singapore. 
In Chapter 6, the same method of neo actor-based analysis is used with the 
second empirical case study to analyse the effects of the three factors mentioned 
above – domestic elites, state capacity and the international bargaining situation – on 
Hong Kong’s post-transitional political system. Hong Kong’s pre-transitional period is 
defined as the period before the late 1970s, i.e. prior to the negotiation between 
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British and Chinese ruling elites on the future of Hong Kong. The transitional period 
ran from 1979 to 1984, during which time the British and Chinese governments 
officially discussed arrangements for the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong. The 
post-transitional period began with the official announcement of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration on December 1984, China and Britain’s agreement on the socio-economic 
and political arrangements of Hong Kong post-handover. This chapter is also based on 
recently declassified archival data, drawn from approximately 10,000 pages of 
documentation to trace the elite decision making process during the transitional 
period, i.e. their negotiation on the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from 
Britain to China. The data suggest that during the negotiation and transition, self-
interested local business elites in Hong Kong were empowered by external actors 
seeking to safeguard their own interests in the post-transitional society. As a result, 
local elites gained political control of Hong Kong and are now capable of manipulating 
coercive state capacity to deter any efforts made by the opposition to implement a 
fully democratic government in Hong Kong. 
In the last chapter, I summarise the major findings of the large-N and small-N 
analyses and discuss the contributions made by this study to literature on 
democratisation, along with future research agendas relating to deviant autocracies 
and theories of democratisation. The results of the two deviant case studies with 
process tracing suggest that to understand the emergence of deviant autocracies in 
Asia, it is crucial to consider elite interests and elite fragmentation. The origin and 
emergence of autocratic regimes in Singapore and Hong Kong provide several 
important lessons. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, this thesis makes 
theoretical contribution by opening up a new research agenda for scholars who are 
concerned about democratic transition and non-transition among the deviant 
autocracies. At the analytical level, as this thesis aims to offer an explanation of non-
transition among the deviant autocracies while using a middle-range theory which 
focuses on elite interaction, state capacity and international bargaining process during 
the transitional period. This thesis also contributes to our empirical knowledge of the 
cases of Hong Kong and Singapore, and why these countries have not made a 
transition to democracy despite all the right circumstances at that time with the fertile 
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soil of structural factors and instead are such stable deviant autocracies. However, the 
small-N analysis covers only two deviant autocracies. Future researchers working in 
the field of democratisation should further investigate this promising but under-
researched topic. 
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Chapter 2: Debating 
Democratisation: Previous Research 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature in the field of democratisation 
to highlight the importance of an understudied area: deviant autocracies. In studies 
of democratisation, many scholars have focused on the transition to or consolidation 
of democracy, or the transition to a hybrid regime. The literature implicitly and 
explicitly suggests that structural factors play an important role in democratic 
consolidation and transition to democracy (Barro 1996: 2; Boix 2011; Boix and Stokes 
2003, Colaresi and Thompson 2003: 383; Coulter 1975; Croissant 2004; Crouch and 
Morley 1999; Cutright and Wiley 1969; Cutright 1963; Epstein et al. 2006; Lipset 1959, 
1960, 1994; Lipset, Seong and Torres 1993; Narayan, Narayan and Smyth 2010; Ravich 
2000; Rost and Booth 2008: 635; Rowen 1995; Smith 1969; Teorell 2010). In recent 
years, the focus has moved toward the issues of deviant democracies, i.e. cases that 
fulfil few structural criteria for democracy but which nonetheless make a transition to 
democracy and/or have consolidated their democratic systems (see Doorenspleet 
2012; Doorenspleet and Kopecký 2008; Doorenspleet, Kopecký and Mudde 2008; 
Seeberg 2010b, 2012, 2014a, 2014b). Deviant autocracies, i.e. cases which have 
favourable structural factors but are still authoritarian, correspondingly deserve more 
attention. Yet there are still controversies about how to conceptualise and measure 
deviant autocracies. I highlight these issues at the end of this chapter and analyse 
them further in the next chapter. 
This chapter is in two parts. Section 2.1 provides an overview of key 
developments in the field of democratisation since the 1950s. To begin with, it is 
essential to review how the concept of democracy have been theorised. The way 
students of democratisation conceptualise democracy affects how democracy is 
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applied in social sciences’ empirical studies. This part reviews early empirical studies 
on democratisation in the 1950s, which mainly concerned the consolidation of 
democracy in Western Europe and Northern America, and the literature from the 
1970s to 1990s on the transition to democracy, which mainly addressed political 
developments and democratisation in Latin America and Eastern and Southern Europe. 
Finally, this section examines important recent literature in the field that focuses on 
hybrid regimes and countries with failed transitions.  
Section 2.2 reviews major developments in studies of deviant democracies. In 
addition to recent developments in the literature on the durability of autocratic 
regimes, it is important to review the body of literature on deviant democracies, as it 
can shed light on the persistence of deviant autocracies. In this section, I therefore 
highlight the importance of studying deviant autocracies and critically examining 
existing studies that focus on those anomalous cases.  
 
2.1 Studies of Democratisation: Developments in the Field 
since the 1950s 
 
When modern political theorists and scholars of democratisation define and 
operationalise democracy they are still strongly influenced by notions of ancient Greek 
democracy. Athenian democracy in particular was a primitive form of government 
emphasising participation in government and policy making by all citizens. Before we 
discuss studies of democratisation since the 1950s, it is beneficial to survey ancient 
forms of democracy and how different political theorists conceptualised democracy 
during the Enlightenment. This can help us understand democracy and 
democratisation in the twentieth century. 
It is generally agreed that democracy as a form of government derives from 
ancient Athenian democracy. The Greek word for ‘democracy’ connotes rule by the 
people (Arblaster 1987: 15; Beetham and Boyle 1995: 5; Bernal 1987; Birch 1993: 45; 
Dahl 1989: 14; Finley 1983; Held 2006: 102; Ober 1989: 3; Stockton 1990: 1). Greek 
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philosophers in the fourth and fifth centuries BC such as Thucydides, Plato and 
Aristotle significantly contributed to the concept of democracy (see Jones 1957). 
Nevertheless, ancient Athenian democracy can hardly be categorised as democracy in 
the modern sense. Only male Athenian residents with citizenship rights could 
participate in political life, such as voting or holding public office; women, slaves and 
foreigners were excluded from political life. The practice of democracy was also 
different. In ancient Athens, democracy was based on direct democracy, whereas 
modern democracy relies on representative democracy (see Dahl 1989: 20-23; Møller 
and Skanning 2013b: 17; Ober 1989: 4-8; Osborne 2010: 25-33; Stockton 1990: 17-18; 
Tilly 2007: 25). 
The concept of democracy was further developed in the Enlightenment. 
Beginning in the 17th century, political philosophers attempted to further develop a 
normative political theory to conceptualise democracy. John Locke in his Second 
Treatise of Government emphasises the importance of individual rights, and claims 
that the relationship between the government and individuals is based on trust. If the 
government breaks their trust, citizens have the right to reassert their individual rights. 
Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan stated that individuals exchange their liberty for 
protection by the state, giving up their power to a ruler (see Harrison 1993: 44-52). 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau in The Social Contract emphasises two important concepts, 
liberty and equality (see Arblaster 1987: 32-34; Harrison 1993: 52; Williams 2014: 29), 
and claims that citizens must be ‘forced to be free’ (Williams 2014: 28). These three 
social contract theorists conceptualised the relationship between the government and 
the ruled, the sources of the government’s power and authority, and individual 
citizens’ rights, laying the foundations of modern democracy. 
Indeed, modern republican democracy, representative government and the 
logic of political equality have been strongly influenced by these philosophers (see 
Dahl 1989: 28-33; Birch 1993: 49-68). For example, in America, the 1776 Declaration 
of Independence and the Constitution embody ideas of representative democracy, 
checks and balances, limited government and separation of power that show the 
influence of Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison (see Arblaster 1987: 
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37-41; Birch 1993: 49-56; Dahl 1989: 24-28). Those ideas shaped how modern 
parliamentary and presidential systems work within a democratic society.  
Since then, theories of democracy have changed from normative and analytical 
to being empirically driven. Scholars started to search for patterns and observable 
phenomena, and to construct causal hypotheses that can be tested empirically. Lively 
(2007 [1975]) described the development of theories of democracy in a very clear and 
convincing way:  
All political theories, they say, are cast in one or more of three moulds 
– normative, analytic or empirical. Normative theory attempts to justify 
particular values and to suggest the institutions, policies or social 
behaviour which would instate or enhance those values. Analytic 
theories are concerned with conceptual analysis. Empirical theories are 
descriptive and explanatory, built up from observations of the real 
world (p. 54). 
Studying the process of democratisation involves operationalisation of democracy as 
a measurable variable suitable for intra- or interregional comparisons. But there is 
always divergence in how normative, analytical and empirical theorists conceptualise 
democracy (see Allison 1994: 9). Modern political philosophers conceive of democracy 
in a specific way and tend to argue that democracy involves the majority principle and 
the rule of the people, which includes citizenship, majority decision-making, political 
equality, popular rule and responsible government (Lively 2007 [1975]: 19-45). 
Nevertheless, there are controversies over how to define democracy in a modern 
sense. There are two major approaches. The first, the so-called ‘minimalist approach’, 
focuses on free and fair elections to select representatives to run the government (see 
Boix, Miller and Rosato 2012; Posner 2003; Przeworski 1999; Riker 1982; and i.e. 
Schumpeter 1950: 269). The second, known as the substantive approach, extends the 
list of criteria beyond the minimalist approach to include absolute social equality, the 
rule of law, civil liberties and various socio-economic rights (see Baldwin 1990; Ploug 
and Kvist 1994; Sen 2001: 10; Sen and Drèze 1989; Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevičius 
2015: 1500; Spicker 2008). The substantive approach attempts to operationalise the 
meaning of democracy closer to the normative definition, but it is difficult to use for 
testing empirical hypotheses. Hence, most scholars of democratisation adopt the 
minimalist approach (Boix, Miller and Rosato 2012; Doorenspleet 2004: 321). There is 
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a detailed discussion of the conceptualisation and operationalisation of democracy in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Key Developments in the Field of Democratisation since the 1950s: The 
Consolidation of Democracy in Western Countries 
  
The initial phase of empirical studies of democratisation in the 1950s mainly focused 
on the consolidation of democracy in Western countries. Based on modernisation 
theory, Lipset (1959) identified economic development as a prerequisite for sustaining 
democracy. He suggested that ‘economic development… is a basic condition 
sustaining democracy’ (p. 86). Lipset (1960) further argued that economic 
development should not be measured solely by per capita income, because ‘all the 
various aspects of economic development – industrialisation, urbanisation, wealth, 
and education – are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the 
political correlate of democracy’ (p. 41). A significant number of studies have 
replicated Lipset’s ideas and support his findings (see Coulter 1975; Cutright and Wiley 
1969; Cutright 1963; Smith 1969).  
Yet we must note that Lipset (1959) used the term ‘sustaining democracy’, i.e. 
consolidation of democracy, rather than transition to democracy. Hence, scholars 
have argued that many research projects confuse transitions to democracy with 
consolidation of democracy (see Diamond et al. 2014; Doorenspleet 2012: 192). In 
response, the existing literature includes rigorous debates on how to understand 
democratic consolidation (see Barany 1997; Diamond 1994: 16; Diamond et al. 2014: 
93; Linde and Ekman 2003: 396; Przeworski et al. 1996; Rhoden 2015: 561; Schmitter 
2010: 24; Svolik 2008: 153; Tusalem 2015: 31). To understand the meaning of 
democratic consolidation more precisely, Merkel (1998: 39-40) has suggested that 
democratic consolidation must be conceptualised at four different levels: 
constitutional consolidation, representative consolidation, behavioural consolidation 
and consolidation of civic culture and civil society.  
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Studies of democracy were significantly affected by the Cold War and the 
perceived threat of the Soviet Union. To begin with, there was extensive debate 
whether democracy is compatible with capitalism and socialism (see Berger 1992; 
Diamond and Plattner 1993; Fukuyama 1992; Schumpeter 1950). In addition, the 
international promotion of democracy and the popularity of modernisation theory 
were both closely related to American foreign policy, which aimed to counteract the 
influence of the Soviet Union. According to Carothers (1999), over the last century, 
the United States government has been actively involved in helping countries all over 
the world to set up electoral systems and promote democracy, including Japan, 
Germany, Cuba, the Philippines, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panama, Nicaragua, 
Haiti and countries in the Caribbean and Central America. Especially since the 1960s, 
foreign aid and democracy promotion have mainly been driven by the security 
rationale of fighting ‘against the spread of Soviet influence… The United States was 
competing with the Soviet Union for influence over and the loyalty of third world 
governments’ (pp. 19-20). During the Kennedy Administration, policy was largely 
based on modernisation theory, that ‘promoting economic development in the third 
world would simultaneously do good (reduce poverty) and serve the goal of fighting 
communism: helping countries grow economically would prevent empty stomachs 
from making revolutions and would foster democratic, therefore pro-Western, 
systems’ (Carothers 1999: 20-21). Yet in the 1960s and 1970s, American policy was 
distracted by anti-communism campaigns which hindered the promotion of 
democracy; CIA support of the Guatemalan military’s counterinsurgency is a case in 
point. Such a policy change may have affected the survival of infant democracies (see 
Carothers 1999: 27). 
In response to the problem of failed transitions to democracy among 
developing countries, Huntington (1968) urged that economic progress in 
underdeveloped countries leads to unstable political systems and is conducive to the 
rise of authoritarianism. Beginning in the 1970s, a tremendous number of countries in 
different regions, such as Latin America and Southern Europe, transitioned to 
democracy. These successful cases attracted the attention of regional specialists and 
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scholars of comparative politics and democratisation, who attempted to elucidate the 
factors behind successful and failed transitions. 
 
Key Developments in the Field of Democratisation since the 1970s: 
Transitions to Democracy 
 
Before we can understand theories of transition to democracy, we need to understand 
the meaning of transition. In addition to the democracies in North America and 
Western Europe already existing in the 1950s, a significant number of countries 
transitioned to democracy from the 1970s onward. The term transition has been used 
to describe these political changes or regime transitions (see Diamond, Fukuyama, 
Horowitz and Plattner 2014: 86; Haggard and Kaufman 1997: 264). Diamond et al. 
(2014: 86-87) argue that it is a relatively new phenomenon to associate the word 
‘transition’ with regime change. Dankwart Rustow (1970) pioneered the 
conceptualisation of transition to democracy in his seminal paper, Transitions to 
Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, suggesting that ‘factors that keep a democracy 
stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence’ (p. 346). In other words, the 
literature on democracy in the 1950s solely focused on democratic consolidation, 
offering little help in explaining transition in developing countries. 
Since then, a significant number of studies have used different research 
methods to focus on different periods of time or regions to explain transition to 
democracy. They fall into two major theoretical camps: structural explanations and 
process-driven approaches (see Doorenspleet 2004: 310; Kitschelt 1992; Posusney 
2004: 128; Zhang 1994: 110). 
The structural approach mainly developed out of Lipset’s (1959) theories. High 
levels of economic development can facilitate social developments such as the growth 
of the middle class and a higher literacy rate, which is considered favourable for a 
country’s transition to democracy (Lipset, Seong and Torres 1993: 166; Lipset 1994: 
17). This idea has been tested in numerous large-N quantitative studies with various 
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structural and contextual variables to explain transition to democracy. Covering 
different periods of time and regions, these studies have replicated Lipset’s analyses 
and the findings appear to be very robust (see Barro 1996: 2; Boix 2011; Colaresi and 
Thompson 2003: 383; Croissant 2004; Crouch and Morley 1999; Epstein et al. 2006; 
Huber et al. 1993; Lipset 1959; Lipset 1994; Lipset et al. 1993; Narayan et al. 2010; 
Ravich 2000; Rost and Booth 2008: 635; Rowen 1995; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; 
Teorell 2010). 
Nevertheless, the proposition that economic development facilitates the 
transition to democracy has led to a lively debate.5 Critics suggest that there is no 
                                                          
5 There is another important classical approach, the dependency approach, studying the issues related 
to democratisation. According to Hout (2016) ‘modernisation and dependency approaches have had 
important influences on more recent theorising’ (p. 21). However, this approach is not incorporated in 
the following discussion and analysis due to the following three reasons: 1) dependency and world-
system theories, derived from Marxist approach are mainly against the notions of classic modernisation 
theory and functionalism in the 1950s. The criticisms are largely not applied to the literature on 
democratisation from the 1970s onward. The dependency and world-system approaches have 
addressed the issue of domination of the Western modernised countries over the underdeveloped 
countries, such as in the context of Latin America (see Cardoso 1973; Chase-Dunn 1975; Frank 1969, 
1971; Hout 2016; Wallerstein 1974, 2000). I agree that ‘[t]hese theories began in different historical 
contexts, were influenced by different theoretical traditions, offered different explanations and… used 
different methodologies’ (Doorenspleet 2005: 53). Yet, the proponents of modernisation theory after 
the 1970s have already taken the criticisms seriously and significantly refined the argument, 
methodology and measurements and method of analysis (see Doorenspleet 2005: 59-63); 2) the second 
concern is about the relevancy of Marxist approaches on democracy. The approaches were originally 
based on normative argument to highlight to issue of unequal economic relationship between the core 
and peripheries. Bollen (1983) was the pioneer studied the effect of peripheral and semi-peripheral 
countries on levels of democracy with quantitative analysis. He finds that “both peripheral and 
semiperipheral countries are less democratic than core nations” (p. 477). But his study is suffered from 
several limitations. First, his study was not test the relationship between dependency level and 
economic development; Second, the result only discussed the differences between the democratic 
countries (see Bollen 1983: 477-478; Doorenspleet 2005: 73, 85). Also his study artificially changed the 
value of six outliers, including Spain, Portugal, South Africa, Taiwan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which may 
affect the overall regression results; 3) the recent economic development among the countries in Asia 
indicated that the relationship between the so-called core and peripheries is different from the 
assumption of the Marxist approaches. The dependency and world-system theories asserted that 
economic backwardness in the undeveloped countries was due to exploitation of the developed 
countries, changing the position within the world-system is rather difficult. Nevertheless, the 
peripheries in Asia managed to catch up to became NICs and made a transition to democracy, such as 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In addition to the discourses of the East Asian Miracles, the influence 
of dependency and world-system theories is diminishing (see Bustelo 2000; Rodan et al. 2001; Stiglitz 
1996; Wade 1990, 1993, 1998; World Bank 1993). In view of the above situation, the limitations of the 
theory have been highlighted by various scholars (see Harold 2005; Rodan et al. 2001; Smith 1981; 
McLaughlin and Hickling-Hudson 2005). More importantly, Wallerstein (2004) also acknowledged the 
limitations of the world-system analysis. In recent development, these approaches are mainly focused 
on issues related to economics and commodity chains (see Hout 2016: 33-36). Hence, due to the above 
reasons, the study on deviant autocracies will not be adopting the theoretical assumption of the Marxist 
approaches. 
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relationship between economic growth and democratisation (see Przeworski and 
Limongi 1993; Przeworski et al. 2000; Marsh 1988; Sirowy and Inkeles 1990) and that 
the linear relationship between the variables is questionable (Arat 1988). In response 
to these criticisms, Boix and Stokes (2003: 522) argue that Przeworski and Limongi 
(1997) only focus on a few cases, and that the case selection and analyses are biased. 
Based on detailed analysis of different time periods (1850-1924, inter-war period and 
1945-1990), they find that economic development, especially among high income 
countries, is still a significant factor in explaining ‘transition to democracy’ and ‘stable 
democracy’. Joining in the discussion, Epstein et al. (2006) use more rigorous statistical 
analysis to challenge the methodology and findings of Przeworski et al. (2000). Epstein 
et al. (2006) argue that Przeworski et al. ‘mistakenly interpret their own estimates in 
a manner that predisposes them to reject the modernization hypothesis’ (p. 551). 
Kennedy (2010: 790-797) has also conducted an analysis of 178 countries from 1816 
to 2004 to show that the results of Przeworski et al. (2000) are ‘misleading’. He 
concludes that ‘the impact of economic development on democratization is significant, 
but it is conditional’. 
The structural approach focuses mainly on economic development, but also 
acknowledges other factors that may affect the likelihood of transition to democracy. 
The approach has led to debates over which alternative factors have a positive or 
negative relationship with democratisation, such as whether countries rely on 
extraction of oil or mineral resources to sustain their economy (Amundsen 2014: 185; 
Barari 2015: 202; Bearce and Hutnick 2011: 706; Butcher 2014: 736; Crystal 1989: 430; 
Gurses 2009: 523; Liou and Musgrave 2014: 1604; Ross 2001; Rost and Booth 2008: 
649; Ulflder 2007: 1012), British colonial rule (Barro 1999; Bernhard et al. 2004; Bollen 
and Jackman 1985: 41; Croissant 2004: 168-169; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; 
Huntington 1991: 19; Jensen and Skaaning 2012: 1129; Lankina and Getachew 2012; 
Przeworski et al. 2000; Rost and Booth 2008: 649; Sing 1996), social inequality 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2001 and 2006; Boix 2003, 2008; Haggard and 
Kaufman 2012: 495; Kuznets 1955; Przeworski 2009; Tudor 2013: 253-254), ethno-
linguistic fractionalisation (Croissant 2004: 166-168; Dahl 1973; Jensen and Shaaning 
2012; Rost and Booth 2008: 649), influence of the military (Haggard and Kaufman 2012: 
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496; Lee 2009: 662) and international factors, including diffusion via democratic 
neighbours (Colaresi and Thompson 2003: 383; Doorenspleet 2004: 328; Hawkins 
2001: 447; Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996; Lipset 1994). These factors have 
been widely discussed, debated and tested by various scholars. Chapter 3 contains a 
detailed discussion of each of these factors, to determine their relevance to 
understanding deviant autocracies in Asia.  
The other approach to understanding transition to democracy is the process-
driven or actor-based approach. This approach is based on the four-volume work by 
O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (O’Donnell et al. 1986a, 1986b, 1986c; O’Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986), which studies transitions from authoritarian regimes to 
democracies in 13 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela in Latin America and Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey in 
Southern Europe. According to Diamond et al. (2014), this is ‘the single most 
influential study of transitions’ (p. 87).  
This approach differs from the structural explanation in two ways. First, the 
research methodology of the actor-based approach mainly uses qualitative small-N 
analysis to explain the process of transition ‘from an autocratic to a democratic regime’ 
(Schmitter and Karl 1994: 173). Second, the actor-based approach emphasises 
interaction between elites and different major actors during the process of transition. 
Successful transition to democracy relies on interaction and bargaining between 
different actors, including incumbents (both hard-liners and soft-liners), military 
leaders and opposition leaders; the international context is also important in the 
process of transition (Schmitter 2010: 27). Schmitter (2010) refuses ‘the notion that 
democracy requires some fixed set of economic or cultural prerequisites’ and 
emphasises ‘the key role of elite interaction and strategic choice during the transition’ 
while giving ‘limited importance to mass mobilization from below’ (p. 23). 
This approach manly focuses on successful cases of transition to democracy 
and how to sustain newly emerged democratic regimes (see Schneider and Schmitter 
2004). The mode of transition, i.e. the outcome of interactions between actors, has a 
major influence on the demise of authoritarian regimes and establishment of 
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democratic institutions (see Karl 1990; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Munck and Leff 1997: 
344; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Different modes of transition may severely affect 
the resultant political system. For example, ‘‘transition by pact’ is the most likely to 
lead to political democracy’ (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 282). As Schmitter (2010) 
explains, ‘Pacts negotiated between old-regime elites and opposition groups do seem 
to have made a difference in the short to medium run, but their longer-term effect is 
more dubious’ (p. 23). 
The existing actor-based approach is limited in several ways. First, it neglects 
some important internal and external actors, including business and professional 
elites, and interactional actors that play a critical role in transition or non-transition to 
democracy. Second, there are limitations in the case selection and coverage. The 
actor-based approach is mainly based on successful cases, neglecting failed transitions 
to democracy (see Hawkins 2001: 441). Chapter 4 offers a comprehensive discussion 
of the existing actor-based approach, and develops a new analytical approach that 
extends the actor-based approach using elite theory and elite structural interaction to 
examine the intersection of internal and external elites. This approach to analysing 
the transitional period of deviant autocracies enables us to understand why outliers 
failed to transition to democracy and how autocratic ruling elites maintained their 
power in the first place. 
 
Recent Developments in Democratisation Studies: Focus on Hybrid 
Regimes 
 
Transitions from authoritarian regimes do not necessarily lead to democratic regimes; 
they can also result in hybrid regimes. Carothers (2002: 9-10) warns that many 
countries fail to establish democracy after transitioning from authoritarianism. We 
must pay more attention to the emerging pattern of countries that fall into the ‘grey 
zone’, stuck between democracy and authoritarianism. This type of hybrid regime is 
different from the traditional understanding of authoritarian regimes.  
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Indeed, the outcome of political transition is not necessarily a democratic 
regime, as Hadenius and Teorell (2007) illustrate by analysing the impact of countries’ 
former regime type from 1972 to 2003. They demonstrate that the ‘breakdown of an 
authoritarian regime does not necessarily signal the onset of democratic 
transformation’ (p. 152). To address the issue of hybrid, ‘grey zone’ regimes, an 
increasing number of scholars have developed alternative categories, such as illiberal 
democracy (Zakaria 1997), electoral autocracy (Kailitz 2013), electoral 
authoritarianism (Schedler 2002), semi-authoritarianism (Ottaway 2003), soft 
authoritarianism (Means 1996) and competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 
2002a, 2002b, 2010). 
Hybrid regime differs from classical totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in 
several ways. According to Gerschewski (2013), the existing research on autocracy can 
be divided into three different periods: the ‘totalitarianism paradigm’ from the 1930s 
to 1960s, ‘authoritarianism’ in the 1960s to 1980s, and studies since the 1990s that 
form a ‘renaissance in studies of autocracies’ (pp. 14-18). The study of 
authoritarianism has focused on more complex cases since the 1960s, such as Linz 
(1964, 1975), who used Spain as his main case study, and O’Donnell (1979), who 
focused on ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ in Latin America to demonstrate the 
domination of military leaders in Argentina and Brazil. To justify the monopolisation 
of political power, authoritarian military rulers often promote economic prosperity 
and stability to attain support from the general public. Unlike totalitarian regimes, 
authoritarian regimes are less dependent on ideological indoctrination and rule by 
terror. Authoritarian regimes can enjoy both political domination and legitimacy. 
Legitimacy can be attained by strong government performance in terms of economic 
prosperity, harmony and social stability. This ruling strategy provides a valuable lesson 
for the new usurpers in how to establish a durable non-democratic regime. 
To conceptualise hybrid regimes, Levitsky and Way (2002a) state that ‘[i]n 
competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are widely viewed 
as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents 
violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to 
meet conventional minimum standards for democracy’ (p. 52). Rulers in hybrid 
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regimes rely on various measures to maintain the leadership. Most autocratic rulers 
or ruling parties rely on highly unbalanced elections to alleviate potential challenges 
from the opposition. This façade of competitive elections provides some kind of 
legitimation to the regime. A legislature with limited effective power serves as a 
rubber stamp for autocratic rulers. Some rulers even make use of the judiciary and 
restrictions on the media to maintain their power (see Gel’man 2014; Gilbert and 
Mohseni 2011; Levitsky and Way 2002a, 2010; McFaul and Petrov 2004; Menocal and 
Rakner 2008; Schedler 2002; Sznajder 1996; White 2013). 
The literature on hybrid regimes has two major focuses. First, recent 
developments in the literature focus on conceptualizing ‘autocracy’ and the different 
types of authoritarian regime. Different types of political regime are classified (see 
Bogaards 2009; Cassani 2014; Cheibub et al. 2010; Geddes 1999; Gilbert and Mohseni 
2011; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Morlino 2009; Wahman et al. 2013; Wigell 2008). 
Based on existing categorisations, Kailitz (2013: 45) further proposes six types of 
autocracy: electoral autocracy, communist ideocracy, one-party autocracy, monarchy, 
military regime and personalist autocracy. This classification is helpful for scholars in 
differentiating between liberal democracy and pseudo democracy.  
The second focus is on the problems or effects associated with hybrid regimes. 
Small-N or large-N analyses of hybrid regimes have been conducted (see Brownlee 
2009; Ekman 2009; Kenyon and Naoi 2010; McMann 2006; Menocal and Rakner 2008; 
Wullery and Williamson 2016). For example, quantitative data from 1975 to 2004 
suggest that electoral democracy will develop after the collapse of hybrid regimes 
(Brownlee 2009). In addition, the problems associated with hybrid regimes have been 
investigated, such as the negative impact on the population’s health and regulatory 
and policy uncertainty (see Kenyon and Naoi 2010; Wullery and Williamson 2016). 
In short, hybrid regimes are often regarded as synonymous with pseudo-
democracy or semi-democracy. An increasing number of scholars have stressed the 
importance of hybrid regimes (see Diamond 2002; Schedler 2002, 2006; Levitsky and 
Way 2002a, 2010; McFaul 2002). In Asia, there are increasing numbers of hybrid 
regimes, in which elections are gerrymandered to favour the ruling party, discourage 
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challenges from the opposition and achieve landslide victories in elections. There have 
been extensive debates over hybrid regimes in Asia, seeking to explain their 
emergence and durability (see Case 1996, 2002, 2009b; Doner, Ritchie and Slater 2005; 
Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007; Means 1996; Nur-tegin and Czap 2012; Slater 2003, 2006; 
Thompson 2012). 
 
2.2 A New Focus: Deviant Democracies and Persistent 
Autocracies 
 
Deviant Democracies 
 
What if countries experience democratisation but lack the favourable structural 
conditions?  A specialized body of literature addresses this issue, and improves our 
theoretical and empirical understanding of those countries, which have been called 
‘deviant democracies’ or ‘anomalous democracies’ (see Bull and Newell 1993, 2009; 
Doorenspleet 2012; Doorenspleet and Kopecký 2008; Doorenspleet, Kopecký and 
Mudde 2008; Seeberg 2010b, 2012, 2014a, 2014b; Veenendaal and Corbett 2015: 
533-537). According to Seeberg (2014a), ‘Deviant democracies may be broadly 
defined as societies that have maintained electoral democracy despite the absence of 
factors conducive to democracy’ (p. 102). Similarly, Doorenspleet (2012) also defined 
deviant democracies as ‘countries that have seemingly beaten the odds and 
successfully democratized within an unfavourable structural setting’ (p. 190). 
It is worth noting that the existence of deviant democracies is not a new 
phenomenon; it was simply overlooked by democratisation scholars. In the early 
1990s, scholars were already aware of the existence of several Third World countries 
with low levels of economic development which nonetheless became democratic (see 
Fukuyama 1992: 104; Lipset 1994: 16). Nevertheless, these outliers have been largely 
ignored, and studies have not analysed such cases systematically.  
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To address the issue of deviant democracies, a systematic, mixed method 
approach was used by Doorenspleet and Kopecký to examine Costa Rica, India, 
Botswana, Benin and Mongolia in a special issue of Democratization in 2008. 
Doorenspleet and Kopecký (2008) set a new research agenda for democratisation 
studies, and more importantly, they coined the term ‘deviant democracies’ to 
signifying the outliers. They suggested that 
On the basis of such quantitative research, it appears that both 
economic development and democratic diffusion play a role during the 
phases of transition and consolidation… other factors such as class 
structure, economic dependency, and political culture explain 
processes of democratization to some extent as well… a small-N 
qualitative analysis, as will be done in each of the following country 
articles… each case analysis is geared towards detecting important 
variables that can explain the unexpected transition to and 
consolidation of democracy (p. 709). 
In this project, Doorenspleet, Kopecký and Mudde (2008) found seven major factors 
contributing to democratic transitions among deviant democracies: 1) political elites 
(Booth 2008; Fritz 2008; Gisselquist 2008; Good and Taylor 2008; McMillan 2008); 2) 
the emergence of a middle class (Booth 2008); 3) the role of external powers (Booth 
2008; Fritz 2008; Gisselquist 2008); 4) the absence of obstacles to transition, such as 
an ethnically non-homogenous population, lack of national identity, or the existence 
of a secession movement (Fritz 2008); 5) cultural factors, especially religious belief 
(Fritz 2008); 6) an economic crisis weakening the previous regime (Gisselquist 2008); 
7) lack of military influence (Good and Taylor 2008; McMillan 2008). Doorenspleet 
(2012) summarises various domestic and external factors affecting deviant 
democracies. Domestic factors include the dynamics of elites (including political elites), 
the military, civil society and high ethnic fragmentation. External factors include 
former colonisers, regional hegemons and external shocks. 
Yet scholars disagree about which cases are deviant democracies (see Seeberg 
2014b: 635). In a small-N qualitative analysis, Costa Rica, India, Botswana, Benin and 
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Mongolia have been identified as deviant democracies (see Doorenspleet 2012: 194-
198; Doorenspleet and Kopecký 2008). A large-N analysis in contrast has given a list of 
deviant democracies that is slightly different. Seeberg (2010b) used structural 
variables of economic development to identify a list of outliers, using nested analysis 
to explain deviant democracies. In recent years, Seeberg (2014a) has conducted a 
quantitative study to map anomalous democracies in the Cold War period. Eleven 
cases have been identified as deviant democracies: Bolivia, Botswana, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Mauritius, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Turkey from 1975 to 1988. Seeberg (2014b: 635) then used neighbour 
diffusion, economic development and the modernisation thesis together with other 
structural variables (Muslim majority, resource reliance, ethnic fractionalisation and 
being a former British colony) to identify deviant democracies. He further maps 12 
cases of deviant democracies from 1993 to 2008: Central Africa, Republic, Ghana, India, 
Indonesia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Niger, Senegal, Trinidad and Tobago, 
and Turkey.  
The factors and analyses developed to identify deviant democracies provide a 
good foundation for future studies of the other type of outlier, deviant autocracies: 
countries favourable structural settings which failed to make a transition to 
democracy. It is still unclear which countries can be classified as deviant autocracies, 
and hence that is one of the main tasks of the next chapter. The literature on deviant 
democracies provides important insights and methods for identifying deviant 
democracies, which can also help in identifying deviant autocracies (see Seeberg 
2014a: 106-107). To explain deviant autocracies, however, the literature on deviant 
democracies is less useful, and hence I need a different theoretical framework (see 
Chapter 4). 
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The Persistence of Autocracy 
 
To understand deviant autocracies, it is also important to learn from studies on 
autocracy and how authoritarian leaders maintain their power. According to 
Gerschewaki (2013), 
Broadly speaking, three research waves can be identified: the 
totalitarianism paradigm until the mid-1960s that highlighted ideology 
and terror; the rise of authoritarianism until the 1980s that placed more 
emphasis on socio-economic factors; and, starting with Geddes’ 
seminal article in 1999, a renaissance of autocracy research that 
centred mostly on strategic repression and co-optation (p. 14). 
To sum up, it is commonly agreed that factors including legitimation, repression and 
co-optation can help us understand autocracies’ stability (see Anderson, Møller, 
Rørbæk and Skaaning 2014; Gerschewski 2013: 17; Köllner and Kailitz 2013: 1). 
Autocratic leaders rely mainly on institutional arrangements and government 
performance to attain legitimacy. Existing studies of autocratic stability suggest that 
constitutions in authoritarian regimes usually establish some pseudo-democratic 
institutions, such as party politics and an electoral system, to enhance regime 
durability (see Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Magaloni 2008; Schedler 
2002; Wright 2008; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2011). Magaloni (2008) has clarified that 
‘[a] reason why dictators aspire to win supermajorities is that this allows them to 
project an image of invincibility and strength… Citizens are likely to despise the 
autocrat who is not a benevolent dictator that can promote economic growth, invest 
in public goods, and make everyone prosper’ (p. 729). Indeed, autocratic regimes also 
make substantial expenditures on education and the public good to pacify citizens (see 
Gandhi 2002). Economic reform and performance can also help the ruling elite to 
attain legitimacy and protect their political power (see Breslin 1996: 692-693, 2008: 
7). 
In addition, studies also outline different legislative arrangements in 
authoritarian regimes, and their impact on economic growth in single-party, military, 
personalist and monarchical regimes (see Wright and Escribà-Folch 2011). For 
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example, ‘regimes which depend on domestic investment (or loans) to grow the 
economy create and maintain political institutions that not only help them rule, but 
do so by credibly binding their own power… Regimes that are largely dependent on 
“unearned” income from sources such as natural resource rents and foreign aid, 
however, do not necessarily have an incentive to create and maintain institutions that 
constrain their power, because they are less dependent on the productive resources 
of the economy’ (Wright 2008: 323). It is worth noting that dictators in electoral 
autocracies pay a price for introducing elections, as this increases the number of 
protests organised by the opposition before the election. In addition, members of the 
opposition may formulate socio-electoral coalitions with each other during social 
movements against the incumbent (Trejo 2014).  
In any case, the literature on autocracy shows that autocratic rulers 
manipulate various channels to obtain legitimacy and consolidate power. It is thus 
important to study how professional elites come to power in the case of deviant 
autocracies such as Singapore and Hong Kong, establishing a political structure that 
includes a semblance of multi-party competition. 
Another strategy commonly used by autocratic leaders to consolidate power 
is repression: the use of measures to control political parties, legislatures, and 
elections (see Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2009; Boix 2003; Gandhi 2002; Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2006; Przeworski et al. 2000). The opposition under these measures has 
difficulty fighting against the authoritarian regime. Greene (2010) for instance explains 
how the authoritarian party can dominate elections by monopolising public resources. 
The ‘dominant parties can transform public resources into patronage goods and illicit 
funds for partisan campaigning that allow them to buy votes, outspend the opposition 
at every turn, and make otherwise meaningful elections unfair’ (p. 828). In addition, 
ruling elites such as military leaders can be given veto power via manipulation of the 
constitution, effectively counteracting the opposition or civilian government (see 
North and Weingast 1989; Wright 2008). 
The most effective factor in maintaining autocratic stability is co-optation 
between elites. Power sharing among the ruling coalition in autocratic regimes is vital 
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for stability (Magaloni 2008). A coalition can also be formed between the dictator and 
potential opposition forces (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). Power sharing can be 
political, social or economic.  Political institutions can be used by the ruler to cater to 
the interests of different elites (see Wright and Escribà-Folch 2011: 284). According to 
Gandhi and Przeworski (2007), ‘[w]e focus on the ruler’s use of legislatures to solicit 
cooperation and to neutralize the threat of rebellion from forces within society’ (p. 
1280). In the context of China, Breslin (2008) argues the new middle class are ‘civil 
servants who benefit from the continued existence of authoritarian state power’ (p. 
9). In addition, Albertus and Menaldo (2012b) conduct a quantitative analysis to 
evaluate the situation in Latin America from 1950 to 2002. They find that regime 
durability is positively correlated to the introduction of a new constitution 
immediately after the autocratic leader seizes power. The new constitution serves to 
secure the political and economic interests of factions within the ruling elite. 
In terms of social and economic interests, Wantchekon (2002) argues that in 
autocracy, economic cooperation between rulers and elites is common to secure their 
loyalty. In the same vein, Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) state that the ‘spoils available 
for distribution—monetary rewards, perks, and privileges—increase when more 
people cooperate with the regime’ (p. 1281). This strategy is commonly used by 
autocratic rulers in different regions. Albertus and Menaldo (2012c) analyse 
competition between the ruling elites and economic elites in Mexico from 1911 to 
2000. They find that expropriation was used to disempower the old economic elites, 
which in turn helped create a new economic elite loyal to the autocratic incumbent. 
In East Asia, crony capitalism is considered a key for economic success. According to 
Kang (2003), ‘[b]y examining corruption and cronyism through the lens of transition 
costs, it can be shown a particular set of government-business relations, although 
corrupt, also lowered transaction costs and made investment more credible’ (p. 439). 
The question of whether patronage and clientelism sustain autocracy has been 
extensively discussed in the studies of autocracy in different regions (see Barari 2015: 
108; Bellin 2004; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Brownlee 2002; Charrad and Adams 
2011; Seeberg 2013: 39). 
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Autocratic diffusion is another factor often used to explain the persistence of 
autocracy. As with democratic diffusion, there are mixed arguments concerning 
autocratic diffusion (see von Soest 2015). Using the examples of China and Russia for 
illustration, ‘authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by 
other autocratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their 
regional proximity’ (Bader, Grävingholt and Kästner 2010: 96). However, the latest 
studies show that co-optation between autocratic regimes in the international 
community is difficult. Tansey (2016) has clarified the problem of autocracy promotion: 
‘I have argued that in order for the idea of autocracy promotion to be useful, it must 
apply only to those cases where there is a clear intention to promote autocracy as a 
regime type, based in significant part on an ideological commitment to 
authoritarianism itself’ (p.  155). More importantly, the foreign policy of autocratic 
regimes is not currently ideologically driven for the most part. The foreign policy of 
Russia toward Ukraine, for example, is driven more by pragmatism rather than the 
desire to promote autocracy: the ruler and ruling coalition are more concerned about 
their interests in gas contracts (see Obydenkova and Libman 2014). 
To sum up, autocratic leaders use multiple strategies to consolidate their 
power. I must clarify that the traditional way of understanding the emergence and 
maintenance of autocracies is useful and important, but additional tools are needed 
to explain deviant autocracies (see Chapter 4). The previous approaches described 
above mainly explain how authoritarian regimes justify their authoritarian ruling style 
with elections and high levels of government performance to attain legitimacy, and 
how they use certain strategies (e.g. oppression and co-optation of the opposition) to 
maintain their authoritarian power. In deviant autocracies, there is a significant group 
of professional and highly educated citizens who support democracy and embrace civil 
liberties (see Dahl 1973: 124 and Huntington 1991: 69). In addition, the structural 
approach would predict the emergence of democracy, as these countries have high 
levels of socio-economic development. The puzzle of deviant autocracies is therefore 
as follows: how do ruling elites monopolise power and prevent democratisation in a 
country with a relatively high level of socio-economic development? Chapters 5 and 6 
focus on case studies of Singapore and Hong Kong; specifically, an analysis of empirical 
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evidence shows how the internal and external elites’ co-optation and bargaining 
processes during the transitional period played a crucial role in preventing transitions 
to democracy. 
 
2.3 The Focus of my Thesis: The Puzzle of Deviant 
Autocracies 
 
It is clear after reviewing the recent literature on deviant democracies and persistent 
autocracies that one area deserves more attention: deviant autocracies. In recent 
years, an increasing number of scholars have emphasised the importance of studying 
deviant autocracies (see e.g. Doorenspleet 2012: 202; Seeberg 2014b: 648), but there 
are still few studies which explain these cases.  
This section starts with a conceptualisation of deviant autocracies and how it 
relates with the existing literature on democratisation. Second, I give an overview of 
cases that can be categorised as deviant autocracies based on previous studies; later, 
Chapter 3 identifies outliers or deviant autocracies in a more systematic way, based 
on large-N quantitative analyses. I also review previous studies’ attempts to identify 
and understand deviant autocracies. 
In my view, studying deviant autocracies is a logical step in the field of 
democratisation and autocracy studies. Studies of democracy in the 1950s mainly 
focused on democratic consolidation among Western countries, which already had a 
long history of practicing democracy; structural factors, especially a high level of 
economic development, were identified as prerequisites for sustaining democracy. 
From the 1970s onward, a significant number of countries experienced 
democratisation, which encouraged scholars to study the factors leading to transitions 
to democracy. The structural approach still finds a robust relationship between high 
level of economic development and democracy. Yet in the process of transition, many 
cases did not have favourable structural conditions and failed to establish a 
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democratic system after a transition from authoritarianism. The literature on hybrid 
regimes mainly focuses on such cases.  
More recently, democratisation studies have begun to focus on deviant 
democracies: countries which sustain a democratic system even with a low level of 
favourable structural conditions. In addition, the renaissance of autocracy research 
has highlighted how autocratic leaders make use of different strategies to increase 
their hold on power. However, the strategies adopted by military or personalist 
autocratic regimes in countries with low levels of socio-economic development are 
fundamentally different from those used in countries with high levels of socio-
economic development, because there are different major stakeholders in society. 
Hence, there is a clear gap in the literature, and few studies try to explain why 
countries with favourable structural conditions fail to transition to democracy. 
Although there are some excellent case studies (Sing 1996, 2004; So 2000; and Myhre 
2010), there is certainly no comparative research yet, focusing specifically on this 
question.  
In short, two crucial factors distinguish deviant autocracies from other types 
of regime: favourable structural factors (which can be absent or present) and 
democracy (which can be absent or present). Figure 2.1 shows the typology of deviant 
autocracy in relation to autocracy, democracy and deviant democracy.  
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Figure 2.1: Typology of Regimes, Based on Structural Factors (IV) and Democracy (DV) 
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Let us look briefly at potential candidates for deviant autocracies (note that 
the next chapter identifies them more rigorously). Using data from the Human 
Development Indicator developed by the United Nations (United Nations 
Development Programme 2015), we can show that Bahrain, Brunei, Hong Kong, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates are 
examples of high-income countries with high levels of social and economic 
development. At the same time, these high-income countries are categorised as non-
democratic regimes (Freedom House 2014; Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2013). To 
highlight the importance of studying and understanding deviant autocracies, I would 
emphasise the findings of Barro’s study (1996), which tried to forecast transitions to 
democracy; Barro predicted that Hong Kong and Singapore would become fully 
democratic by the year 2000. In explanation, he stated that ‘[e]xpectations for large 
increases in democracy also apply to some reasonably prosperous places with some 
political rights in which the measured level of rights lags behind the standard of living. 
As examples, Singapore is projected to increase its democracy index from 0.33 in 1994 
to 0.64 in 2000’ (pp. 21-23). The actual history of Hong Kong and Singapore has proven 
his prediction false. Table 2.1 compares the potential deviant autocracies Hong Kong 
and Singapore with consolidated democracies. The figures show that these two cases 
are on par with developed societies like the United Kingdom and United States in 
terms of socio-economic development.  
Democracy (absent / present) 
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Table 2.1: Socio-economic conditions among different societies 
Country Life 
Expectancy at 
Birth 
Mean Years 
of Schooling 
Expected 
Years of 
Schooling 
Gross National 
Income per 
Capita 
France 82.2 11.1 16.0 38,056 
Hong Kong 84.0 11.2 15.6 53,959 
Singapore 83.0 10.6 15.4 76,628 
United 
Kingdom 
80.7 13.1 16.2 39,267 
United States 79.1 12.9 16.5 52,947 
Source: United Nations Development Programme (2015: 208) 
 
Like deviant democracies, deviant autocracies are not a new phenomenon. The 
existing studies have simply ignored them. For example, Diamond (2012) claims that 
Singapore is ‘the most economically developed nondemocracy in the history of the 
world’ (p. 7). In the early 1990s, Lipset et al. (1993) revealed that ‘[s]ome countries 
with outstanding economic growth records remained staunchly authoritarian, e.g. 
Brazil, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, etc.’ (p. 155). Lipset and his colleagues 
were fully aware of cases which did not fit into their theory, but did not offer an 
explanation for this. 
Another interesting feature of deviant autocracies is the general lack of 
quantifiable, comparative data. Cross-national studies on democratisation, especially 
quantitative ones, heavily rely on existing databases such as the World Bank, United 
Nations and Freedom House and Polity project to provide indicators for statistical 
analysis and hypothesis testing. Small states or territories are neglected and data from 
them is omitted from the dataset, because it is argued that small countries have a 
higher propensity to democratise (Seeberg 2014b: 636). Due to limited availability of 
data, most existing cross country studies (such as Barro 1996; Cutright 1963; Cutright 
and Wiley 1969; Lipset 1959; Lipset 1994; Lipset et al. 1993; Narayan and Smyth 2010; 
Ravich 2000; Rostow 1960) have ignored anomalous cases or simply do not include 
them in their analysis models. The city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore, for instance, 
have always been overlooked in large-N analyses.  
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Still, some scholars have tried to identify and understand anomalous cases. 
According to Sing (1996: 344), ‘on the basis of economic development alone, Hong 
Kong and Singapore appear as the sole anomalies’. To explain the situation of Hong 
Kong, Sing (1996: 351-355) argued that several factors contributed to the absent of 
democratisation in Hong Kong, including China’s opposition in the 1980s, the 
weakness of the pro-democracy movement, the government’s strong performance 
and relatively lack of corruption, and the co-optation of business elites into 
government decision-making and consultative bodies. Yet this explanation neglects 
the most important external actor, Britain, the colonial master that played a major 
role in establishing institutions and norms favourable to the development of 
democracy. Sing (1996) stated, ‘Hong Kong has been a British colony for over 140 years, 
pervaded in that time by British ideas of the rule of law and procedural justice’ (p. 344). 
Also, ‘[i]t had been British policy gradually to democratize Hong Kong after the signing 
of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, preparing the way for an honourable 
retreat’ (Sing 1996: 354). Nevertheless, the negotiations between China and Britain 
about the future of Hong Kong were secret at the time this analysis was made. To fully 
understand deviant autocracies, we need to consider elite structural interaction, 
including how ruling elites acquire coercive state capacity in the process of transition 
and how internal and external elites interact to shape the resultant system. 
Recently, Seeberg (2012: 29) has tried to map ‘anomalous autocracies’ using 
large-N analyses. This mapping focuses on 1993 to 2008, and only uses diffusion via 
democratic neighbour countries as an independent variable. This analysis 
underestimates the importance of other dependent variables, such as economic 
development level, oil production and country size. Hence, his analysis identified some 
controversial cases such as North Korea and China as anomalous autocracies, unlike 
the conceptualisation of deviant autocracies proposed in this thesis. 
In addition to economic development, countries reliant on the export of raw 
materials and small states should not be excluded when identifying deviant 
autocracies. With regard to high income countries in Middle East that deviate from 
the structural analysis, some scholars use the oil production explanation to argue that 
the social structures and values have not undergone significant changes, and hence 
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pressure for democratisation is low (see Barari 2015: 102; Sing 1996: 344). 
Nevertheless, many large-N studies show that oil producing countries can easily be 
democratic (see Ahmadov 2013; Bearce and Hutnick 2011: 706; Butcher 2014: 736; 
Gurses 2009: 523, 2011: 173; Liou and Musgrave 2014: 1604). In other words, oil 
producing countries should not be neglected. 
In addition, with regard to small countries or city-states, it is unwise to exclude 
outliers such as Hong Kong, Macau and Brunei. Apparently Seeberg (2012) overlooked 
the literature on democratisation that I reviewed in this chapter. Social economic 
development is indeed an important structural factor in explaining democratic 
consolidation in the 1950s and transition to democracy from the 1970s onward. Hence, 
the list that Seeberg (2012) proposed is quite controversial; he categorised Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Cuba, North Korea, Peru, Singapore, Swaziland, Togo 
and Zimbabwe as anomalous autocracies. It is debatable to categorise North Korea as 
a deviant autocracy, for example, given its low level of development in terms of 
structural factors. There is a detailed discussion in the next chapter on how to properly 
identify deviant autocracies with large-N quantitative analysis. 
In other words, while studies have focused on deviant autocracies, it is still a 
very small field. The next chapter shows that the number of deviant autocracies has 
increased over time, and hence the study of them has become more important. These 
under-studied cases should be analysed critically and systematically; a new analytical 
framework is thus needed to help understand the phenomenon. According to 
Doorenspleet (2012: 202), studying ‘deviant autocracies’ can explain why autocratic 
regimes continue even in societies experiencing a high level of economic development; 
in turn this may help us to understand more about the process of democratisation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To conclude, this chapter has summarised the key debates and developments in the 
field of democracy and democratisation.  
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In the 1950s and 1960s, scholars were mainly concerned about the durability 
of democracies, particularly in Western Europe and Northern America. At the same 
time, the U.S. government began actively promoting democracy all over the world (see 
Carothers 1999) to counteract the influence of communism. From the 1970s onward, 
more and more countries make transitions to democracy. Some successfully 
established a genuine, consolidated democracy, but some still remained authoritarian 
or became hybrid, ‘grey zone’ regimes. This political reality contributed to the 
development of the literature on transitions to democracy and hybrid regimes.  
The idea of studying deviant autocracies is inspired by recent studies of both 
deviant democracies and of the durability of autocratic regimes. The literature on 
deviant democracies mainly addresses the issue of countries that transitioned 
successfully to democracy despite unfavourable structural conditions. A number of 
excellent studies have examined such outliers using small-N qualitative or large-N 
quantitative analysis to identify and identify explanatory factors. They provide a 
strong foundation for the study of the other type of outlier, i.e. deviant autocracies. 
Studies of the durability of autocratic regimes have mainly analysed cases in which 
structural factors favouring sustained autocratic government are absent. They help us 
to answer several important research questions, such as how authoritarian leaders 
consolidate their power. Yet the autocratic regimes analysed in this area of the 
literature differs conceptually from deviant autocracies.  
The deviant autocracies highlighted in this thesis are societies possessing a 
high level of socio-economic development. This flies in the face of the central idea of 
the structural explanation, that economic development is positively related to 
democracy. Deviant autocracies thus point to a gap in studies of democratisation and 
persistent autocracies. The literature review in this chapter has shown that deviant 
autocracies have been understudied so far. In my view, understanding deviant 
autocracies is very important, particularly as the number of cases seems to have 
increased (see next chapter). Understanding the phenomenon of deviant autocracies 
also has great theoretical significance for the study of democratisation. Hence, we 
need to improve our empirical knowledge of those cases. 
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When proposing a study of deviant autocracies, two questions may be asked. 
First, why should we bother with outliers? As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, 
the study of democracy and democratisation has changed focus from normative and 
analytical studies to empirical studies. I agree with the observation of Diamond et al. 
(2014): 
It is a kind of standard story in social science: Someone identifies a 
pattern or two associated with a phenomenon, others glom onto it, and 
then it’s discovered that the pattern is not universal. This shouldn’t 
shock us, because it is so common, but it doesn’t make the ideas utterly 
worthless. There are various paths to democracy, and it’s worth trying 
to identify them (p. 89). 
Indeed, the structural explanation of democratisation has dominated the field since 
the 1950s. A significant amount of empirical large-N quantitative analysis shows that 
economic development is an important independent variable in accounting for the 
consolidation of and transition to democracy. But the data in the next chapter show 
that this pattern is no longer universal; an increasing number of outliers that have 
emerged in recent decades deserve our attention. 
The second question is related to how to define autocracy. Autocracy is the 
antonym of democracy. I concur with the idea that an undemocratic regime can be 
categorised as an autocracy (Møller and Skanning 2013b: 45). To identify autocracy, it 
is beneficial to understand the typology of democratic political regimes. Møller and 
Skanning (2013b: 43) use four criteria (competitive elections; free, inclusive elections; 
political liberty; and the rule of law) to categorise different sub-types of democracy, 
namely minimalist democracy, electoral democracy, polyarchy and liberal democracy. 
Classifying autocratic regimes is straightforward based on the definition of minimalist 
democracy, which emphasises one basic criterion, competitive elections. To fulfil the 
minimalist standard, elections must be provide genuine choice to voters, without 
government intervention or manipulation of the electoral law by incumbents. In the 
case of Singapore, for example, the government allows periodic elections, but because 
it does not fulfil the minimal standard of democracy, Møller and Skanning (2013b) still 
categorise Singapore as an autocracy. 
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The next chapter provides a more detailed conceptualisation of democracy 
versus non-democracy, and the major structural factors identifying deviant 
autocracies. Large-N quantitative analyses are used to evaluate the most important 
factors in regime change. The most significant predictor is then used to identify 
outliers or deviant autocracies since the 1960s. I also provide a list of cases that will 
be analysed further – in qualitative research – in subsequent chapters.   
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Chapter 3: Making the Empirical Case 
for Deviant Autocracies: Large-N 
Analyses 
 
Introduction 
 
The study of political systems – in particular the study of democracy and autocracy - 
is a core concern within comparative politics. The previous chapter discussed the 
existing literature and the key debates in this field. It showed that so far previous 
studies have mainly focused on transition to democracy, democratic consolidation 
and autocratic consolidation, while the issue of democratic non-transition among the 
deviant autocracies - in Asia and elsewhere - has rarely been discussed (see for 
exceptions, though, Doorenspleet 2012: 202; Seeberg 2014b: 648, and see previous 
chapter). This chapter fills this gap by highlighting the empirical case for deviant 
autocracies with large-N analyses. Given the robust explanatory power of the 
structural explanations of the effect of economic development on democratisation, 
the increasing number of outliers posits a critical challenge to this influential 
theoretical approach. The first type of outlier, deviant democracies, has already been 
vividly discussed in recent literature (see Chapter 2); however, the second type, 
deviant autocracies, has been rarely studied (Seeberg 2012; Sing 1996) and in my view 
they deserve much more attention in order to synergise the studies on transition to 
democracy, hybrid regime and autocratic consolidation.  
This chapter uses large-N analyses to re-test the major tenet of the structural 
explanations, and hence focuses specifically on the effect of economic development 
on democracy. The data set is based on a self-compiled data set from the latest 
notable international databases, covering 167 countries in the world from 1960 to 
2011, including small cases in Asia that are usually ignored or excluded in previous 
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quantitative studies. In general, there are two major reasons why previous studies 
have ignored such cases in Asia. First, the cases do not fit into the existing theoretical 
explanation, and ignoring outliers in quantitative analysis can sometimes increase the 
explanatory power of the theory (see Bollen and Jackman 1990: 190; Cook 1979). 
Moreover, the main task of large-N quantitative studies is to find general patterns, 
and hence those studies are not particularly interested in a detailed in-depth study of 
those outliers. Second, some databases intentionally exclude small states and 
disputed territories, such as Hong Kong, Macau and Brunei (Marshall et al. 2013: 1). 
Including such cases in the analysis requires tremendous effort by the researcher in 
the process of data mining and coding with various reliable sources, and in accordance 
with the original coding criteria. The effort is worthwhile, as the latest data set can 
enable us to verify whether economic development still is an important factor in 
explaining democratisation. In addition, it can also detect the number of deviant 
autocracies over the past few decades. Especially if there is an increasing number of 
deviant autocracies in Asia, it is sensible to examine this phenomenon carefully to 
enhance knowledge not only about transition to democracy, but also non-transition 
to democracy as will be shown later in this chapter, there are more and more deviant 
autocracies, which makes a study of this phenomenon more relevant, interesting and 
important.  
This chapter begins with the important question of how to define autocracy 
and democracy. There are different ways and approaches to define those concepts. 
Each approach is crucial for understanding different issues related to democracy, 
democratisation and autocracy. This chapter will rely on a very minimalistic procedural 
Schumpeterian notion of democracy to understand transition to democracy and to 
explain the increasing number of deviant autocracies.  
The second section provides a brief overview of the major tenets of the 
structural explanations of democratisation. The contextual and intervening factors, 
both internal and external, which may elucidate transition to democracy are carefully 
scrutinised to shed light on the puzzle related to the emergence of deviant autocracies. 
The discussion covers variables such as economic development, social homogeneity, 
military influence, oil production, religious belief and external factors, such as 
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economic aid, number of democratic countries in the nearby area and colonial 
influence.  
The findings in the third section suggest that there is a robust significant 
positive relationship between economic development and democracy among ‘normal’ 
cases. The data also suggest that economic development still remains the strongest 
predictor for explaining democracy and non-democracy in the period 1960 to 2010.  
The final part detects the main outliers with statistical analyses. The empirical 
data show that since the 1970s, there has been an increasing number of deviant 
autocracies, including Bahrain, Brunei, Equatorial Guinea, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Macau, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. The existence of 
deviant autocracies deserves more attention, both because we would like to 
understand these cases, and because they can help us to improve our existing 
theoretical knowledge of democratisation. 
 
3.1 Defining Democracy and Autocracy 
 
Mapping out deviant autocracies requires a clear definition of democracy and 
autocracy. What do I mean by those concepts in my thesis? The study and 
conceptualisation of autocracy can be characterised by a relatively long history. The 
way how autocracy scholars conceptualise the meaning of autocracy depends on how 
the world has been changed. There has been extensive discussion on despotism in 
premodern time (see Andrews 1967; Barrell 2006; Gershoy 1944; Krieger 1975; Runes 
1963; Wittfogel 1957). In addition, the study of totalitarian regime was provoked in 
the 1930s to 1960s, the totalitarian regime has been conceptualised to involve highly 
organised in a hierarchical, more precisely, under the leadership of a leading figure 
with power to get access to all levels of arenas in the society. Essentially, six features 
are being identified that associated with totalitarian states, including ideology, mass 
party, terror system, monopoly of mass communication, monopoly of force and state-
run economy (see Friedrich and Brzezinski 1968; Gerschewski 2013:15; Linz 1964, 
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1975, 2000). However, when despotism and totalitarian regimes vanished, there are 
new types of non-democratic regimes emerged and cannot fit well into the existing 
typology. 
To define autocracy, it is simply regarded as the antonym of democracy. Moller 
and Skanning (2013) urged that ‘we call all instances of undemocratic regimes 
autocracies” (p. 45). The differences of the existing literature on autocracy research 
mainly on how to categorise non-democratic regimes. Indeed, autocracy scholars tend 
to adopt taxonomic approach to group regimes into typologies (see Linz 2000: 7). 
Scholars have many concerns about the emergence of electoral competitive 
authoritarian regimes (see Brumberg 2002; Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Diamond 2002; 
Schedler 2002, 2006; Levitsky and Way 2002a, 2010; Ortmann 2014b; Wong 2014). 
This type of regime generally relies on highly controlled and monopolised elections to 
create a myth that the autocratic ruling party or leader attained legitimation from the 
voters. 
Another group of scholars continued to refine the criteria of the typologies to 
fit in the variations of the model autocratic regimes. The typology of autocracies 
include authoritarian, military rule, monarchies, personalist rule, post-totalitarian, 
single-party rule, sultanistic and totalitarian, etc. (see Cheibub et al. 2010; Geddes 
1999; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Linz and Stepan 1996; Wahman, Teorell and 
Hadenius 2013). In recent years, Kailitz (2013: 45) attempted to summarise the 
typologies into six types, namely electoral autocracy, communist ideocracy, one-party 
autocracy, monarchy, military regime and personalist autocracy. 
In short, all sub-type of autocracies can be regarded as non-democratic. This 
thesis is not trying to develop a new subtype of autocracies. The meaning of deviant 
autocracies as discussed in the previous chapter is a theoretical puzzle, derived from 
the theories of democratization and their empirical evidence. It refers to the cases 
with strong structural conditions but still under a non-democratic regime. In other 
words, countries with low levels of economic development, such as China and North 
Korea cannot be categorised as deviant autocracies. To identify the deviant 
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autocracies, it is very important to conceptualise and operationalise the meaning of 
democracy (and consequently, autocracy as well) 
Democracy is an abstract concept that makes studying the process of 
democratisation a challenging task for students of comparative politics. The situation 
is even more complicated as there is always a gap between theories of democracy and 
theories of democratisation. Allison (1994) acutely highlighted this issue by saying ‘the 
democratisation crowd are empirical students of politics while the democracy gang 
are political theorists or philosophers’ (p. 9). Indeed, the latter group generally has 
conceptualised theories of democracy in a normative way (see Fung 2007: 443; Rawls 
1971: 122). For example, Rawls (1993) uses his theory of justice to conceptualise 
democracy in two levels:  
at the most basic level… of the fundamental ideas of a democratic 
society as a fair system of cooperation between citizens as free and 
equal… in the second stage, we know on the basis of general facts and 
the historical condition of the age that a conception of political justice 
leading to free institutions must be acceptable to a plurality of opposing 
comprehensive doctrines. That conception must, therefore, present 
itself as independent of any particular comprehensive view and must 
firmly guarantee for all citizens the basic rights and liberties as a 
condition of their sense of security and their peaceful, mutual 
recognition (pp. 260-261). 
The above argument is interesting to understand the meaning of democracy, but the 
idea can hardly be operationalised for large-N analyses. Hence, from the perspective 
of empiricists who are concerned about the causal mechanisms of democratisation, 
those normative definitions are not very useful.  
Another problem associated with the definition of democracy is caused by the 
existence of hybrid regimes, which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. To capture the nature of different types of regime, scholars have frequently 
used ‘democracy with adjectives’ (Collier and Levitsky 1997). Sub-types include ‘non-
western democracy’ (Youngs 2015), ‘deliberative democracy’ (Dryzek 2009: 1380; 
Wilson 2011), ‘formal democracy’ (Huber et al. 1997: 324), ‘delegative democracy’ 
(O’Donnell 1994: 59-60), ‘defective democracy’ (Bogaards 2009) and ‘managed 
democracy’ (Krastev and Holmes 2012). The existing literature also creates different 
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typologies to categorise different regimes (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Møller and 
Skaaning 2013a: 144, 2013b; Wigell 2008). To support the idea of creating sub-types, 
one may argue that ‘[s]imply classifying regimes as either democratic or non-
democratic (or authoritarian) has become too parsimonious’ (Wigell 2008: 233).  
If we insist on using sub-types and inventing new adjectives to explain and 
understand issues related to democratisation in different regimes, there are, however, 
at least three major consequences First, there are only a few cases in the world that 
can be truly categorised as democracies by strict definition (see Diamond 2002: 22; 
Levitsky and Way 2002a: 53). This classification exercise is endless when scholars 
suggest different sub-types, and even propose further levels of subordinate (i.e. sub-
types of sub-types) regime. The use of sub-types is discouraged because ‘different 
terms are merely synonyms for each other’ (Allison 1994: 13). Second, such sub-types 
further reinforce the tendency of non-democratic regime leaders to manipulate 
election arrangements and political institutions to pay lip service to democratic 
principles; the Singapore and Chinese governments are cases in point (see Diamond 
2002: 23; He 2009; He and Leib, 2006: 8). Finally, creating more categories or sub-
types merely transforms democracy to countless nominal variables, which is not 
beneficial for large-N and small-N analysis. I wish to clarify that this thesis is not an 
attempt to create a sub-type for democracy or autocracy. The term deviant autocracy, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, merely refers to the empirical puzzle in relation to the 
democratisation studies literature and the large N analysis conducted in this chapter. 
One of the purposes of this chapter is to map out deviant autocracies. It is 
therefore more important here to operationalise democracy than to engage with the 
debate on scientific or normative ways to define democracy. The existing literature 
contains hundreds of subtypes of democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997: 431). Storm 
(2008) accurately pointed out the problem: ‘[w]ith hundreds of different definitions 
of democracy in use today, it has become almost impossible to gauge what is meant 
by the term when it is applied in the academic literature, unless, that is, the author 
specifies exactly what democracy denotes in the publication in question’ (p. 215). 
Defining the meaning of democracy is crucial for elaborating what is and is not 
democracy (Schmitter and Karl 1991). Implicitly or explicitly, most scholars of 
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democracy have referred to representative democracy, i.e. the rulers and 
representatives are elected through competition in elections (Fung 2007: 449; Merkel 
1998: 34; Schmitter 2015: 35-36; Schmitter and Karl 1991), the differences mainly 
resting on the length of the criteria checklist.  
To define democracy, Huntington (1991) stipulated a very good operational 
definition of a democracy as a country where ‘its most powerful collective decision 
makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates 
freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible for 
vote’ (pp. 6-7). To conceptualise democracy, there is a well-established and 
recognised definition of democracy, i.e. a minimalist standard, emphasising 
contestation and participation in electing representatives and rulers (see Posner 2003; 
Przeworski 1999; Riker 1982; Schumpeter 1950: 269). More importantly, the 
minimalist definition of democracy has been widely adopted in quantitative studies so 
far (Boix et al. 2012; Doorenspleet 2004: 321).  
An alternative but controversial way to define democracy is the substantive 
approach (see Sen 2001: 10). Going beyond the minimal approach, its advocates to 
take other economic and social rights in the countries into account when 
conceptualising democracy (Spicker 2008), including entitlement to avoid poverty 
(Sen and Drèze 1989), labour rights (Baldwin 1990) and welfare provision (Ploug and 
Kvist 1994). The substantive approach can be problematic when it comes to 
measurement; for example, Skaaning et al. (2015: 1500) introduced a lexical index to 
measure democracy, which features male and female suffrage as major indicators. Yet, 
if a country lack of female politicians running for election that may severely affect its 
level of democracy. The exhaustive list has merely led to a situation in which ‘an 
unprecedented proportion of the world’s countries—has the form of electoral 
democracy but fails to meet the substantive test’ (Diamond 2002: 22). Not surprisingly, 
Schedler (1998) complained that the ‘conditions of democratic consolidation’ have 
been unreasonably and causally expanded by the scholars (p. 91-92). The substantive 
approach I would say is suitable for scholars concerned with democratic consolidation 
and quality of democracy (see Diamond and Morlino 2004), but less relevant for 
understanding non-transition to democracy.  
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In addition, there has been discussion around the thickness of conceptions of 
democracy (see Coppedge 1999; Møller and Skaaning 2010). This debate on thin 
(minimal) and thick (substantive) views of democracy is only relevant to cases of 
democratic transition, so again it is less relevant for the deviant autocracies discussed 
in this thesis in which there is no transition to democracy. But the discussion provides 
insight for us to consider which view of democracy should be adopted when 
measuring and mapping out the deviant autocracies. The minimalist approach is far 
from perfect, especially when explaining transition to democracy or democratic 
consolidation with a loose standard based on existence of competitive elections as 
sole criteria. But I envisage this limitation actually provides an ideal sensitive 
measurement to detect the outliers.6  
Further to the discussion in Chapter 2 on the autocracy literature, countries 
that fulfil the minimal criteria of the procedural minimalist approach can be regarded 
as democracies; if not, they are non-democracies or autocracies. Indeed, according to 
a recent classification, none of the deviant autocracies identified in the large-N 
analysis in this chapter are categorised as any subtype of democracy, namely 
minimalist, electoral, polyarchy or liberal (see Møller and Skaaning 2010: 271-274, 
Møller et al. 2012). 
 
3.2 Measuring Democracy and Autocracy 
 
Recently there has been a debate on the gap between the existing measurement and 
conceptualisation of democracy. Scholars have challenged measurements of 
democracy derived only from the perspective of scholars and ignoring how ordinary 
citizens view democracy (see Canache 2012: 1150; Doorenspleet 2015: 477; Koelbe 
and Lipuma 2008: 24). One of the suggested solutions is to adopt data from surveys 
such as that of Afrobarometer, to provide additional data about the perception of 
                                                          
6 This chapter is to detect deviant autocracies, if the cases failed to reach the minimal standard of 
democracy. Those cases can no doubt be regarded as autocracies. 
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people toward democracy (see Doorenspleet 2015: 481). The idea is good, but the 
data has limited coverage, with only 37 countries in Africa. Countries in other 
continents are not included in the study. The questions and research design are also 
incomparable with other existing survey based studies, such as the European Social 
Survey, Eurobarometer, Latinobarómetro and World Values Survey. Lack of historical 
data for comparison is another concern of using this new measurement for democracy. 
I concur with the idea that refining existing measurements of democracy is important 
for future study of democracy. But for merely illustrating the increasing number of 
deviant autocracies, we have to rely on the existing measurements and databases. 
Another controversy is related to the scale of operationalising democracy, i.e. 
the use of a dichotomous or continuous approach (see Bollen and Jackman 1989; Boix 
et al. 2012: 1525-1531; Doorenspleet 2004: 323; Przeworski et al. 2000; Sartori 2009). 
Determining the scale of the variable to a very large extent depends on the purpose 
of the study and appropriateness for hypothesis testing. Apart from testing 
hypotheses derived from a structural approach, this chapter also aims to detect 
outliers. For easy illustration, the definition of democracy and autocracy is very much 
data-driven, for example in line with the Polity score rating (-10 to +10), i.e. cases with 
a score of 6 or above can be regarded as democracies (see Marshall et al. 2011).  
To measure democracy, there are various data sets available (see Arat 1991; 
Bollen 2001; Vanhanen 2000), but those data sets cannot be used in this thesis, as 
they focus only on a limited number of countries and/or time periods. Moreover, 
there is a recent – very promising and ambitious – project in which democracy is 
measured in different ways (the so-called V-Dem project, V-Dem Institute 2016) but 
the data has been only released very recently in 2016, so it was too late to include this 
approach in my thesis. There are two major ‘historically oriented and integrated 
replication databases (HIRDs)’ (Lieberman 2010: 39) offering historical studies of 
democracy across the world: the Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800-2010 by Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2011) and the Annual Survey of 
Freedom by Freedom House (2012). These two data sets do not only provide 
quantitative data for studies related to democracy and democratic transition, but they 
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also produce  in-depth country reports to demonstrate changes occurring in relation 
to political development and civil liberties.  
There are three reasons to adopt the data of the Polity IV project over Freedom 
House in measuring levels of democracy. The first is because the data more accurately 
reports each individual case. According to Lieberman (2010),  
in terms of concerns about valid comparisons, the Polity HIRD stands 
out in two respects. Each country report provides a clear summary of 
the key facts justifying the specific component scores… Moreover, 
Polity reserves several classifications for special circumstances, such 
as “foreign interruption”, “transition”, or “anarchy”, and analysts are 
appropriately warned that country-years so coded should be 
approached with caution, particularly before one makes comparisons 
in terms of ‘degrees’ of democracy’ (p. 51).  
Hence, countries with the above codes are indicated as missing values in my dataset. 
The analysis does not include those values to avoid potential problems that might 
undermine the validity of the results.  
Second, the Polity IV project provides better coverage with more variables, 
which is favourable for the study of deviant autocracies. Freedom House (2012) only 
measures ‘political freedom’ and ‘civil liberties’ from 1973 to 2012 with ratings from 
1 to 7. Countries with lower scores are freer, whereas higher scores mean less 
freedom. This does admittedly provide valuable data showing the level of democracy 
in different cases. In contrast, the Polity score provides more accurate and refined 
measurements to capture the ‘concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic 
authority in governing institutions’ from 1800 to 2011. The Polity score is based on the 
combination of two measurements. The first is level of democracy (DEMOC), which is 
an additive scale range from 0 to 10 based on the indicators shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Measurements of Democracy 
Authority Coding Scale Weight 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP): 
(3) Election 
(2) Transitional 
 
+2 
+1 
Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN):  
only if XRCOMP is Election (3) or Transitional (2) 
(3) Dual/election 
(4) Election 
 
 
+1 
+1 
Constraint on Chief Executive (XCONST): 
(7) Executive parity or subordination 
(6) Intermediate category 
(5) Substantial limitations 
(4) Intermediate category 
 
+4 
+3 
+2 
+1 
Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP): 
(5) Competitive 
(4) Transitional 
(3) Factional 
 
+3 
+2 
+1 
Source: Marshall et al. (2013: 15) 
 
The second is level of autocracy (AUTOC), which is measured based on five major 
coding criteria, including competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of 
executive recruitment, constraint of chief executive, regulation of participation and 
competitiveness of participation (Marshall et al. 2013: 15-16). The score also ranges 
from 0 to 10. The coding is summarised as follows (see Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2 Measurements of Autocracy 
Authority Coding Scale Weight 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP): 
(1) Selection 
 
+2 
Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN):  
only if XRCOMP is coded Selection (1) 
(1) Closed 
(2) Dual/designation 
 
 
+1 
+1 
Constraint on Chief Executive (XCONST): 
(1) Unlimited authority 
(2) Intermediate category 
(3) Slight to moderate limitations 
 
+3 
+2 
+1 
Regulation of participation (PARREG): 
(4) Restricted 
(3) Sectarian 
 
+2 
+1 
Competitiveness of Participation (PARCOMP): 
(1) Repressed 
(2) Suppressed 
 
+2 
+1 
Source: Marshall et al. (2013: 16) 
 
The Polity project consists of a Polity score as a handy index to measure democracy 
and non-democracy. In fact, ‘POLITY, is derived simply by subtracting the AUTOC value 
from the DEMOC value; this procedure provides a single regime score that ranges from 
+10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy)’ (Marshall et al. 2011: 12). We need to 
accept that this measurement is far from perfect. As Munck (2009) criticised the Polity 
score: ‘no justification is provided for the weighting scheme’ (p. 34). It also has the 
problem of ignoring inclusiveness: ‘one risks adopting a measurement of democracy 
that is biased or even racist or sexist’ (Doorenspleet 2000:387) and ignoring ordinary 
people’s views when measuring democracy (Doorenspleet 2015). 
I fully agree with critics of the Polity data set if we are measuring democratic 
stability or consolidation. Still, for the purpose of re-testing the structural explanation 
and mapping outliers, the existing measure is adequate to show whether a particular 
country is a democracy or non-democracy with reference to the existing literature on 
the procedural-minimal approach on democracy, as discussed in the beginning of this 
chapter (see Dahl 1973; Huntington 1991; Schmitter and Karl 1991; Schumpeter 1950: 
369). Indeed, Doorenspleet (2000) still perceived the Polity data set as an ‘ideal source 
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to measure the presence of competition’ for minimal democracies (p. 390). Munck 
(2009) also pointed out that a ‘positive quality of the Polity IV index, however, is that 
the disaggregate data are publicly available, thus ensuring that independent scholars 
can assess the implications of different aggregation rules and potentially suggest more 
appropriate aggregation rules’ (p. 39). According to Doorenspleet (2015), the 
‘underlying concept of democracy as used in the Polity Project emphasises the 
importance of free and fair competition among political parties, of political 
participation by the people, and of protection of civil liberties’ (p. 473). These 
attributes are in line with the basic criteria of the procedural-minimalist approach.  
Polity measure is the most dominant measure in recent quantitative studies, 
and most – of not all-  research projects have relied on this measurement when 
explaining transitions to democracy, democratic consolidation and autocratic 
consolidation (see Ahmadov 2013; Barro 2015; Bearce and Hutnick 2011; Boix 2011; 
Butcher 2014; Colaresi and Thompson 2003; Epstein et al. 2006; Goldstone et al. 2010; 
Haggard and Kaufman 2012; Hariri 2012; Jensen and Skaaning 2012; Knutsen and 
Nygård 2015; Linder and Bächtiger 2005; Liou and Musgrave 2014; Nur-tegin and Czap 
2012; Rost and Booth 2008; Strand and Hegre 2012; Tusalem 2015; Ulfedler and Lustik 
2007; Ulfelder 2007; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2011). Hence, the Polity Project 
provides the most appropriate measure for my thesis, not only to replicate the 
findings of previous studies but also to detect the deviant autocracies  
The third reason to use the Polity data set over Freedom House is due to 
consistency of the measurement. The measurement adopted in Freedom House is 
subject to minor adjustments every year. It has received significant criticisms in 
relation to inconsistency of measurement and being ideologically driven (see Diamond 
1999: 12; Giannone 2010:68; Munck and Verkuilen 2002: 21; Schneider and Schmitter 
2004: 60; Seawright and Collier 2014). In fact, the problems of Freedom House’s 
measurements can be easily identified by specialists who have a good understanding 
of particular cases. For example, the political freedom and civil liberty scores for Hong 
Kong were 3 and 2 respectively in 1972 even though direct elections had not yet been 
introduced for members of the legislature and all senior government officials were 
appointed by the colonial governor. The rating remained between 2 to 4 from 1972 to 
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1996. Interestingly, right after the handover of sovereignty to China in 1997, the rating 
suddenly dropped to 6 for political freedom and 3 for civil liberties (Freedom House 
2012). In fact, the political structure and arrangement for selecting the Chief Executive 
and legislature remained very similar to the situation during the colonial era. The 
sudden decrease in ratings may easily lead to scepticism concerning the validity and 
consistency of the measurement. The rating may be simply based on the coders’ 
subjective perception rather than reflecting the real institutional arrangements. By 
contrast, the Polity project provides a more consistent measurement to code the level 
of democracy and autocracy. 
There are several issues we need to address before adopting the Polity project 
scale to measure democracy and autocracy. The most important issue is that some 
potential outliers were not studied in the Polity project (see Marshall et al. 2013: 1). 
Therefore I had to manually code the missing values for the Polity score. The coding 
procedure was carefully conducted with reference to the original code book and 
criteria listed in the project manual (Marshall et al. 2013). I followed the standards 
suggested by Lieberman (2010) to code missing values, which include ‘the quality of 
sources, transparency of citations, reporting of certainty in the historical record, and 
attention to valid comparisons (including the explicit calibration of quantitative scores 
to qualitative observations)’ (p. 55). There are three cases involved this process, 
including Brunei, Hong Kong and Macau (the coding procedure can refer to Table 3.1 
and 3.2, also Marshall et al. 2013). To fill in the missing data of these cases, a rigorous 
procedure was implemented to obtain the data from reliable sources, by analysing the 
constitutional and electoral law of the countries in question. In addition, books, 
academic journal articles, official government reports, international replication 
databases have been used to cross-check with the validity of the coding. Usually more 
than one source of information has been consulted to ensure that the data obtained 
is valid and free from potential bias. The next section will discuss the independent and 
intervening variables derived from the structural approach, followed by data 
collection and measurement strategies. 
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3.3 Explaining Autocracy: the Main Structural Variables 
 
Since the introduction of the structural explanations of democratisation, a significant 
number of quantitative studies have tested the impact of structural factors on 
democracy based on different time periods, different regions and different contextual 
factors (see Chapter 2). The aim of this third chapter is not only to identify potential 
factors for detailed analysis to re-test the major notions of the structural approach, 
but also to detect the outliers. This section therefore first provides an overview of the 
major internal and external factors that relate to democratisation in the existing 
literature. There is a detailed discussion to scrutinise major variables related to the 
structural explanation, including level of democracy, economic development, social 
homogeneity, oil production, religious belief and external factors, such as former 
colonial influence, receipt of economic support from external powers and number of 
democratic countries in the surrounding area. After discussion of these variables, the 
next section describes the data sources and measurement. I derived the data for the 
independent and intervening variables from existing data sets (see Lieberman 2010: 
39). Two principles will be vigilantly emphasised when selecting a database, namely 
high reliability of measurements or scales and comprehensiveness of data coverage, 
to ensure that it provides the maximum amount of data to cover most cases around 
the world. So, what are the most important independent variables as analysed in 
previous quantitative studies? 
 
Economic Development 
 
Economic development has been regarded as the major independent variable for 
explaining consolidation of democracy and transition to democracy. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the ground breaking study of Lipset (1959) explored economic 
development as the main requisite for sustaining democracy in Western Europe and 
North America. In the following years, various research projects have replicated this 
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argument and have shown the positive effect of economic development on sustaining 
democracy (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Coulter 1975; Cutright 1963; Cutright and Wiley 
1969; Lipset et al. 1993; Smith 1969). Economic development is not only relevant to 
democratic consolidation, but there are also many studies which have shown that high 
levels of economic development have a positive impact on  the chance that a country 
makes a transition to democracy (see Barro 1996; Boix 2011; Colaresi and Thompson 
2003: 383; Croissant 2004; Crouch and Morley 1999; Epstein et al. O’Halloran 2006; 
Lipset 1959; Lipset 1994; Lipset et al. 1993; Narayan et al. 2010; Ravich 2000; Rost and 
Booth 2008: 635; Rowen 1995; Teorell 2010). Let me just  highlight a few examples of 
these excellent studies., Boix (2011: 827) confirmed the positive effect of economic 
development on democratic transitions and consolidation with a data set from the 
early nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth century. Colaresi and Thompson 
(2003) also found that ‘that when external conditions are controlled, there is qualified 
confirmation that economic development supports democracy’ (p. 383). In addition, 
Jensen and Skaaning (2012: 1125) showed that economic development in terms of 
GDP per capita still has a significant positive effect on political rights and civil liberties. 
In the context of Asia, Croissant (2004) indicated that social and economic 
determinants, such as a high level of economic modernisation, positively correlate 
with democracy. But he also highlighted cases against the grain, e.g. stating that 
‘democracy did not emerge despite high socio-economic modernisation (Singapore)’ 
(pp. 166-168). This is precisely the puzzle I seek to unpack further in the small-N 
analysis part of this study.  
Countries with high levels of economic development can facilitate social 
development in the society. These intervening variables, including urbanisation, 
educational level, life expectancy and vibrancy of communication channels are also 
favourable for transitions to democracy (see Barro 1996; Cullen and Sommer 2011; 
Cutright 1963: 259; Diamond 2009: 78; Gurses 2011: 173; Halpern and Gibbs 2013; 
Huntington 1991; Lipset 1994; Lipset et al. 1993; Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008). 
Another study, which analysed 174 countries from 1960 to 2005, showed that a higher 
level of schooling (average years of education) had a positive impact on 
democratisation: ‘[w]hile countries that have remained autocratic over the past three 
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decades had 1.72 average years of schooling in 1975, countries that managed to opt 
out from autocracy had on average 3.59 years of schooling’ (Papaioannou and 
Siourounis 2008:374). These intervening variables can also be used in the large-N 
analysis when replicating the findings of the structural approach and when mapping 
out the deviant autocracies. 
 
Homogenous Society 
 
A homogenous society has also been considered favourable to democratic 
development (see Barro 1996; Dahl 2000; Gurses 2011: 173). Previous research has 
been inconclusive, though, with mixed findings. According to Papaioannou and 
Siourounis (2008: 376), ethnic diversity is not a significant factor in predicting 
transition to democracy in the third wave of democratisation. However, Mansfield and 
Snyder (2009: 381-384) illustrated that ethnic diversity, especially when there is 
conflict between dominant and outsider groups, is very likely to intensify political 
struggle based on nationalism and result in incomplete democratisation. With 
quantitative data from 1972 covering 167 countries, Jensen and Skaaning (2012) 
suggested that not only modernisation but also ethnic fractionalisation have 
significant positive relationships with democratisation.  
Hence, it is not clear whether this variable has an important impact. Moreover, 
potential deviant autocracies are quite homogenous in general. According to the 
Central Intelligence Agency (2014), Hong Kong (93.1% Chinese), Macau (92.4% 
Chinese), Saudi Arabia (90% Arab) and Singapore (74.2% Chinese) are dominated by a 
single ethnic group. Countries such as Brunei, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) are relatively multi-ethnic societies, if we count both national and non-
national populaces. Take UAE as an example. According to the latest official 
government census data, 85% of the total population is non-national, i.e. only 15% are 
citizens, so the country is dominated by a single ethnic group so to speak (Federal 
Competiveness and Statistics Authority 2015).  
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Religious Belief 
 
Religious belief is another important factor in the literature which may help us to 
understand transition to democracy. Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) found that 
‘there is a significant negative correlation between Muslim share and the likelihood 
that a non-democratic country will democratise’ (p. 375). Nevertheless, Lust (2011: 
168) pointed out that there are different strands of Islam. This implies that the 
traditional way of measuring the share of Muslims in the total population is biased. 
With regard to Muslim(-majority) states, Lust (2011) argued that they should be 
further subdivided four ways: ‘[a] secularist-based state allowing non-state Islamist 
groups to participate, an Islamic based state allowing such Islamist participation, an 
Islamic-based state excluding participation of non-state Islamist groups, and a 
secularist-based state excluding Islamist participation’ (p. 173). Rost and Booth (2008: 
649) found that religious factionalism and percentage of Muslims have no relationship 
to democracy at all. Empirical evidence from the Middle East shows that historical 
experiences and institutional structures, especially in different types of Muslim-
majority states, may affect the likelihood of democratisation. Islamic society is not 
necessarily anti-democracy, however, as the absolute power of incumbents in high 
income countries such as Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia has been 
challenged in recent political uprisings (see Bellin 2012; Brynen et al. 2012; Matthiesen 
2013). 
 
Oil Producing Country 
 
Being an oil producing country is often regarded an important factor impeding 
democratic progress (see Ross 2001: 327-328). Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008: 
376) boldly suggest that oil producing countries are ‘always autocratic’. To illustrate 
this idea, Diamond (2009) used the example of Russia to explain why it failed to 
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emerge as a legitimate democracy in recent years even though Russia has notable 
economic growth and development. He suggests that a ‘distorted type of economic 
growth has been occurring in Russia—very dependent on natural resources—and 
occurring in a way that has actually given more resources, more control, and more 
political power to the existing authoritarian ruling elites’ (p. 80). To further explain the 
underlying logic, Crystal (1989: 430-441) clarified how oil revenues facilitate coalition 
building between rulers and merchants to stabilise the regime. Recently, Amundsen 
(2014: 185) provided a detailed discussion of how the ruling elites monopolise power 
and block democratisation. Cross country analysis also supported the claim that 
natural-resource wealth impedes transition to democracy (Ulfelder 2007). 
New findings in recent years supported the opposite conclusion, however. A 
large-N empirical study focused on the Muslim world from 1972 to 1999, and showed 
that oil-rich countries have a potentially positive effect on democratisation (Gurses 
2009: 523). Gurses (2011) also used ‘fuel’ and ‘ores and metals exports’ to measure 
the effect on democratic development of countries’ dependence on exporting natural 
resources, arguing that  
‘the emergence of natural-resource-rich democracies (e.g., Mexico, 
Chile, Indonesia) in the aftermath of the Cold War coupled with those 
democracies that have proven durable despite (or because of) 
substantial natural resources (e.g., Botswana, Trinidad and Tobago) 
have raised a more complex view of the relationship between natural 
resource wealth and the endurance of democracy’ (p. 172).  
To counteract the claim that oil production may be alien to democracy, Liou and 
Musgrave (2014) used timing effects to analyse the cases of Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, and Trinidad and Tobago to show that ‘[m]ost of the 
countries we investigate did not become more authoritarian than we would have 
expected even without an influx of oil income’ (p. 1604). Likewise, a recent regression 
analysis shows that oil producing countries are not hindering democracy (Ahmadov 
2013). In addition, Bearce and Hutnick (2011: 706) identified a new variable, ‘net 
immigration per capita’, as an important intervening variable to explain lack of 
democratisation among resource-rich countries. After controlling for this variable, 
GDP per capita still maintains a positive relationship with democracy. Based on the 
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above findings and in view of the recent ‘Arab Spring’, it would seem that oil-reliant 
countries are not necessarily alien to democracy (see Butcher 2014: 736). Given the 
latest findings and recent political developments among oil producing countries, it is 
reasonable to expect that this factor only has a marginal effect on democratisation. 
 
Inequality  
 
The interplay of elites, such as middle class is also crucial for democratisation. Moore’s 
(1966:418) famous dictum, ‘no bourgeoisie, no democracy’, suggest that the middle 
class plays an important role in the transition to democracy. The size of the middle 
class can be useful in explaining democratic transitions (Doorenspleet 1997) and 
democratic consolidation (Inglehart 1988). But if the society is highly stratified, 
income and economic resources are highly concentrated among a small elite in a way 
that is unfavourable for the emergence of a middle class and the development of 
democracy.  
Indeed, Moore’s thesis has been challenged in recent studies. Bernhard (2016) 
analysed post-communist societies to show that ‘in 1989 we witnessed for the first 
time the emergence of democracy without a bourgeoisie in Moore’s sense’ (p. 123). 
Boix and Stokes (2003) also implied that ‘democracy is caused not by income per se 
but by other changes that accompany development, in particular, income equality’ (p. 
540). Similar arguments can be found in Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 
(1992), highlighting that elites or a landowning class continually act to impede 
democratisation. Recent studies also stress the important role of inequality in the 
process of democratisation, such as elite support in oil producing countries (Gurses 
2011: 173) and the effect of adjusting taxation in highly unequal countries, which 
increase the plausibility of democratisation (Yi 2012).  
Haggard and Kaufman (1995 and 1997) used the economic approach to 
highlight the importance of inequality and its effect on democracy. Basically, the poor 
prefer democracy, whereas the rich prefer (right-wing) dictatorship. To that extent, 
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the socio-economic background of the ruling elites is crucial in the process of political 
transition and democratisation. If right-wing actors take power, they will be reluctant 
to promote democracy. Nevertheless, Teorell (2010) argued that ‘[t]he greatest 
drawback of the economic approach, to date, is its relative lack of empirical 
corroboration’ (p. 27). To address this issue, Chapter 4 will provides a detailed 
elaboration of the interaction between elites with a neo actor-based approach to 
understand how business and professional elites seize power during the period of 
transition.  
 
External Factors 
 
In the process of transitions to democracy, it is not uncommon to notice cases where 
democratic institutions are imposed by external actors. International forces generally 
refer to pressure from powerful states in the region, ‘demonstration effects, the 
collapse of regional hegemons, and regional economic crises’ (Hawkins 2001: 447). 
Haggard and Kaufman (2012) also made the following claim, ‘[e]xternal actors were 
decisive in some cases’ (p. 496). Colaresi and Thompson (2003) also claimed that ‘the 
international environment significantly alters the prospects for democracy. External 
threats from other states decrease the likelihood of democracy’ (p. 383). In the cases 
of former Soviet states, the package of economic incentives offered by the European 
Union may become ‘the most powerful incentives for democratic behavior… but you 
have to have political actors in the target countries that are willing to respond to 
incentives and cultural and social circumstances that provide at least some political 
pluralism and scope for influence’ (Diamond 2009: 85).  
However, the desirability of exporting democratic systems from developed 
countries to developing nations is being questioned. Barro (1996) found that ‘political 
freedoms tend to erode over time if they [the country with democratic political 
structure imposed by external actor] get out of line with a country’s standard of living’ 
(p. 24). In any case, the interplay between external and internal actors may shed light 
on the existence of deviant autocracies. We will see how external actor(s) such as the 
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British government and communist China have shaped the political structure of 
former colonies such as Hong Kong and Singapore during the transitional period. 
In the same vein, external influence via diffusion effects has been shown to be 
quite effective in breaking down autocracies. Lipset (1994: 16) explained that ‘events 
in neighbouring countries, diffusion effects from elsewhere, leadership and 
movement behaviour, can affect the nature of the polity’. More importantly, this 
effect is widely accepted by a range of scholars (Doorenspleet and Kopecký 2008; 
Doorenspleet and Mudde 2008; Gibler and Tir 2014; Hale 2013; Hawkins 2001; 
Huntington 1991). This demonstration effect has a significant effect on 
democratisation. The influence of the demonstration effect or diffusion on democracy 
has been further illustrated in a study based on a dataset from the early 1950s to late 
1990s (see i.e. Gleditsch 2002; Gleditsch and Ward 2006, 2008). Examining how 
political actors interact with and respond to the democratic experiences of 
neighbouring countries or influential external powers may help us to understand and 
explain deviant autocracies. 
Finally, another critical international factor is colonial influence. The colonial 
experience, especially British rule, is often regarded as favourable to democratic 
development (Barro 1996: 19; Huber et al. 1993: 9; Jensen and Skaaning 2012: 1129). 
Glaeser et al. (2004) argued that European colonisation can enhance the human 
capital of the colonies. Likewise, Lipset et al. (1993: 160) claimed that ‘former British 
colonies are more likely to have political democracy through the 1970s than countries 
that have been ruled by other colonial powers’. Lipset and his colleagues did not, 
however, provide any detailed description of the situation from the 1980s onward. It 
is worth noting that the relationship between British colonial experience and 
democracy is not statistically significant in their study after the 1970s. This result was 
replicated in Croissant’s (2004) analysis, suggesting that there is ‘no positive 
correlation between British colonialism and (liberal) democracy’ (pp. 168-169).  
These contradictory findings inevitably triggered debate on this issue. Some 
scholars were sceptical of the effect of colonial experience on democracy. Huntington 
(1991: 19) argued that ‘no real effort was made to introduce democratic institutions’ 
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in the colonies. Hariri (2012) shared a similar opinion: ‘European colonisation and 
settlement did not export democracy, but European settlers did bring institutional 
forms of governance from their countries of origin, and their identity as Europeans… 
Institutional transplantation was not an export of democracy because none of the 
colonial powers were democratic at the time’ (p. 474). In the case of India, 
Subrahmanyam (2006:87) argued that the British colonial government adopted divide 
and rule, trying to politicise social tensions to ensure effective rule. Further examples 
are illustrated by McMillan (2008), who stated that the British colonial government 
‘introduced elections to the Indian system of government, although with a severely 
restricted franchise, and with safeguards built in to guarantee representation for 
particular groups’ (p. 738).  
A recent econometric analysis based on a dataset from 1960 to 2000 also 
showed that countries colonised by Britain are associated with a negative relationship 
with democracy (Posso and Feeny 2015: 1260-1261). Moreover, Ganguly (2007: ix) 
claimed that the British did little or nothing to promote the growth of democratic 
institutions in India. In the case of Botswana, according to Good and Taylor (2008), the 
country acquired no functioning legislature until the year before independence in 
1966, as the limited political development was concentrated on the embryonic 
executive (p. 753). Hong Kong is another pertinent example. It was a British colony for 
over 150 years; yet the introduction of direct elections with a limited franchise was 
initiated in 1988 right after the ratification of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984. 
Why was the British colonial administration reluctant to develop liberal democracy 
during the colonial era? Was the colonial policy of British adjusted after the 1970s? If 
so, why?  
It is worth noting that Comeau (2003) is cautious on the impact of British 
colonial experience on democracy, arguing that  
[u]sing the colonial experience as an indicator of a nation’s political 
tradition has some intrinsic conceptual problems. Due to fierce 
competition among colonial powers, a number of nations have 
experienced a succession of colonial administrations over time. The 
fact that a competitor would prevail, usually after throwing its rivals 
out of a disputed territory, does not necessarily imply that the losers 
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left behind no impact. Therefore, it might not be appropriate to 
attribute the entirety of a nation’s political heritage before 
independence to the one predominant colonial ruler (p. 4). 
Therefore, it would be useful to study the interaction of the former colonial elites and 
the successors during the process of negotiation and political transition, in cases such 
as independence (Bahrain, Brunei and Singapore) and handover of sovereignty (Hong 
Kong and Macau).  
 
The Selected Structural Variables and Hypotheses 
 
To sum up, there are multiple factors contributing to transition to democracy, as 
illustrated by Fukuyama (1992): 
Democratisation is an autonomous political process, however, that is 
dependent on a variety of political factors including: the apparent success 
of democracy relative to its authoritarian competitors in other countries; 
the fortunes of war (and peace) in the international system; the skill and 
competence of the individual leaders who seek to create and consolidate 
democratic systems; and sheer accident. There are also cultural obstacles 
to stable democracy, such as religion, ethnicity, preexisting social 
structure, and the like, that are independent of the level of economic 
development and affect the possibility of democracy (p. 108). 
Most studies which have tested the structural explanation indicate that economic 
development is still a significant independent variable in predicting democratisation. 
To re-test the structural explanation, I state the following two hypotheses: 
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between economic development and 
level of democracy. 
H2: Ceteris paribus, economic development is the most important 
predictor in explaining level of democracy. 
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To test the above hypotheses, I collected data from various sources and data sets (see 
Table 3.3). The dependent variable is based on the Polity score (Marshall et al. 2011). 
The scores for the independent and intervening variables are mainly collected from 
data of the World Bank’s (2012) World Development Indicator, which provides a 
comprehensive list of variables in a wide range of areas, including agriculture and rural 
development, aid effectiveness, climate change, economic policy and external debt, 
education, energy and mining, environment, the financial sector, gender, health, 
infrastructure, labour and social protection, poverty, the public and private sectors, 
science and technology, social development and urban development. This time-series 
database covers the period 1960 to 2012 and a total of 214 economies.7 The data is 
not exclusively drawn from large countries; small states and territories are all present 
in the data. Variables are also excerpted from Democracy Crossnational Data (Norris 
2009), which contains 1,000 variables covering data on the social, economic and 
political characteristics of 191 states. The influence of Islam is based on the idea of 
Lust (2011). 
 
Table 3.3 List of Major Variables and Sources 
Major Variables Code Source 
Dependent variables 
- POLITY (-10 to 10) 
- Democracy (0-10) 
- Autocracy (0-10) 
 
polity 
in_dem 
in_aut 
 
Marshall et al. (2011) 
Marshall et al. (2011) 
Marshall et al. (2011) 
Social-economic conditions 
- GDP per capita (ln) 
- Urban population (% of 
total) 
- Life expectancy at birth, 
total (years) 
- School enrolment, 
 
GDP 
urb 
life_exp 
 
sch_sec 
 
 
World Bank (2012) 
World Bank (2012) 
World Bank (2012) 
 
World Bank (2012) 
 
                                                          
7 Some scholars argue that the military always has a decisive effect on transition; if military leaders fail 
to give up power peacefully and use a military coup to get rid of the civilian government, this will 
severely affect the smooth transition and consolidation of the newly developed political structure (see 
Haggard and Kaufman 2012: 496; Lee 2009: 662). The effect of military is not analysed in this chapter 
due to two reasons: 1) lack of existing reliable quantitative measurement and database on influence of 
military for each individual country from 1960 to 2010; 2) this is not an important factor among the 
potential cases of deviant autocracies identified in this chapter. For example, during the transitional 
period, military and armed force did not played any role in Singapore and Hong Kong. 
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secondary (% gross) 
- School enrolment, tertiary 
(% gross) 
- Ethnic fractionalisation 
(combined linguistic and 
racial) 
- Gini coefficient 
sch_ter 
 
ethnic 
 
 
gini 
World Bank (2012) 
 
Norris (2009) 
 
 
Norris (2009) 
Communication Channels 
- Telephone lines (per 100 
people) 
- Mobile cellular 
subscriptions (per 100 
people) 
- Internet users (per 100 
people) 
- Newspapers per 1,000 
people 
 
tele 
 
mobile 
 
internet 
 
newspaper 
 
World Bank (2012) 
 
World Bank (2012) 
 
World Bank (2012) 
 
World Bank (2012) 
Natural Resource 
- Total natural resources 
profits (% of GDP) 
- Oil profits (% of GDP) 
- Fuel exports (% of 
merchandise exports) 
- Ores and metals exports 
(% of merchandise 
exports) 
 
nat_res 
 
oil_rents 
fuel_exp 
 
ore_met 
 
World Bank (2012) 
 
World Bank (2012) 
World Bank (2012) 
 
World Bank (2012) 
Demographic Factor 
- Land area (sq. km) 
- Population density (people 
per sq. km of land area) 
 
land 
pop_den 
 
Norris (2009) 
World Bank (2012) 
 
Influence of Islam 
- Islam as predominant 
religion 
- Secular regime with 
Islamist inclusion 
- Secular regime with 
Islamist exclusion 
- Islamic-based regime with 
Islamist inclusion 
- Islamic based regime with 
Islamist exclusion 
 
muslim 
 
muslim_SRI 
 
muslim_SRE 
 
muslim_IRI 
 
muslim_IBE 
 
Lust (2011) 
 
Lust (2011) 
 
Lust (2011) 
 
Lust (2011) 
 
Lust (2011) 
External factors 
- Former British colony 
- Total reserves (% of total 
external debt) 
- Percentage of other 
democracies in region 
 
GBR_colony 
ext_debt 
 
demo_reg 
 
Norris 2009 
World Bank (2012) 
 
World Bank (2012) 
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Label (in Scatterplot) 
- Country Name (Polity) 
 
 
Scode 
 
Marshall et al. (2011) 
 
All the above data are carefully compiled to formulate a single dataset for large-N 
analyses, which consists of 167 countries and territories, covering the period from 
1960 to 2011. It provides a reliable and accurate dataset with various dependent, 
independent and intervening variables to test the hypotheses. 
There is an issue of autocorrelation in data analysis that was originally stressed 
spontaneously in the disciplines of geography and econometrics. It generally refers to 
a repeating pattern in the time series data that may undermine the significance of the 
findings of regression analysis (see Anselin 1992; Beck et al. 1998; Getis and Ord 1992; 
Ord and Getis 1995; Robert 2003; Roodman 2009). Instruments for identification and 
measurement of autocorrelation have been developed in difference disciplines, such 
as the Arellano-Bond test, the Baltagi-Wu test, the Breusch-Godfrey test, the Durbin-
Watson statistic, Geary’s c, Moran’s I, Wooldridge’s test and spatial association 
analysis (Anselin 1988; Anselin and Getis 1992; Bhargava 1982; Breusch 1978; Breusch 
and Pagan 1979, 1980; Cliff and Ord 1973; Davis 1986; Drukker 2003; Godfrey 1978; 
Kirby and Ward 1987; Lee and Strang 2006; O’Loughlin et al. 2004; Ord and Getis 1995; 
Wooldridge 2002). Proponents have argued that failure to avoid spatial 
autocorrelation can lead to model misinterpretation (see Anselin and Griffith 1988; 
Arbia 1989; Getis and Ord 1992: 203). Hence, Getis and Ord (1992: 189) urged 
researchers to assess the effects of autocorrelation. 
Only a limited number of studies on democratisation have highlighted the 
issue of autocorrelation. Those research studies generally replicated the notion of 
structural explanation, that is, structural factors still hold a significant positive 
relationship with democratisation (see Diebolt et al. 2013: 748; O’Loughlin et al. 2004: 
568; Ulfelder 2008: 291). In recent years, Torfason and Ingram (2010) used a network 
autocorrelation model to examine the cases from 1815 to 2000 and demonstrated the 
positive effects of the interstate network and the global diffusion of democracy. They 
used the Arellano-Bond test to suggest that ‘serial autocorrelation does not seem to 
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be driving our results’ (p. 371). Another study on democratisation and corruption 
demonstrated that the issue of autocorrelation did not exist (Roca and Alidedeoglu-
Buchner 2010: 10). Not surprisingly, scholars in the field of democratisation have been 
urged not to adjust for autocorrelation because there is a lack of evidence to show 
that it is relevant to the study of democratisation (see Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006: 
149; Mansfield and Snyder 2002: 537; Welzel 2006: 886).8 
The next section will test the impact of the key structural factors on the level 
of democracy in a large-N statistical analysis. The first finding is that findings of 
previous studies can be replicated. The second finding, though, is that there is an 
increasing number of outliers. This number went from 3 in 1960 to 11 in 2010. Those 
outliers are countries with a high level of economic development but without 
democracy, called ‘deviant autocracies’ in my thesis. 
I will argue that the emergence of deviant autocracies in recent decades posits 
a huge challenge to the structural explanation, especially modernisation theory, and 
also a puzzle for the student of democratisation. It is important to study and examine 
this issue systematically. 
 
3.4 Re-testing the Impact of Structural Explanations 
 
To start with, Table 3.4 shows the result of bivariate analysis of the major variables 
with Polity scores to provide a baseline for multivariate analysis in the later part of this 
chapter. This helps to determine which factors can be eliminated in subsequent 
analysis and/or case studies (see Frees 2004; George and Bennett 2005; Simon 1954; 
Lieberman 2005, 2010). The result concerning social-economic conditions and 
democracy are pretty much consistent with the existing literature; in particular, 
economic development as measured by GDP per capita (.441) and school enrolment 
                                                          
8 To avoid the potential danger of autocorrelation, I have conducted the Breusch-Godfrey test and the 
Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch 1978; Breusch and Pagan 1979, 1980; Godfrey 1978). Neither set of results 
suggests that there are problems of autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity in the data used in this thesis. 
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for university students (.528) maintain a significant moderate positive relationship 
with the Polity score.  
Unsurprisingly, this finding confirms the importance of communication 
channels for democracy (see Cutright 1963). Given that current communication 
channels are very different from half a century ago, the use of mobile phone (.276) 
and internet (.294) are positively correlated with democracy (p < .001). Gurses (2011: 
164) highlighted the well famed ‘resource curse’ among countries that heavily rely on 
exporting natural resources, more precisely oil; such dependence has an adverse 
effect on democratisation and tends to sustain a suppressive regime. The preliminary 
bivariate analysis supports this claim and all the variables that related to exportation 
of natural resources are negatively correlated with Polity score; in particular, the total 
natural resources profits and oil profits are -.369 (p < .001) and -.410 (p < .001), 
respectively.  
The results show that the demographic factor has only insignificant effect on 
democracy: country size and population density only hold a very weak positive 
relationship with democracy, at .037 (p = .032) and .039 (p = .005) respectively. In this 
regard, there is no reason for us to neglect small states. To incorporate more countries 
into the model for analysis can definitely enhance the explanatory power and 
generalisability of the structural explanation. Similar to the ‘resource curse’, Islamic 
belief is usually depicted as incompatible with democracy. If we analyse 
predominantly Muslim countries, the results support this assertion, showing 
significant negative correlation with democracy (-.394).  
Lust (2011) suggested different types of Islamic state; using this categorisation 
method we obtain a very interesting finding: the ‘secular regime with Islamist 
inclusion’ neither supports nor resists democracy, as this variable does not have any 
significant relationship with Polity score (p = .867).  
Finally, external factors, such as foreign aid (0.48, p = .004) and democracy 
diffusion (.541, p = 000), also have a significant effect on democracy. However, it is 
worth noting that former British colonies no longer maintain a significant relationship 
with democracy. We also find this interesting finding in the study of Lipset et al. (1993), 
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but their paper does not explain this finding at all. As clarified above, the effect of 
former British colonisation on democracy is diminishing. Especially those cases 
involved disputes with external actors during the de-colonisation process. The next 
chapter will closely scrutinise this factor to explain the emergent and persistence of 
deviant autocracies.  
 
Table 3.4: Aggregated Correlational Analysis between the Key Variables, 1960 to 
2011 
Variable Number of 
Cases 
Polity Score 
Social-economic conditions 
- GDP per capita (ln) 
- Urban population (% of total) 
- School enrolment, secondary (% gross) 
- School enrolment, tertiary (% gross) 
- Life expectancy at birth, total (year) 
- Ethnic fractionalisation (combined linguistic 
and racial) 
- Inequality (Gini coefficient) 
 
6,382 
7,094 
4,362 
4,038 
7,030 
6,993 
 
7,061 
 
.441*** 
.357 *** 
.521*** 
.528*** 
.492*** 
-.282*** 
 
-.068*** 
Communication Channels 
- Telephone lines (per 100 people) 
- Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) 
- Internet users (per 100 people) 
- Newspapers per 1,000 people 
 
5,444 
5,607 
2,947 
1,935 
 
.523*** 
.276*** 
.294*** 
.437*** 
Natural Resource 
- Total natural resources profits (% of GDP) 
- Oil profits (% of GDP) 
- Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) 
- Ore and metal exports (% of merchandise 
exports) 
 
5,379 
4,382 
4,567 
4,668 
 
-.369*** 
-.410*** 
-.339*** 
-.133*** 
Demographic Factor 
- Land area (sq. km) 
- Population density (people per sq. km of land 
area) 
 
3,302 
5,080 
 
.037* 
.039** 
Influence of Islam 
- Islam as predominant religion 
- Secular regime with Islamist inclusion 
- Secular regime with Islamist exclusion 
- Islamic-based regime with Islamist inclusion 
- Islamic based regime with Islamist exclusion 
 
7,061 
7,180 
7,180 
7,180 
7,180 
 
-.394*** 
.002 
-.226*** 
-.114*** 
-.236*** 
External factors   
84 
 
- Former British colony 
- Total reserves (% of total external debt) 
- Percentage of other democracies in region 
7,180 
3,575 
7,061 
.021 
.048** 
.541*** 
* p < .05     ** p < .01     *** p < .001 
 
After these bivariate correlational analysis, the next step is to reduce the 
number of variables for further multivariate analysis (see Frees 2004: 11; George and 
Bennett 2005; Meyers et al. 2013; Simon 1954). Factor analysis (see Gorsuch 2015) is 
then conducted to reduce the number of factors that explain most of the variance 
before the regression analysis. Analyses show that economic development, GDP per 
capita (.794), and other social development related variables, urban population (.751), 
tertiary enrolment (.673) and life expectancy at birth (. 655) can explain 21.69% of the 
variance. This suggests that factors related to a structural approach are still important 
in explaining democracy. Other variables identified in the factor analysis deserve more 
attention: Islam as predominant religion (.662), oil profits in percentage of GDP (.655), 
armed forces personnel in percentage of total labour force (.687), fuel exports in 
percentage of merchandise exports (.585) contribute to 14.51% of the variance, and 
former British colony (.726) and total reserves in percentage of total external debt 
(.534) are two important factors which explain 11.05% of the variance.  
The bivariate and factor analysis suggest that economic variable still have a 
significant effect on the dependent variable, the level of democracy (as measured by 
the Polity Project). To further verify the result, a multivariate analysis, namely 
regression analysis, is conducted. To replicate the finding of Barro (1996: 16-18) for 
the basic regressions for level of democracy, the following variables are analysed, GDP 
per capita, schooling and life expectancy. These variables are aligned with major 
notions of the structural explanations (see Lipset, Seong and Torres 1993: 166; Lipset 
1994: 17). Here are the structural equations of the model:9 
                                                          
9 To analyse the data, some scholars preferred to use lagged variables to show the impact over time 
(see Boix 2011; Epstein et al. 2006: 560). But I do agree with the argument of Jensen and Skaaning 
(2012: 1124, 1127) in view of the lagged variable. Thus, the data present in the following section 
without using any artificial procedure to lag the data. 
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polity = β0(GDP per capita) +β1 (urban population) +μ (1) 
polity = β0(GDP per capita) +β1 (urban population) +β2 (life expectancy) +μ (2) 
polity = β0(GDP per capita) +β1 (urban population) +β2 (life expectancy) + β3 (school 
enrolment, secondary) + β4 (school enrolment, tertiary) +μ (3) 
 
In Table 3.5, the first model shows that the economic indicators still retain a 
significant positive relationship with democracy. Economic development, i.e. GDP per 
capita, yields a significant positive relationship (.415, < .001). However, the effect of 
urbanisation is not as strong, as shown by the bivariate analysis: there is a very weak 
positive relationship with the dependent variable, yielding the standardised 
coefficients beta-weight at .034, p = .040. Other variables such as life expectancy and 
educational attainment did have a significant effect on developing or maintaining 
democracy, especially tertiary education (.282, p < .001), which involves training 
skilled labourers to enhance human capital and facilitate further economic 
progression. At the same time, economic development may nurture so-called ‘civic 
culture’ with a participatory political culture and liberal mind set, which will eventually 
provide a solid foundation for transition to democracy (see Almond and Verba 1963; 
Inglehart 1988; Inglehart and Welzel 2003; Hadenius and Teorell 2005; Pye and Verba 
1965; Teorell and Hadenius 2006; Welzel and Inglehart 2006, 2008).  
All in all, the models suggest that economic development and other social 
development indicators, such as life expectancy and educational level, are significant 
predictors for the variance of the Polity score. This finding is in line with many 
successful transitional experiences. In several highly developed countries, such as 
Taiwan and South Korea, a significant number of university students and members of 
the middle class were involved in establishing a democratic political structure (see 
Cheng 1989; Kim 2003). More importantly, it is worth mentioning that economic 
development still has a significant positive relationship in explaining the variance of 
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Polity, with beta-weight at .415, p < .001, .175, p < .001 and .138, p < .001 in Models 
1, 2 and 3 respectively.10 
 
Table 3.5: Regression Analysis on the Major Variables of Modernisation Theory 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Predictor Polity Polity Polity 
- GDP per capita (ln) .415*** .175*** .138*** 
- Urban population 
(ln) 
.034* -.075*** -.174*** 
- Life expectancy (ln) - .399*** .208*** 
- School enrolment, 
secondary 
- - .175*** 
- School enrolment, 
tertiary 
- - .282*** 
    
N 6,377 6,314 3,340 
R2 (adjusted) .194 .244 .374 
* p < .05     ** p < .01     *** p < .001 
Note: Numbers presented are Standardised Coefficients Beta-Weight. 
 
To further investigate the influence of other factors discussed in the previous 
section, more variables are included in the equation to examine its effect on the 
dependent variable, GDP per capita, with reference to the existing structural 
explanations literature. These variables include urbanisation, life expectancy, ethnic 
fractionalisation, Gini-coefficient, former British colonisation, and percentage of 
democracies in the region (in Model 4).11 In addition, oil production and religious 
                                                          
10 Socio-economic development indicators are high correlated, to avoid noises to affect the result on 
the multivariable analysis in Model 4 and 5. A factor analysis has been conducted to select the variables 
for detail analysis with other independent variables. The result shows that school enrolment for 
secondary and tertiary enrolment can only explain 3.3% and 2.3% of the variance only. Hence, these 
variables will be excluded in the sequence analysis. 
11 The formula of Model 4 is based on the variables used in following existing studies: Polity Score 
(Ahmadov 2013; Barro 2015; Bearce and Hutnick 2011; Boix 2011; Butcher 2014; Colaresi and 
Thompson 2003; Epstein et al. 2006; Goldstone et al. 2010; Haggard and Kaufman 2012; Hariri 2012; 
Jensen and Skaaning 2012; Knutsen and Nygård 2015; Linder and Bächtiger 2005; Liou and Musgrave 
2014; Nur-tegin and Czap 2012; Rost and Booth 2008; Tusalem 2015; Ulfedler and Lustik 2007; Ulfelder 
2007; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2011); GDP per capita (Barro 1996: 2; Boix 2011; Colaresi and Thompson 
2003: 383; Croissant 2004; Crouch and Morley 1999; Epstein et al. 2006; Huber et al. 1993; Lipset 1959; 
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belief are added in (Model 5). 12  The hypotheses will be will be tested with the 
following formulas: 
 
polity = β0(GDP per capita) +β1 (urban population) +β2 (life expectancy) +β3 (Gini 
coefficient) +β4 (former British colony) + β5 (percentage of other democracies in region) 
+β6 (ethnic fractionalisation) +μ (4) 
polity = β0(GDP per capita) +β1 (urban population) +β2 (life expectancy) +β3 (Gini 
coefficient) +β4 (Islam as predominant religion) +β5 (oil profits (% of GDP)) +β6 (former 
British colony) + β7 (percentage of other democracies in region) + β8 (ethnic 
fractionalisation) +μ (5) 
  
                                                          
Lipset 1994; Lipset et al. 1993; Narayan et al. 2010; Ravich 2000; Rost and Booth 2008: 635; Rowen 
1995; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Teorell 2010); Urban population (Colaresi and Thompson 2003; 
Epstein et al. 2006: 560); Life expectancy (Barro 1996; Ulfelder and Lustik 2007: 361); Gini Coefficient 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2001 and 2006; Boix 2003, 2008; Freeman and Quinn 2012; Tudor 2013); 
Former British colony (Barro 1996, 1999; Bernhard et al. 2004; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Colaresi and 
Thompson 2003; Epstein et al. 2006: 560; Jensen and Skaaning 2012; Lankina and Getachew 2012; 
Rueschemeyer et al. 1992); Percentage of other democracies in region (Colaresi and Thompson 2003; 
Doorenspleet 2004; Hawkins 2001; Linz and Stepan 1996; Lipset 1994); and ethnic fractionalisation 
(Barro 1996; Dahl 1973; Croissant 2004; Jensen and Shaaning 2012; Rost and Booth 2008). 
12 In addition to the variables used in Model 4, Model 5 add the following variables into the formula: 
Islam as predominant religion (Barro 1996; Epstein et al. 2006; Lust 2011; Papaioannou and Siourounis 
2008; Rost and Booth 2008; Tusalem 2009); and oil profits (% of GDP) (Bearce and Hutnick 2011; Epstein 
et al. 2006; Gurses 2009; Liou and Musgrave 2014). 
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Table 3.6: Explaining Democracy Levels: Multivariate Regression Analyses 
 (4) (5) 
 Independent Variables Polity Scores Polity Scores 
- GDP per capita (ln) .166*** .277*** 
- Urban population (ln) -.007 -.050** 
- Life expectancy (ln) .129*** .096*** 
- Gini coefficient .027* .019 
- Islam as predominant 
religion  
- -.233*** 
- Oil profits (% of GDP) - -.225*** 
- Former British colony .150*** .112*** 
- Percentage of other 
democracies in region 
.455*** .263*** 
- Ethnic fractionalisation -.085*** -.058*** 
   
N 6,213 4,301 
R2 (adjusted) .410 .530 
* p < .05     ** p < .01     *** p < .001 
Note: Numbers presented are Standardised Coefficients Beta-Weight. 
 
Models 4 and 5 are used to conduct regression analysis on Polity scores. In 
Model 4 (df = 7, n = 6,213), the overall explanatory power is 41.0% for the variance of 
the dependent variable. The GDP per capita is the second important predictor in the 
analysis, yielding a positive significant relationship (.166, p < .001). The most 
significant factor in this model is percentage of democracies in the region, with beta 
weight .455, p < .001. Finally, the GDP per capita (.277, p < .001) is the most important 
predictor in Model 5 (df = 9, n = 4310, R2 (adjusted) = .530). In other words, countries 
with higher levels of economic development are more likely to become democratic. 
These results also support Hypothesis H1 and Hypothesis H2. 
Model 5 has the strongest explanatory power among all the models, as it can 
explain 53.0% of the variance of Polity score. This overall result is consistent with the 
major arguments of the structural explanation. The significant negative relationship 
of muslim (-.233, p < .001) signify that non-Muslim societies are more likely to favour 
a democratic political structure (see Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008; Lust 2011). 
Countries that rely on exporting raw materials, such as oil, are also negatively related 
to the dependent variable (-.225, p < .001) which is consistent with the ‘resource curse’ 
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highlighted by Gurses (2011). The geo-political factor, number of democracies in the 
region (.263, p < .001), also has a significant influence on Polity score (see Gleditsch 
and Ward 2008; Lipset 1994). In addition, former British colonies also tend to become 
democratic, with a significant weak positive relationship (.112, p < .001).  
In short, the multivariate analyses with the latest empirical data have 
successfully replicated the major findings of structural explanations. The GDP per 
capita yielding a significant positive relationship with Polity score in all the Models 
presented above. Models 1, 2 and 3 mainly tested the basic notion of the structural 
explanation. In Models 4 and 5, different independent variables have been added in 
the equations, including urbanisation, life expectancy, ethnic fractionalisation, Gini-
coefficient, former British colonisation, percentage of democracies in the region, oil 
production and religious belief. The results still show that economic development has 
a significant positive relationship with democracy. More importantly, among the 
above independent variables, economic development is the most important factors in 
explaining the variance of the dependent variable, i.e. Polity scores. 
 
3.5 Identifying the Outliers, Discovering the Deviant 
Autocracies  
 
To illustrate the emergence of outliers or deviant autocracies, I decided to regroup the 
data into different years (1960 and 2010) and the results demonstrate a very 
interesting trend. The year 1960 was immediately after Lipset (1959) first set out his 
hypothesis, i.e. the correlation between economic development and democracy. As 
shown in Figure 3.1, the scatterplot demonstrates that most cases fit into Lipset’s 
prediction. With the Polity score as the dependent variable and GDP per capita (ln) as 
the predictor, the statistical result shows a robust explanatory power (with adjusted 
R2 .502); the beta weight is .714 (p < .001) among the 68 countries. This clearly shows 
that there is a linear relationship between these two variables, and that the 
explanatory power is very strong in explaining the variance of the dependent variable. 
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The result definitely replicates the modernisation hypothesis, showing that economic 
development is an important prerequisite for democratic development (see Barro 
2015: 912; Epstein et al. 2006: 551). 
 
Figure 3.1: Scatterplot of Polity Score and Economic Development in 1960   
 
 
 
 
In a regression analysis of the Polity score, as predicted by the GDP per capita 
(ln) in the year 2010, the R2 (adjusted) greatly reduced to 0.39 compared with .502 in 
1960. In addition, the beta weight dropped from .714 to .212 at significance levels 
of .008 among 154 countries in the world (Figure 3.2). This reveals that the 
explanatory power of economic development on democracy has significantly 
weakened. Since the 1960s, there have been various state building events due to 
independent movements, de-colonisation and the breakdown of the former Soviet 
Union; these have all contributed to the creation of new states in different regions in 
Asia, Africa, Latin American, Southern Europe and Eastern Europe. From 1960 to 2010, 
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the total number of states increased rapidly from 68 to more than 167. Most deviant 
autocracies have been nation states that experienced transition to independent or 
changed sovereignty in this period. After the transitional period, all such cases already 
possessed a certain level of economic development, such as Bahrain (1971), Brunei 
(1984), Kuwait (1961), Qatar (1971), Singapore (1965) and the United Arab Emirates 
(1971). Hong Kong and Macau were fully developed when returned to Chinese 
sovereignty by Britain and Portugal in 1997 and 1999, respectively.  
 
Figure 3.2: Scatterplot of Polity Score and Economic Development in 2010 
 
 
 
 
The question is, then, how many deviant autocracies have actually emerged 
since 1960? Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the increasing number of deviant autocracies 
over the past few decades. In 1960, only three cases could be categorised as deviant 
autocracies: Mexico, Portugal and Spain. The number of outliers increased twofold by 
1970, to include Argentina, Greece, Kuwait, Mexico, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore 
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and Spain. Intriguingly, with the waves of democratisation (see Doorenspleet 2000; 
Huntington 1991), a significant number of countries in Southern Europe and Latin 
America went through democratic transitions, including the outliers, Argentina, 
Greece, Mexico, Portugal and Spain. Yet the number of outliers has not diminished 
from the 1980s onwards. To the contrary. By 2010, the total number of cases 
increased to the impressive number of 11 countries (see Figure 3.3).  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Number of Deviant Autocracies, 1960 to 2010 
 
 
The above analysis suggests that the relationship between economic 
development and level of democracy has significantly diminished after half century. 
On the one hand, there are more well-to-do countries make a transition to democracy, 
such as Argentina, the Baltic States, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, East 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, 
Spain and Taiwan. On the other hand, there is an increasing number of outliers which 
go against the modernisation hypothesis. In Table 3.7, there are eleven deviant 
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autocracies that possess a high level of economic development but are still non-
democratic.13  
The cases identified as deviant autocracies in Table 3.7 undeniably possess 
high levels of economic development, but it is worthwhile noting the heterogeneous 
nature of their successful developmental pathways. The literature of standard 
development theory already includes vivid discussions of the two different types of 
development trajectories in relation to the concerned cases. The first type refers to 
the cases, including Hong Kong, Macau, and Singapore, that achieved economic 
success primarily by adopting the notion of neo-liberalism and emphasising foreign 
direct investment and an export-oriented approach (see Chan 2013; Chao and Yi 2007; 
Gu, Dong and Huang 2015: 111-113; Gu and Dong 2011; Harvey 2005; Hill et al. 2012; 
Wang 2012). Consequently, it created a group of interest-oriented business and 
professional elites who strived to maintain the status quo for the sake of economic 
stability and prosperity (see Case 1996; Chua 2000, 2010b; Jayasuriya 1994; So 2000). 
The second types are regarded as resource-reliant countries. The economies 
of countries such as Bahrain, Brunei, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United 
Arab Emirates have been largely sustained by the extraction of petroleum resources 
since the discovery of oil in the 1920s, with reliance upon Western technology to drill 
and extract the resources. The international actors and local elites interacted to 
protect their respective interests (Magnus 1975, 1976). The mass production of crude 
oil that began in the 1940s, fused with the influence of the Cold War and the 
astonishing increase in oil prices in the 1970s, not only contributed to these countries’ 
hasty economic development, but also intensified the elite bargaining situation (see 
Khatib 2014; Knauerhase 1979; Magnus 1975, 1976). Hence, the ruling elites worked 
closely or even established patron-client relationships with the oil-based business 
conglomerates to secure their political and economic interests (see Greenwood 2008; 
Kamrave 2007). 
                                                          
13 Based on the advice and strategy recommended by Lieberman (2005: 445) and Seeberg (2014a: 106-
107). Deviant cases refer to standardised residual more than 2.0. The deviant cases listed in Table 3.5 
show a high standardised residual of more than 3.0. 
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The cases above are in Asia, including East, Southeast and West Asia, but there 
is an exceptional case, Equatorial Guinea, the only African state on the list, which 
makes the deviant autocracies an important research domain. The cases discussed 
above experienced the Cold War era and the de-colonisation process. Equatorial 
Guinea has experienced rapid economic growth since the mid-1990s without any 
direct interference from the above historical incidents (Fraynas 2004). In the post-
colonial period, especially after the 1990s, both American and Chinese companies 
have had increasing influence in Equatorial Guinea. Obiang’s authoritarian 
administration was eager to build up client networks to further consolidate its power 
(see Appel 2012; Esteban 2009). Thus, it is theoretically interesting to see the 
interaction between the ruling elites, the external actors and state capacity during its 
transitional period. More importantly, it opens the possibility of increasing the total 
number of cases categorised as deviant autocracies in the future. 
Given this brief overview of the economic development trajectories among the 
outliers, it is important to examine the interaction of elites during the transitional 
period and to observe how the ruling elites manipulated the state capacity to explain 
the genesis and persistence of deviant autocracies (see Chapter 4). 
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Table 3.7: Polity Score among Deviant Autocracies in 2010 
Country/Territory Polity Score 
Bahrain -5 
Brunei -8 
Equatorial Guinea -5 
Hong Kong 1 
Kuwait -7 
Macau -1 
Oman -8 
Qatar -10 
Saudi Arabia -10 
Singapore -2 
United Arab Emirates -8 
Source: Marshall et al. (2011); missing values are compiled by the author 
 
To provide further empirical evidence to illustrate the emergence of deviant 
autocracies, I calculated the Cook’s distance (see Cook 1977, 1979; Cook and Weisberg 
1982) and compared it with the situation in 1960 and 2010. This statistical equation 
can detect the existence of outliers in linear regression models. The existence of 
outliers in the model could weaken the explanatory power of the theory. In discussing 
outliers, Cook (1979: 172-174) attempts to delete observations categorised as outliers 
in the model and finds that this will greatly enhance the model’s residual correlation 
and confidence level (40% increased to 99.95%). But to understand social phenomena, 
we cannot simply ignore the existence of outliers in the study of democratisation. 
Deleting cases which cannot be explained by the model may prevent researchers from 
exploring the process and factors that are crucial in democratisation.14  
For illustration, I adopted the equation introduced by Bollen and Jackman 
(1990) for identifying deviant cases. To determine the existence of outliers, ‘[a] cutoff 
of 4/n for Di would be roughly equivalent’, i.e. Di > 4/N (p. 266). Analysing the linear 
regression result of the influence of GDP per capita on the autocracy index available 
in Polity IV shows that the standard deviation of Cook’s Distance is .013 (N = 68) in 
                                                          
14 Cook (1979: 172) emphasised that outliers are difficult to detect in a model which consists of many 
cases. A cross-national analysis on the effect of economic development on democracy is certainly an 
example of such a model; any outliers will be easily overlooked by researchers. 
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1960, far lower than the expected .062. The situation became more interesting in 2010, 
with the number of valid cases, 154, demonstrating a Cook’s Distance of .022, which 
is very close to the cut-off point .026.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The findings of this chapter have two major implications for the field of 
democratization. First, the factors which have been central in the structural approach 
to explain levels of democracy still matter when understanding the changes of political 
regimes. In this chapter, the latest empirical data from 1960 to 2011 showed a robust 
relationship between economic development and democracy. I replicated the findings 
from the existing literature that economic development has a significant positive 
effect on political regime. My multivariate regression analyses also showed that 
economic development is the most significant predictor for the variance of the 
dependent variable, democracy (as measured by the polity scores). Hence, both 
hypotheses cannot be rejected which means that economic development is still an 
important structural factor when explaining democratization. Replicating the major 
notion of structural approach can provide the grounds for making the empirical cases 
for the deviant autocracies.    
Secondly, the result clearly identified empirical cases to show the existence of 
deviant autocracies. The data showed that there have been an increasing number of 
deviant autocracies in the past few decades. Beginning in the 1970s, an increasing 
number of countries fell into the category of deviant autocracies after experiencing a 
transitional period, such as de-colonisation, transfer of sovereignty and independence. 
By 2010, the data detected 11 deviant autocracies, including Bahrain, Brunei, 
Equatorial Guinea, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Macau, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore 
and the United Arab Emirates. Those cases possess a high level of economic 
development, but against the odds – they are not democratic and (still) have not made 
a transition to democracy. The empirical cases further reaffirmed that the existence 
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of democratic non-transition among the deviant autocracies is understudied, and that 
this theme has largely been neglected in the existing studies and debates in the field.  
The existing theories of democratisation (structural and process-driven 
explanations, as discussed in Chapter 2) placed a strong emphasis on transition to 
democracy and democratic stability or consolidation. The structural approach is 
apparently overdetermined to overgeneralise the findings in explaining transition to 
democracy. The existence of outliers was neglected and left unexplained. On the 
contrary, the actor-based approach is underdetermined, ignoring the importance of 
structural factors and while mainly focusing on the involvement of elites in explaining 
cases of democratic transition and democratic consolidation.  
Explaining these outliers can enable us to understand more about the process 
of non-transition to democracy and contribute to the existing knowledge on theories 
of democratisation. There is inherent value in studying outliers. Bollen and Jackman 
(1990) identified several outliers while discussing the relationship between world 
system position and political democracy, and they argued that: 
Knowing that our estimates are affected by outliers raises the next 
question: What should we do with these observations? If we simply 
leave them in the sample and do nothing, we are left with a distorted 
picture of the relationship that characterises the bulk of the countries. 
If, on the other hand, we remove them from our sample, we are ignoring 
the fact that half a dozen of our cases are not fitted by the model. 
However, this drop or keep strategy does not exhaust the potential 
remedies, and, indeed, oversimplifies the alternatives. It is much more 
instructive to ask why these countries appear as deviant cases (p. 284). 
The existence of deviant autocracies is not a new phenomenon, but many scholars 
have ignored such cases (see Lipset et al. 1993; Przeworski et al. 2000; Mølller and 
Skaaning 2013: 102) or have used controversial criterion to detect the outliers 
(Seeberg 2012).  
This thesis aims to explain and understand this puzzle of deviant autocracies. 
The results can shed light on understanding deviant autocracies per se, and also 
improve our theoretical knowledge on the absence of democratisation. Mapping out 
those cases is just the first step (see this Chapter 3) but in the end we need to look for 
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explanations. To provide an analytical tool to explain deviant autocracies, the next 
chapter (Chapter 4) will introduce a middle-range, neo actor-based approach. This 
approach will integrate the existing process-driven approach in democratisation 
studies and concentrate on three important factors (elite, state capacity and 
international bargaining situation) in order to understand the lack of democratisation 
among deviant autocracies. It will also briefly introduce the small-N cases: Singapore 
and Hong Kong, which will be central in the qualitative, case-study oriented part of 
the thesis (Chapters 5 and 6). 
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Chapter 4: Understanding Deviant 
Autocracies: Reintroducing Agency 
  
Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to develop a middle-range analytical framework that draws on 
actor-based analysis to understand deviant autocracies in Asia. The analytical 
framework will be derived from the actor-based approach in democratisation studies 
(Karl 1990, 1997, 2005; Karl and Schmitter 1991, 1995; Rustow 1970; O’Donnell et al. 
1986a, 1986b, 1986c; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Schmitter and Karl 1994), elite 
theory (Bermeo 2010; Burton et al. 1992; Burton and Higley 1987; Etzioni-Halevy 1993; 
Greenwood 2008; Higley and Burton 1998, 2006; Mosca 1939; Pareto 1963 [1935]; 
O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999; Prewitt and Stone 1973; Singh 2016), models of the 
elite bargaining process (Case 1996, 2005, 2009b; Croissant 2014; Jayasuriya and 
Rodan 2007; Silva 1996; Sklair 2002; Thompson 2012; Tolstrup 2013) and elite-
structure paradigms (Alexander 2008; Levitsky and Way 2002a, 2002b, 2013; 
Lundquist 1987).The analytical framework, as developed in this chapter, will however 
differ from the existing actor-based approach in several ways. First, it makes use of a 
historical analysis of international actors, focusing in particular on the bargaining 
situation between international and local elites; second, it focuses on how local elites 
gain power in the transitional period, i.e. the period before and after the emergence 
of deviant autocracy, so that they become the ruling elite in post-transitional society. 
Third, it accounts for how empowered actors make use of coercive state capacity to 
discourage pressure for democratisation from opposition actors, so as to protect 
ruling elites’ individual and group interests. 
This chapter is divided in four parts. The first part will provide an overview of 
the existing actor-based or process-driven approach in democratisation studies. In the 
second part, elite theory will be discussed, along with the elite bargaining situation in 
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Asia and the elite-institution paradigm, before introducing the analytical framework 
for deviant autocracies that I term a ‘neo actor-based approach’. This focuses on the 
interaction between internal elites, external actors and state capacity, which is 
derived from the perspectives of the actor-based approach 15  in democratisation 
studies, elite theory, models of elite bargaining progress and elite-structure paradigms. 
Part three will outline the historical development of Hong Kong and Singapore in view 
of their elite bargaining situation and internal and external state capacity, paving the 
way for more detailed analysis in subsequent chapters. The last section will discuss 
the archival research data collection method used in the Hong Kong and Singapore 
case studies in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
4.1 Agency in Democratisation Studies 
 
The two major theoretical traditions for explaining why democracies arise and endure 
are the structural and process-driven approaches (see Karl 1997: 758; Kitschelt 1992). 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the structural explanation fails to account for the 
increasing number of deviant autocracies. By contrast, the process-driven or actor-
based approach downplays the importance of structural factors in predicting 
democratisation, focusing on the interactions and decisions of actors (see Karl 2005: 
4). Successful transition to democracy depends substantially on the strategic choices 
of social elites. Hence, it is fruitful to use an actor-based approach to understand 
deviant autocracies in Asia. 
                                                          
15 I must clarify that my understanding of the actor-based approach differs from the notions of agent-
based models in economics, finance, medical sciences and computational sociology, which emphasise 
computer simulation or game-theoretic analysis (see Auchincloss et al. 2011; Axelrod 1997; Barr et al. 
2008; Best and Lebiere 2006; Bonabeau 2002; Epstein 2006; Epstein and Axtell 1996; Farmer and Foley 
2009; Fostel and Geanakoplos 2008; Gilli and Winker 2003; Macy and Willer 2002; Nannen et al. 2013; 
Noe et al. 2003; Ponte et al. 2017; Till 2010; Yang et al. 2011). The actor-based approach is refers to the 
same meaning of actor-oriented, process-driven or transition approaches in democratisation studies 
(see Doorenspleet 2005: 11). 
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The origins of the actor-based approach can be traced to Dankwart Rustow’s 
paper Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. Rustow (1970) outlined 
the different phases of democratisation. In the preparatory phase,  
the dynamic process of democratization itself is set off by a prolonged 
and inconclusive political struggle… the issues must have profound 
meaning to them [social classes]. Such a struggle is likely to begin as 
the result of the emergence of a new elite that arouses a depressed 
and previously leaderless social group into concerted action. (p. 352) 
In the decision phase, the turn toward democracy ‘results from the interplay of a 
number of forces’, such as political leaders and elites representing the interest of 
industrialists and intellectuals. The final phase is habituation, which is usually called 
‘democratic consolidation’ in democratisation studies (Rustow 1970: 356). 
In the 1980s, the major advocates of the actor-based approach captured the 
essence of transition from authoritarian rule through systematic study of transitions 
from authoritarian regimes to democracy in 13 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela in Latin America, and Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and Turkey in Southern Europe (O’Donnell et al. 1986a; O’Donnell et 
al. 1986b; O’Donnell et al. 1986c; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). These studies laid 
the foundations for using the actor-based approach to study transition to democracy 
and democratic stability or consolidation. Schmitter and Karl (1994) emphasised that 
the approach must focus on ‘a universalistic set of assumptions, concepts and 
hypotheses… [which] can explain and hopefully help to guide the way from an 
autocratic to a democratic regime’ (p. 173).  
The actor-based approach emphasises interaction between elites and other 
major actors in the process of transition. Actor-based theorists believe that 
interactions between actors such as incumbents (both hard-liners and soft-liners), 
military leaders and oppositional leaders and the mode of transition (outcome of the 
interactions) strongly affect the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and the 
establishment of democratic institutions (Karl 1990; Karl and Schmitter 1991, 1995; 
O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).  
102 
 
The actor-based approach identifies four phases in the breakdown of an 
authoritarian regime, i.e. a transition to democracy. Actor-based theorists argue that 
the initial impulse for the transition of an authoritarian regime to democracy comes 
from the authoritarian regime itself, i.e. hard-liners and soft-liners. In the next stage, 
a domestic crisis or incident involving strong oppositional forces in the civilian 
population intensifies the cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners and plays a 
major role in launching transition. In the third stage, military leaders play a crucial role 
in regime transition. Political elites need to deal carefully with military leaders to 
ensure the peaceful transference of military power to civilian government. This is vital 
in preventing military coups that disrupt the transition process. Finally, intense 
negotiation occurs among political elites, including incumbents (both hard-liners and 
soft-liners), military leaders and opposition leaders. Actors must reach a mutual 
agreement or ‘pact’ concerning the final political arrangement. This process is known 
as the ‘mode of transition’ (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 15-37). Different modes of 
transition have a major effect on the resultant political system. For example, regimes 
that undergo ‘”transition by pact” are the most likely to lead to political democracy, 
followed by “transition by imposition”’ (Karl and Schmitter 1991:282). According to 
Friedheim (1993), a ‘pact is a mutual understanding between regime and opposition 
elites about how to reach free elections’ (p. 491). Many actor-based theorists argue 
that transition by pact is favourable to democratic consolidation (see Di Palma 1990; 
Burton and Higley 1987: 300; O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999: 126). 
In recent years, various scholars have further developed the actor-based 
approach. Some applied rational choice explanations or social network analyses to 
study democratisation in different regions (see Casper and Taylor 1996; Hermansson 
1992; Osei 2015; Yilmaz 2002). The idea of elite cohesion is also used to explain the 
political survival of dictators (see Schedler and Hoffmann 2016: 94). In addition, 
international actors have been examined in studies of aid-dependent states and 
democracy promotion (Girod and Walters 2012: 182), political bargaining among Latin 
American countries during democratic transition (O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999: 
126) and interaction between internal and external actors during democratisation 
103 
 
(see Tolstrup 2013: 718). These recent studies have provided inspiration for my own 
neo actor-based approach to analysing deviant autocracies in Asia. 
The original actor-based approach is nonetheless far from perfect. It mainly 
focuses on internal division between elites, while external actors and bargaining 
between elites is largely overlooked. It also mainly focuses on successful stories rather 
than failed transitions or non-transitions. Indeed, there have been numerous 
challenges to its methodology and assumptions by specialists and practitioners (see 
Bunce 1995a: 93, 1995b: 981-987, 1995c: 118; Carothers 2002: 16; Kwon 2004: 358; 
Terry 1993: 334-336; Wiarda 2001; Welsh 1994: 381). More importantly, Schedler 
(2001) pointed out that the existing elite perspective can only explain democratic 
consolidation. It does not capture the reasons behind elite interaction—why they 
pursue a particular decision to turn against democracy. In the same vein, Petsinis 
(2010) argued that ‘a growing number of regional specialists [have] stressed the 
necessity to elaborate new theoretical frameworks that would replace [the actor-
based approach]’ (p. 315).  
To address the limitations of the existing actor-based approach and develop 
an analytical framework to explain and understand deviant autocracies in Asia. I 
develop a neo actor-based approach, with a more comprehensive and holistic 
analytical framework that gives us a better understanding of negotiation between 
international and domestic elites, and how the elite structure interacts to consolidate 
ruling elites’ hold on power during the transitional period. 
 
4.2 Neo Actor-based Approach 
 
Elite Theory 
 
To reintroduce agency into our understanding of deviant autocracies in Asia, this 
section begins with a brief discussion of the debate between elite and class theory, 
and why elite theory is better suited to elucidating the actor bargaining process. The 
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second part offers an overview of the current state of elite domination in Asia. 
Understanding the tendency toward elite domination is crucial in comprehending the 
dynamics and interaction of actors. The last part introduces the neo actor-based 
approach to help us to understand deviant autocracies in Asia, combining the actor-
based approach, theories of elite bargaining and an elite-structure paradigm. 
 Classical elite theory mainly focuses on the concept of social elite. Elite 
theorists have focused on elite variability, such as governing and non-governing elites 
(see Mosca 1939; Pareto 1963[1935]), later shifting their focus to elite settlement, i.e. 
how governing elites monopolise state power through competition (see Burton and 
Higley 1987). Burton and Higley (1987) define elites as ‘people who are able, through 
their positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes 
individually, regularly and seriously. Elites thus constitute a nation’s top leadership in 
all sectors—political, governmental, business, trade union, military, media, religious 
and intellectual—including both ‘establishment’ and ‘counter-elite’ factions’ (p. 296). 
Early applications of elite theory focused on the United States. Mills (1956) 
used the term ‘power elite’ in his study of American society, to pinpoint the 
problematic inter-linkage between political, military and business elites. Other elite 
theorists echoed similar concerns about interlocking elite networks in the United 
States (see Domhoff 1983; Dye 1985; Useem 1984). Prewitt and Stone (1973) further 
demonstrate the importance of historical factors in the interminable struggle among 
elites, and suggest two principles:  
First, no matter what the dominant political ideology or the manner of 
organizing the State, every society can be divided into the small number 
who rule and the larger who are ruled. Second, the character of society 
and the direction it is taking can be understood in terms of the 
composition, structure, and conflicts of the ruling group. (p. 5) 
As this brief overview suggests, elite theory is helpful in understanding the importance 
of elites in society and how they monopolise power. This is relevant for understanding 
non-transition to democracy in Asia, as a region with a long history of elite domination. 
Different elite groups in Asia are in continual competition to maximise their individual 
and group interests.  
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A closely related but different theoretical tradition concerning political power 
is offered by Marxist class theory (see Alford and Friedland 1985), which has been 
used to explain the cleavage between different classes during democratisation in 
Europe (see Moore 1966; Stephens 1989, 1993; Therborn 1977) and Asia (see 
Samudavanija and Parichart 1998:156; Ungpakorn 2007:52; Phongpaichit and Baker 
2008: 78). Jäger (2012), for instance, argued in connection with the 2006 military coup 
in Thailand that the middle and upper class turn against democracy was mainly 
because they feared their wealth would be affected by the Thaksin administration’s 
redistribution policies.  
Yet the emphasis on confrontation between social classes to explain failed 
democracy or non-transition in Asia is superficial and undervalues the importance of 
elite competition behind the scene. Competition between domestic and international 
elites was evident in Thailand before and after the Asian Financial Crisis. Hewison 
(1999b: 31-32, 2002: 239-242, 2003: 5-6) showed that immediately after the crisis the 
power of local bankers significantly diminished and the power of international 
business investors in the banking, manufacturing and retail industries grew. The 
fundamental reason other elite groups turned against the government was that 
‘Thaksin adopted so-called populist and nationalist policies so that domestic business 
could gain control of the state through election. His opposition to neoliberal reform 
was couched in terms that promised domestic capital the space necessary to re-
establish its competitiveness vis-à-vis foreign investors’ (Jayasuriya and Hewison 2004: 
572). To that extent, it is more accurate to say that the conflict was not primarily class-
based but involved competition for power among elites from the business, political 
and economic sectors (see Harish 2006; Pye and Schaffar 2007). 
The second problem with class based analysis concerns the difficulty of clearly 
defining and differentiating social classes. For example, Chua and Tan (1999: 140) used 
household income to artificially define Singapore’s lower middle class in 1990 as 
having an income of $3,000 to $6,999 (29.6%) and the upper middle class as having an 
income of $7,000 to $9,999 (4.5%); 20.1% of the population was categorised as 
working class, falling in the income range $2,000 to $2,999. Thus, to take an extreme 
case, one dollar’s difference in household income could transform a family from 
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working class to lower middle class. Indeed, a satisfactory definition of ‘middle class’ 
is elusive. The middle class from the perspective of a structural approach (as discussed 
in Chapter 2) plays a vital role in the process of democratisation. Yet the notion of the 
middle class is fuzzy, because it can be based either on economic criteria or the 
subjective perception of individual members (see Ansell and Samuels 2014: 40-56).  
In the case of deviant autocracies in Asia, political competition has not hinged 
on class based interest, but on conflict between different elite groups. Indeed, Bermeo 
(2010: 1124) highlighted the importance of elites’ self-interested behaviour during the 
process of transition to democracy. Elites’ self-interest is a frequent theme in recent 
studies. Autocratic elites generally reject mass enfranchisement. With a restricted 
franchise, the rich can impose policies that are favourable to them (see Ansell and 
Samuels 2014: 37; Boix 2001; Knutsen 2011; Levi 1989; McGuire and Olson 1996; 
Niskanen 1997; Olson 1993). Ansell and Samuels (2014) stated that an ‘elite-
competition understanding of the dynamics of regime change suggests that 
incumbent elites’ primary fear does not emanate from the poor, but from rising 
economic groups’ (p. 59).  
Recent studies showed that dominant political and military elites were 
competing with each other even in the process of drafting the constitution of Thailand 
(Hewison 2007a: 930, 2007b: 244, 2015: 55-27). The ruling elites in Asia are also eager 
to maintain social ties to other major stakeholders. There are, for instance, state 
funded think tanks in Singapore such as the Institute of South East Asian Studies 
(ISEAS), which has organised events since 1980 ‘to bring together a range of people 
from the private and public sectors… its choice of research agenda it has been highly 
responsive to the interests of the Singaporean state as well as Singaporean state elites’ 
(Jayasuriya 1994: 417-418). In addition, according to Jayasuriya and Rodan (2007), 
‘[d]ominant political elites seek to shape modes of participation in a particular 
direction. That will reflect an underlying political struggle over the forms of 
representation through which conflict is organized and limited’ (p. 780). In short, we 
can distinguish between two levels of competition between elites: international actors 
compete with each other due to the international bargaining situation; while domestic 
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elites also compete with each other to maximise their political and economic interests 
during an unstable transitional period. 
It is not obvious why some business elites support democracy and others do 
not (Greenwood 2008). In general, there are two camps within elite theory. The first 
sees the ruling elite as mainly motivated by personal and family benefit. The second 
argues that rulers perform necessary and socially beneficial tasks (see Prewitt and 
Stone 1973: 5-6; Singh 2016: 190). However, Etzioni-Halevy (1993) rightly emphasised 
that ‘elites and sub-elites have both despotic and liberating potential’ (p. 4). This 
assertion can be demonstrated in the context of Latin America (see Cardoso and 
Faletto 1978; Evans 1979), Arab society (Greenwood 2008: 854; Kamrava 2007) and 
Asia (Case 1996, 2002, 2005, 2009b; Croissant 2014; Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007; Silva 
1996; Thompson 2012). In other words, without effective institutional mechanisms, 
such as checks and balances, separation of power, limitations on the power of rulers 
and greater liberty for the ruled, ruling elites tend to become autocratic and abuse 
their power. Institutions that counterbalance the power of elites, such as a meaningful 
opposition, academic elites who can conduct research freely, an independent judiciary 
and media free from government control, are vital to sustain democracy. To address 
Greenwood’s (2008) question, it is clear that institutional structure has a decisive 
effect: it is important for democratic development that it not provide loopholes for 
rulers to usurp and manipulate power. Based on this analysis, Chapters 5 and 6 will 
show how ruling elites in deviant autocracies seize state capacity from international 
actors during the transitional period. The transitional period here refers to de-
colonisation and the transfer of sovereignty, whether this involves independence or a 
transfer to another sovereign state. 
During the transitional period of deviant autocracies, international actors play 
a vital role in shaping political institutions that favour a particular faction of the local 
elite. The notion that international influence shapes political institutions has been 
elaborated in several studies of democratisation, including discussions of the influence 
of the United States, European foreign policy, European Union membership 
negotiations, the United Nations and NAFTA (see Alexander 2008: 933). International 
actors themselves cannot influence the institutions of particular countries; they need 
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partners inside these countries, i.e. political actors and members of the business and 
professional elites (see Case 1996; Sklair 2002; Tolstrup 2013: 735). In the context of 
deviant autocracies in Asia, most such countries were former British colonies and are 
geographically and politically linked with communist China; thus, the international 
actors involved during the transitional period are mainly the United Kingdom and the 
People’s Republic of China. In the cases of Singapore and Hong Kong, the transition 
was implemented with little involvement of local elites; in other words, the resultant 
system was designed by the former incumbents. Local elites were empowered in the 
process to safeguard the interests of international elites, and these empowered elites 
further stabilised and consolidated their autocratic power after transition. 
 
Tendencies toward Elite Domination in Asia 
 
To begin with, it is important to clarify that elite domination in Asia has nothing to do 
with so-called illiberal culture. By combining a cultural perspective with class theory, 
scholars have attempted to explain the persistence of non-democratic regimes in Asia; 
for example, Jones (1998) has suggested that an illiberal middle class culture is the 
source of autocracy.  Nevertheless, cultural determinism cannot explain non-
transition to democracy. It suffers from a fundamental logical problem: it cannot 
explain why democracy emerged in the first place. Cultural theorists also have 
difficulty explaining cases such as South Korea and Taiwan, which successfully 
experienced democratisation in the 1980s, yet have cultural experiences and roots 
similar to other Asian societies. The debate concerning liberal versus illiberal culture 
is largely irrelevant; the leaders in Asia simply find whatever ‘ideological resource[s 
they need] for the construction of politics’ (Chua 2010a: 204). Chua and Tan (1999), 
for example, argued that Singapore’s political culture is ‘largely shaped by the ideology 
and practice of the PAP’ (p. 141). The evidence shows that interest oriented 
instrumental rationality offers a more accurate model (see Weber 1954), accounting 
for competition and common interests between the ruling and ruled elites. For 
example, civil servants remain loyal to the PAP government because they ‘fear… being 
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fired and losing [their] pension’ (Chua 2010b: 336). In addition, the state provision of 
public housing makes citizens more dependent, thus reducing their political power at 
the ballot box (see Chua 2000: 58). 
Another argument related to the cultural explanation is the negative effect of 
religious belief on democracy. Many recent studies have however refuted such 
cultural determinism; they argue that religious actors in Islamic countries are not 
necessarily anti-democratic. Ruling elites’ behaviour is implicitly interest-oriented in 
terms of their religious authority, legitimacy and position (see Künkler and Leininger 
2009; Ozzano 2014: 608; Somer 2011: 538; Villalón 2015: 314). Hence, the democracy 
deficit in the Middle East seems to be due mostly to the power relationship between 
the state elite and social actors (Kamrava 2007). Consequently, to understand deviant 
autocracies in Asia one must focus on elite competition and bargaining to comprehend 
how different groups of elites collaborate to fully optimise their perceived interests. 
Not surprisingly, many scholars have advocated studying elites to understand 
the development of democracy in Asia. As Ferdinand (2012) stated ‘Democratization 
is not irresistibly determined by economic development. Agency is also critical’ in Asia 
(p. 287). For Lundquist (1987), ‘politics becomes a question of how some actors seek 
to maintain a social structure which operates to their advantage, and how other actors 
seek to change the structure to bring it into accord with their own particular goals’ (p. 
47). Jayasuriya and Rodan (2007) also explained issues around democratic transition 
and consolidation in Southeast Asia with reference to the participation of different 
elites based on socio-economic conflicts. Their analysis differs from so-called Western 
class analysis, being more focused on the interests of different social elites. Emmerson 
(2008: 79) attempted to replace a structural approach with a process-driven one in 
understanding the development of democracy in Asia since 1986, while Hadiz (2009) 
noted that no current scholar, ‘in relation to the literature on contemporary 
Indonesian society, can [ignore] the role of social actors in his or her analysis’ (p. 529).  
The importance of elites’ self-interest is convincingly demonstrated in the 
process of constitution-making in Southeast Asian countries. Croissant (2014) argued 
that ‘dictators bother to create constitutions because it facilitates their objective of 
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political survival by, among other things, enabling coordination among multiple 
institutional actors and eliciting cooperation from a dictator’s subjects’ (p. 24). The 
potential interest of elites has been conceptualised in three different categories: the 
personal interests of constitution-makers, group interests of political parties and self-
interest of political institutions (see Croissant 2014: 39-42; Elster 1993: 181-185). 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand are good examples of elite competition in Asia 
between ruling elites, various ethnically-delineated business elites and foreign 
investors (Case 2009a: 651-658). In addition, Case (1996) uses examples from Asia, 
including Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, to show that elite relations and 
constituent networking contribute to the rise of non-democratic regimes. He suggests 
that ‘[c]ore elites usually wield most state power, enabling them to benefit their 
constituents directly. At the same time, denial of these benefits to others is equally 
important and amplifies the bland gratitude of recipients into more highly fevered 
loyalty’ (p. 442). 
Another major area in the literature closely related to elite domination is crony 
capitalism or patron-client relationships in Asia. Clientelism has been widely discussed 
(see Fox 1994; Scott 1969, 1972; Tarrow 1967; Weiner 1967), and these state-business 
collisions have been intensively studied by scholars in the Asian context (see 
Greenwood 2008; Kang 2003; Neher and Ross 1995; Silva 1996). Ironically,  crony 
capitalism, while it is considered an advanced form of corruption, has also been 
deemed a new form of development for developing countries, because it lowers 
transaction costs between actors; South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia are 
cases in point (Kang 2003: 439-442). Khan (2005) also argued for the positive effect of 
patron-client relationships, stating that ‘[e]conomic characteristics of developing 
countries make patron–client politics both rational for redistributive coalitions and 
effective as strategies for achieving the goals of powerful constituencies within these 
coalitions’ (p. 704). This development model is widely accepted in Asia: it can be easily 
seen how the domination of business tycoons and elites in Indonesia (Case 2009a; 
Davidson 2009; Uhlin 1995), the Philippines (Case 2009a; Quimpo 2009) and Thailand 
(Case 2009a; Connors 2009) has hindered democracy.  
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Patron-client relationships are unfavourable for democratisation, especially 
when there are few institutional mechanisms to control ruling elites. Thompson (2012) 
argued that familial succession in Asia is a good example of how elite collusion or 
dynasticism works. In addition, Case (2009b) stated that,  
elites do not sit passively at the peak of their institutional hierarchies. 
They organize and navigate their apparatuses too, using them variously 
to energize or under-mobilize their followings, predisposed in their 
sentiments by structural forces. And further, in their pursuit of state 
power and patronage, elites engage other elites in ways that at their 
poles can be characterized as cohesive or fractious, therein impacting 
profoundly on the form and durability of the regimes that they operate. 
(p. 266)  
To further consolidate their power, rulers in Southeast Asia skilfully manipulate 
mistrust between elites (Case 2005: 97). This does not mean that the future of Asian 
democracy is doomed. Etzioni-Halevy (1993) argued that when there is an institution 
to ensure the autonomy of elites, the state-business relationship is no longer a private 
matter between political and business elites. Elected rulers are accountable to voters. 
The exercise of power is also monitored by various institutions, such as the judiciary 
and media. Democracies have emerged in Latin America during the third wave of 
democratisation, featuring institutions that counteract the effect of elite collusion and 
prevent domination by business elites, even in regions strongly affected by clientelism 
(see Bucheli and Salvaj 2014: 535; Grugel 1998). 
To understand how elites maximise their interest in political institutions, 
historical analysis is needed. Tilly (2002) made a case to pay attention to ‘historical 
products, outcomes of struggle’ (p. 123). Indeed, democratisation studies scholars 
have generally agreed that historical conditions have an important influence on 
regime transition (see O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999: 126; Prewitt and Stone 1973: 
4; Singh 2016). Indeed, in the case of deviant autocracies, it is fruitful to analyse the 
struggle during the transitional period, i.e. the international and domestic elites’ 
negotiations prior to de-colonisation and transfer of sovereignty. This enables us to 
understand how non-ruling elites during the colonial period empowered themselves 
during transition and subsequently became ruling elites. Burton and Higley (1987) also 
suggested that ‘the origins of consensually unified elites and stable, representative 
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regimes must be sought in other circumstances. Colonial experience is the most 
obvious and most widely discussed… Consensually unified elites have most frequently 
originated in the habituation of major elite factions to open but peaceful competition 
while their society is still a colony or territorial dependency’ (p. 297). Hence, historical 
analysis or a case-oriented systematic historical-comparative approach (see Capoccia 
and Ziblatt 2010; Kitschelt 1992: 1034) to the small-N cases in Chapters 5 and 6 can 
shed light on the elite bargaining situation between actors and how it contributes to 
non-transition to democracy in Singapore and Hong Kong. 
 
State Capacity and Deviant Autocracies 
 
To understand deviant autocracies, the linkage between elites’ bargaining situation 
and state capacity must be understood. I use the term ‘state capacity’ differently from 
traditional developmental studies (see Evans 1989: 568; Evans 2008: 3-16; Evans 
2012). The present analytical framework relies instead on the concept of state 
capacity in Mann (1984: 189), which involves a twofold division of state power into 
despotic and infrastructural power. Despotic or coercive capacity is the capacity of 
incumbent elites to control opposition: manipulation of the electoral framework, 
restrictions on speech and association, and use of military and police power to 
suppress opposition and challenges (see Albertus and Menaldo 2012a: 153; Alexander 
2008: 931; Andersen, Møller, Rørbæk and Skaaning 2014: 1306-1307; Andersen, 
Møller and Skaaning 2014; Fortin-Rittberger 2012: 100-101; Fortin-Rittberger 2014; 
Mann 1984: 189; Seeberg 2014).  
In recent years, many studies have used coercive capacity to explain the 
endurance of autocracies (see Albertus and Menaldo 2012a; Fortin 2012; Knutsen 
2012; Levitsky and Way 2002a, 2002b, 2013; Seeberg 2014). Seeberg (2014: 1269-
1272), for example, analysed Malaysia and the Philippines to illustrate how 
authoritarian regimes rely on measures such as control of elections, supermajority 
victories and suppression of opposition mobilisation and voter protests. In addition, 
Alexander (2008) stated that ‘high coercive state capacity in general prevent[s] 
113 
 
democratization’ (p. 941). Innes (2002) also pointed out that elite power interests may 
affect the despotic power of the state. In the cases of deviant autocracies, the ruling 
elites gained coercive capacity during the transitional period. Hence, the focus of the 
small-N cases is on negotiation between elites and its effect on the resultant system’s 
coercive capacity. 
The second dimension of state capacity is infrastructural or administrative 
capacity, the ability of the state to reshape civil society to implement state policies 
and reforms (see Alexander 2008: 931; Andersen, Møller and Skaaning 2014; 
Andersen, Møller, Rørbæk and Skaaning 2014: 1306-1307; Fortin-Rittberger 2012: 
100-101; Fortin-Rittberger 2014; Mann 1984: 189). Infrastructural capacity is more 
closely related to democratic stability or longevity (see Andersen, Møller, Rørbæk and 
Skaaning 2014; Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Hanson 2015). This finding has been 
replicated in the context of postcommunist countries (Fortin 2012; Fortin-Rittberger 
2012). Yet this type of state capacity is mainly relevant to democratic consolidation 
and survival. Because deviant autocracies have not transitioned to democracy, only 
coercive capacity is considered here in analysing elite bargaining situations. 
Indeed, coercive capacity is crucial for the durability of autocratic regimes. 
According to Andersen, Møller, Rørbæk and Skaaning (2014), ‘autocrats can often 
survive decades of bad performance through a mix of repression and cooptation of 
elites to secure a stable winning coalition’ (p. 1308). Levitsky and Way (2002b) also 
noted that ‘[a]s long as autocratic incumbents do not cancel or openly steal elections 
or commit egregious human rights violations, they may be able to hold onto power 
for many years. Using techniques such as bribery, co-optation and various forms of 
‘legal’ persecution, governments may limit opposition challenges without provoking 
massive protest or international repudiation’ (p. 8). In the context of deviant 
autocracies, state power has been deliberately transferred to interest-oriented elites 
by international actors during the transitional period. Those local elites have been 
empowered with despotic capacity, without institutional constraints on their power.  
State capacity is thus narrowly defined in the context of deviant autocracies as 
coercive power sharing within the state apparatus that protects individual and group 
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interests for a specific set of elites. According to Alexander (2008), ‘strong state 
capacity serves as a resource for elites to implement institutional change… hence, an 
authoritarian-leaning government will use coercive state capacity to increase 
repression… Strong states may be expected to retard democratization by helping 
elites consolidate an increasingly more authoritarian form of rule’ (p. 931). This idea 
is consistent with the idea of elite autonomy; if elites can take control of political 
institutions in the absence of effective checks and balances, it is likely that ruling elites 
will dominate, which does not favour democratisation (see Etzioni-Halevy 1993). To 
compensate for a lack of democracy, the ruling elites of the deviant autocracies largely 
emphasise the provision of public goods and sustained, long-term economic growth 
to attain legitimacy for its authority. Domestic elites will also compete, building 
patron-client relationships to maximise individual and group interests (see Burton and 
Higley 1987: 297; Case 1996: 442; Kamrave 2007: 199). 
Autocratic ruling elites rely on biased institutional arrangements to limit 
potential opposition to the political system. The nature of opposition is crucial to elite-
institution interaction: as Alexander (2008) wrote, ‘[w]hen the elites decide the 
direction of institutional change, an opposition can serve to block a change in the 
direction of either democracy or autocracy. Beyond acting as a simple decelerator, the 
nature of the party cleavages within the opposition also plays an important role in 
influencing institutional change’ (p. 932). Nevertheless, coercive state capacity is 
highly controlled by ruling elites, which ‘prevent opposition parties from winning 
elections and replacing the government as in full procedural democracy’ (Case 1996: 
439). Schedler and Hoffmann (2016: 95) stated that in such a situation, the political 
system offers an ‘absence of challenges to rulers’. The next section of this chapter will 
discuss Singapore and Hong Kong, to show how ruling elites monopolise political 
power within institutional arrangements. 
To sum up, the neo actor-based approach focuses on the genesis of elite 
domination among deviant autocracies, applying historical analysis to the negotiations 
between international and domestic actors that have shaped the coercive state 
capacity toward autocracy (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1: Analytical Framework for Understanding Deviant Autocracies 
 
Source: Inspired by Alexander (2008:931); Burton and Higley (1987:297); Case (1996:442, 2005:97, 
2009b:257); Etzioni-Halevy (1993); Jayasuriya and Rodan (2007:776); Kamrave (2007:199); Levitsky 
and Way 2002b:10-17; O’Shaughnessy and Dodson (1999:126); Tolstrup (2013:735) 
 
Within this framework, post-transitional ruling elites dominate political power in three 
ways. First, ruling elites claim that their monopolisation of political power is not for 
individual interest, but for the benefit of society as a whole. The ruling elites in 
Singapore and Hong Kong have made claims of this sort after transition (see Hewison 
1999a: 232; Ortmann 2014a: 123-125; Rao and Wang 2007: 357). Ruling elites rely on 
this claim to maintain legitimacy, and the incumbent also claims a track record of 
freedom from corruption, economic prosperity and stability to prevent potential 
challenges from the opposition. The second factor is related to cohesion within ruling 
elites (see Levitsky and Way 2002b: 10-17). If there are different elite factions in a 
society, any policy that jeopardises individual, group or factional interests within the 
ruling elites may affect elite unity (see Burton and Higley 1987: 296; Dahrendorf 1969; 
Fleron 1969; Field and Higley 1985). The third factor is whether the opposition works 
within the unequal distribution of political power in the institutional framework, or 
Resultant 
System
Domestic 
Actors
State 
Capacity
International 
Actors
116 
 
seeks to use radical means to challenge the ruling elites and existing system. In 
Singapore and Hong Kong, the opposition has mainly relied on ‘non-violent and 
institutional means’ (Osei 2015: 533) to press for greater democracy. Indeed, the 
opposition has little choice, as the military is tightly controlled by the ruling elites and 
the electoral system also favours the ruling elites. The next section elaborates this 
point in more detail. 
 
4.3 The Situation in Hong Kong and Singapore 
  
This section provides an overview of the political situation in Hong Kong and Singapore 
before and after the transitional period. In addition to the quantitative data presented 
in Chapter 3, it offers a detailed explanation why Hong Kong and Singapore are 
regarded as autocracies. This section also sets the scene for the small-N case studies 
in Chapter 5 and 6 using the proposed analytical framework; the international 
negotiations between international and local actors have been highlighted to show 
how elites have shaped institutions to protect their perceived interests. The 
institutional arrangement in both cases provides the ruling elites a strong state 
capacity to control society and consolidate their non-democratic rule. As a result, the 
opposition has difficulty challenging the ruling elites using formal and institutional 
channels.  
 
Hong Kong: Historical Background 
 
Democracy did not exist in Hong Kong during the colonial period; only the wealthy and 
privileged had political influence, and the system was in theory one of benevolent 
paternalism (see England 1971: 214-215; Pepper 2000: 416-417). Overholt (2001) 
argued that ‘the British governors had basically been dictators, able to impose changes 
at will, and with a vast policy and administrative apparatus in London to back them up’ 
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(p. 11). The power enjoyed by the Hong Kong governor is described in detail by Ghai 
(1991: 797-798) and is set forth in the former constitutional instruments the Hong 
Kong Letters Patent and Hong Kong Royal Instructions (Colonial Office 1931). 
According to Pepper (2000), ‘British colonies were typically led by all-powerful 
governors sent out from London, who appointed the members of their Executive and 
Legislative Councils’ (p. 412).  
This colonial structure was based on a double principle of subordination: the 
colonial executive was subordinated to the Colonial Office of Britain and the colonial 
legislature was subordinated to the colonial executive (see Wight 1952: 17). Norman 
Miners (1986), former head of the Department of Politics and Public Administration 
at the University of Hong Kong, noted that ‘[i]n 1984 the Legislative and Executive 
Councils were still composed entirely of officials and unofficials nominated by the 
Governor without a single elected member, just as they have been for the past 140 
years’ (p. 463). The British government attempted to promote limited democracy in 
Hong Kong from the 1950s onward, but without success (see Overholt 2001: 7; Miners 
1986).  
 
The Elite Bargaining Situation and State Capacity in Hong Kong 
 
The elite bargaining situation in Hong Kong prior to the transitional period mainly 
involved local business and government elites. There was limited political 
participation in the colonial era and it was monopolised by the business and 
professional elites. Under the so-called ‘administrative absorption of politics’ (see King 
1975), the business elites, usually British based business conglomerates, were 
appointed by Governors to take up important positions in the Hong Kong government 
(see Chiu 1994: 52-63; Choi 1999: 144). After the transition, the pro-British elites 
immediately lost their influence and were replaced by conservative pro-Beijing elites. 
As Kuan (1991: 781-782) predicted, the conservative group attempted to retain its 
influence and benefits after the handover by developing a ‘working relationship’ with 
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the Chinese government. In return, pro-Beijing elites received reciprocal benefits from 
the government in terms of business opportunities and social status (see Kwong 2007). 
During the transitional period, Beijing and London actors negotiated with each 
other regarding the post-transitional institutional arrangement of Hong Kong. They 
engineered the Chief Executive and Legislative Council ‘to ensure that it would be 
dominated for at least ten years by economic and managerial experts… In short, the 
idea was to get the benefits of representation without sacrificing a certain 
authoritarian capacity for dispatch and decisiveness’ (Overholt 2001: 5-6). Hence, 
Kuan (1991) predicted that before and after the handover, Hong Kong would ‘remain 
a dependent polity’ (p. 774). Indeed, the result of the handover as described by Baum 
(2000:439) was a legislature with limited power to enact new laws and a Chief 
Executive who is not democratically elected. This institutional arrangement was the 
result of negotiation between the British and Chinese government elites in the 1980s. 
They agreed to the idea of ‘One Country Two Systems’ as a guiding principle after Hong 
Kong reverted to China, and the Chinese government insisted that ‘well water and 
river water should not mix’ (Pepper 2000: 411). This arrangement ensured a relatively 
smooth transition for the economic system. In his 2000 book, Ferdinand, for example, 
showed the importance of maintaining the Hong Kong monetary system and the 
principle of ‘One Country Two Systems’ (p. 42). These arrangements were formally 
written into the mini constitution of Hong Kong—the Basic Law. Both international 
actors attempted to maximise benefit to both sides. By maintaining the status quo 
they retained the confidence of local citizens and avoided fluctuation and uncertainty 
that might hinder the business and ruling elites’ interests. 
British and Chinese actors carefully crafted a post-handover institution that 
controlled state capacity and opposition in Hong Kong. The resultant system 
discouraged party politics. The opposition, especially advocates for democracy, could 
not make use of institutional channels to promote democratic development due to 
the lack of political parties before the late 1980s (Lau and Kuan 2000: 705). Even since 
the handover, political parties have been weak due to constraints imposed by the 
political structure (Lau and Kuan 2002: 1027).  
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After the promulgation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1985, the 
National People’s Congress of China formed the Basic Law Drafting Committee and 
Basic Law Consultative Committee. These committees were dominated by ‘business 
and industrial sectors who favoured a conservative approach to political reform’; 
hence the Basic Law ‘can be regarded as a pact between the business and industrial 
elites in Hong Kong’ (Kuan 1991: 785). More importantly, due to Beijing’s adoption of 
the infamous United Front strategy, functional constituency representation within the 
Legislature Council, Preparatory Committee and Selection Committee of the SAR was 
dominated by pro-Beijing business elites (see Goodstadt 2000: 729-732; Hook 1993: 
851; Pepper 2000: 429-431). Various measures were implemented to prevent social 
movements or political reforms that would threaten the elites’ interests, while the 
opposition lacked economic power to fight for greater democracy (see Chan and Kwok 
1999: 51-61; Chan and Lee 2007; Kuan 1991: 781-782; Lui 1999: 97-98; Ortmann 
2010a; Ma 2007; Sing 2010). 
To further ensure political stability after the handover, the Beijing government 
was eager to recruit and select the post-colonial elites, including the business and 
professional elites (see Goodstadt 2000: 722; Ho et al. 2010). This reciprocal 
relationship has been described in a recent study (Kwong 2007: 389, 398; Table 1). For 
example, the method of electing the Chief Executive has simply reinforced patron-
client relationships through the exchange of benefits, such as business opportunities, 
public resources, appointments to committees, medals and honours, to ensure clients’ 
loyalty toward the Beijing government. 
The Basic Law is the constitutional document of Hong Kong, in addition to the 
pact between the British and Chinese governments; these both include numerous 
arrangements impeding democratic elections of the Chief Executive and Legislative 
Council (see Baum 2000: 440-441; Hook 1993: 846-847; Holliday et al. 2004: 260; Kuan 
and Lau 2002: 59; Kwong 2007: 390; Lau and Kuan 2000: 707; Pepper 2000: 411). It is 
not surprising that the 1998 Legislative Council election, the first after the handover, 
was condemned by observers due to its lack of representation (see Chan and Kwok 
1999: 51-61); the general public were dissatisfied with the government’s overall 
performance (see Kuan and Lau 2002: 62-63; Lui 1999: 101; Tang 1999: 6) and 
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criticised it for colluding with business interests (So 2000: 377). In addition, the state-
press relationship deteriorated, as the government imposed increasing controls on 
the press and prosecuted journalists (see Ma 2007; Lui 1999: 97-98). The autonomy 
of HKSAR was severely reduced after the 1997 sovereignty transfer (see Holliday et al. 
2004: 258-259).  
Not surprisingly, Chinese legal scholars have reaffirmed that legitimacy and 
government performance are crucial in deterring challenges to the domination of the 
pro-Beijing elite. They argued that China will maintain Hong Kong’s ‘stability’ and 
‘prosperity’ under the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. They promoted the idea 
that ‘Hong Kong is much more democratic than it was before 1997’ (Rao and Wang 
2007: 357). The idea of stability and prosperity are often used not only by Chinese 
officials but also British colonial officials. This is unsurprising, as the colonial 
government attained legitimacy from materialistic and pragmatic Hong Kong citizens 
within a non-democratic political structure (see Goodstadt 2004; King 1975; Lau 1984; 
Sing 1996; Scott 1989). This instrumental mentality even made economic prosperity 
and democracy into two conflicting values in Hong Kong—a zero-sum game (see Lam 
and Mok 1997). In any case, the political situation of Hong Kong can be classified as 
non-democratic or autocratic from the perspective of scholars and quantitative 
measurement (see Lau and Kuan 2000: 720; Marshall et al. 2011; Kuan and Lau 2002: 
58; Sing 1996: 344). The local elites in Hong Kong were manipulated by British colonial 
actors before the handover and then by Beijing’s ruling elites after 1997 to justify and 
maintain a non-democratic regime.  
 
Singapore: Historical Background 
 
The colonial political structure of Singapore resembled Hong Kong’s, and given their 
similar colonial legacy and socio-economic trajectory, Hong Kong and Singapore may 
be regarded as twin city-states (Low 2001: 437). The Singapore Governor enjoyed 
absolute power in the colony, appointing all government officials and only being 
accountable to the Colonial Office in London (see Pepper 2000; Wight 1952). Means 
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(1996) argued that the ‘colonial system, even in its most benevolent phases, [was] 
highly authoritarian’ (p. 104). Singapore Governors had usually served before in other 
British colonies, including Hong Kong; this is true of George Bonham, Cecil Clementi, 
Franklin Charles Gimson and Robert Brown Black. The colonial administrators were 
quite familiar with the colonial political structure, and that structure remained stable 
for over one hundred years. Changes only occurred after the Second World War, when 
the British government pursued a policy of de-colonisation, and strove to de-centralise 
local elites to prepare for the post-colonial era. In the case of Singapore, the Rendel 
Constitution introduced in February 1955 promoted greater representation of elected 
members in the legislature, which led to competition between local elites on the basis 
of ethnic, individual and group interests. 
During the colonial period, elections were dominated by pro-British and 
professional elites. Periodic elections with a limited franchise were introduced in 
Singapore during the transitional period immediately before independence. Bellows 
(1967) argued that Singapore had a ‘relatively open competitive party system’ in the 
1950s (p.122). However, one major problem was the limited franchise: Singapore 
society at that time contained a significant number of people under 18, and only so-
called British subjects could vote. It is not surprising that pro-British professionals and 
entrepreneurs dominated the Progressive Party, also known as the ‘Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce party’, which held a political stranglehold over seats in the legislature 
(Bellows 1967: 128). With the 1955 political reforms in the wake of the Rendel 
Constitution, the Labour Front, a newly formed political party representing workers’ 
interests, managed to defeat the Progressive Party in the 1955 election, and their 
leader David Marshall became the first Chief Minister of Singapore. Further significant 
changes in suffrage occurred before the 1959 general election, according to Bellows 
(1967): ‘[o]ne hundred and fifty-eight thousand voted in 1955. Five hundred and 
twenty-eight thousand voted in 1959’ (p. 128). The People’s Action Party (PAP) and its 
leader Lee Kuan Yew, a professional and primarily Western-educated elite group, 
claimed a landslide victory and attained 43 out of 51 seats in the Legislative Assembly.  
The 1959 election resulted in a major power transfer from one political party 
to another. Ironically, such a transfer never happened again after the PAP came to 
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power. The ruling elites made use of electoral laws to outlaw opposition parties. The 
PAP created a ‘one-party system… Although 16 political parties are registered, none 
of the 15 opposition parties can pose a serious threat to the ruling People’s Action 
Party (PAP) in an electoral struggle’ (Chan 1976: 425). Nam (1969) stated that ‘the PAP 
government was reluctant to encourage the development of an opposition party’ (p. 
469). Consequently, the ‘PAP has held power since the first general elections of the 
island city state in 1959, and in the most recent 1972 general elections it was returned 
to power with a 69.2 percent majority vote and all of the 65 seats in Parliament’ (Chan 
1976: 425). Hitherto, the PAP has successfully won all seats from 1968 to 1980 and 
held over 90% of Parliamentary seats from the 1980s onward (Elections Department 
Singapore 2015). George (2007) similarly observed that ‘Singapore’s ruling party has 
never lost power since 1959. Opposition parties have not occupied more than four 
seats in parliament since 1966’ (p. 132).  
There was little improvement in the 2011 and 2015 elections, in which 
opposition candidates won 6 out of 87 seats and 6 out of 89 seats, respectively; this 
hardly posed a significant challenge to the ruling elites in Singapore. In view of this 
situation, it is not surprising that scholars and existing quantitative measures classified 
Singapore as an autocracy (see Marshall et al. 2011; Møller and Skanning 2013b). 
 
The Elite Bargaining Situation and State Capacity in Singapore 
 
The ruling elites in Singapore have maintained their hold on power since 
independence by various measures, such as implementation of strategic economic 
plans for sustained long term growth, avoidance of corruption, effective response to 
challenges from the opposition, a compelling nation-building ideology and effective 
control of the press (see Bellows 1967: 136-137; Chua 1995; George 2000 and 2007). 
We now turn to a brief overview of those measures and policies. 
The government effectively controls society by careful selection of the ruling 
elites. Chan (1976: 428-430) listed the ruling elites represented by the PAP’s elected 
123 
 
MPs: technocrats, mobilisers, Malay vote-getters and Chinese-educated intellectuals. 
The intention is to ensure representation of the interests of all classes and ethnic 
minorities. In addition, the  
political elites mainly in the cabinet demonstrate strong group cohesion 
and continuity of leadership among the small and self-perpetuating 
circle of ministers. The achievement of group solidarity in Lee’s present 
cabinet is largely due to the ministers’ common educational and 
occupational backgrounds. Virtually all of them were educated in the 
English or English-medium institutes… Prior to entering the cabinet, 
almost all of them were successful lawyers, economists, or doctors. 
(Nam 1969: 470) 
As in Hong Kong, professional elites in Singapore are heavily represented in 
government departments, statutory bodies and government-linked companies, aka 
GLCs (see Rodan and Jayasuriya 2009: 30). In addition, as George (2007: 142) noted, 
political elites also control the instruments of coercion; for example, the Prime 
Minister and other ruling elites within the government retain high-ranking positions 
in the military. These inter-locking arrangements increase the government’s ability to 
counteract challenges from the opposition. 
Gerrymandering tactics contribute to one-party domination. According to 
Levitsky and Way (2002a), a competitive authoritarianism regime tends to  
create an uneven playing field between government and opposition… 
incumbents routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition 
adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their 
supporters, and in some cases manipulate electoral results. Journalists, 
opposition politicians, and other government critics may be spied on, 
threatened, harassed, or arrested. (p. 53) 
Means (1996) gave one example, which is the creation in 1988 of multimember Group 
Representation Constituencies (GRCs). On paper, the intention is to increase 
representation of ethnic minorities. In reality, it is simply a strategy ‘to block the 
formation of ethnically based parties and create a greater electoral hurdle for 
opposition parties. In practice, the GRC system only increased Malay MPs from 9 to 
10, while Indian MPs remained at 6 and Eurasian MPs decreased from one to none’ (p. 
107). In addition, when the ‘opposition Workers’ Party finally gained parliamentary 
representation by winning a by-election in 1981… its leader, J.B. Jeyaretnam, found 
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himself expelled from Parliament and disqualified from contesting elections’. Another 
example is ‘the 1984 elections, [in which] the opposition gained a pair of seats; it was 
reduced to a single seat in 1988’ (pp. 107-108). Rodan and Jayasuriya (2009) pointed 
out that there is even ‘discrimination in the dispensing of state infrastructure against 
electorates voting for opposition parties’ (p. 29). 
Another effective way to exercise control is through ideological indoctrination. 
Immediately after independence in 1965,  
Lee Kuan Yew called upon Singapore’s citizenry to support a 
comprehensive survival strategy…asked Singaporeans to give the PAP a 
sweeping mandate for ‘strong and decisive rule’ unencumbered by a 
parliamentary opposition or public debate over contentious issues. 
Parliamentary institutions provided the legitimizing rituals for the 
exercise of paternalistic and authoritarian rule. (Means 1996: 105-106) 
 The schooling system is an ideal channel for diffusing ideology. Nasir and Turner (2013) 
showed that ‘[e]ducational policies to foster citizenship values in Singapore 
emphasised obedience to the state rather than knowledge of democratic principles’ 
(p. 340). National Education and citizenship education in Civic and Moral Education 
address issues central to Singapore’s survival and success (see Han 2000: 71). The core 
idea transmitted to pupils is that political instability must be avoided, as it may 
jeopardise the country’s economic stability. The official reason for maintaining one-
party domination is because the majority of the public in Singapore is ‘illiterate’ and 
not politically mature enough to discuss social and political issues, and thus vulnerable 
to ‘chauvinistic instigators’ or ‘unscrupulous manipulators’ (see Han 2000: 71; Nam 
1969: 468). Apart from ideological control, the ruling elites also make use of laws and 
regulations to serve their political goals. 
Oppositional leaders, associations and media are strictly controlled. As Nam 
(1969) described it clearly: ‘In the period 1963-65 alone, Lee banned ten student and 
trade union publications for security reasons and also withdrew the license of the 
FAJAR, the organ of the University of Singapore [now National University of Singapore] 
Socialist Club’ (p. 475). Additionally, various laws and regulations, such as the Internal 
Security Act, the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance and the Societies 
Ordinance, have been enacted to suppress potential challenges to authority. 
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Opposition MPs and leaders such as Chia Thye Poh and Francis Seow were detained 
or arrested without warrant or trial (see George 2007: 132, 139; Means 1996: 109; 
Nam 1969: 472-473; Rodan 2003: 508). According to Slater (2012), ‘[o]ngoing legal 
and political intimidation of oppositionists (and the districts that looked primed to 
back them) ensured that the PAP would not even face an opponent in more than half 
of Singapore’s districts until 2006’ (p. 29).  
Defamation suits are often used against oppositional leaders, such as Dr Chee 
Soon Juan, leader of the Singapore Democratic Party and former lecturer at the 
National University of Singapore, who went bankrupt as a consequence of two 
lawsuits by Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong (Chee 2012: i). The government has also 
imposed many controls on the media, including electronic media and the internet. The 
state owned Singapore Broadcasting Corporation owns all radio and television 
channels. Privately owned newspapers’ board of director appointments must be 
approved by the government. Financial penalties are often imposed on foreign media, 
including journalists and political commentators. This indirect press censorship has 
forced the media to adopt self-censorship to avoid confrontation with the government 
(see George 2007: 133-137; Mauzy and Milne 2002: 128; Means 1996: 109-110; Rodan 
2003, 2004: 16). 
In short, both Hong Kong and Singapore are typical deviant autocracies: they 
have prosperous economies and are ruled non-democratically by elites (Kuan and Lau 
2002: 58; Lau and Kuan 2000: 720; Myhre 2010; Reilly 2013: 157; Roy 1994: 242; Sing 
1996, 2004). As we have seen, elite domination in present-day Hong Kong and 
Singapore is closely related to British colonial history and the elite bargaining situation 
during the transitional period. For this reason, it is fruitful to examine in detail, using 
the neo actor-based analytical framework, the way that elites dominate the political 
arena. The analysis not only enables us to understand deviant autocracies in Asia, but 
contributes to democratisation studies by showing the reasons for non-transition to 
democracy. 
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4.4 Data Collection Method for Small-N Analysis 
 
The archival method is used to collect data for case studies of Singapore (Chapter 5) 
and Hong Kong (Chapter 6). According to Kapiszewski et al. (2015), ‘national archives 
[are] “low-hanging fruit” – publicly available and located in places (e.g. archives and 
libraries) that are familiar and comfortable for academics. These qualities can make 
gathering such materials relatively easy, and immediately make progress’ (p. 165). I 
have visited archives in Hong Kong, Singapore and London from 2013 to 2015.16 Only 
the National Archives in London, it turns out, provide the data required for this thesis. 
Documents in the archives in Hong Kong and Singapore have sometimes been 
destroyed by the governments (see Kapiszewski et al. 2015: 171); the remaining 
documents are mainly stored in London, the former colonial capital. Because the focus 
of the small-N analysis is the transitional period, I have relied primarily on the London 
archives, which contain important data on the interaction and decision making 
process among actors during this period. The data are also openly available to access 
due to the 30-year transfer rule (see Burnham et al. 2004: 202). 
Regarding historical source materials, Lichtman and French (1978) provided a 
very refined categorisation: ‘Historians… usually refer to evidence produced at the 
time of the event as “primary”, and accounts written later as “secondary”… and 
tertiary source are “historical” accounts written afterward to reconstruct the event’ 
(p. 18). The small-N analysis here mainly relies on primary and tertiary sources. The 
primary source is mainly documents from the archives, and the tertiary source is 
memoirs of different actors in Hong Kong (Chung 2001; Lu 2009) and Singapore (Lee 
1998) during the transitional period. This triangulation method is generally regarded 
as a valid approach to field research, as it ‘allows the strengths of the data gathered 
using one mode of collection to offset the weaknesses of those gathered using 
another’ (Kapiszewski et al. 2015: 158). It can also verify the validity of the data and 
                                                          
16 I visited National Archives of Singapore on 3-9 January 2014; Public Records Office in Hong Kong on 
3-5 February 2014; and the National Archives in London three times in March 2013, July 2014 and June 
2015. 
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fill in information gaps. Because sources are written by different actors with conflicting 
interests, it provides a holistic view of events. 
I sampled archive data through careful advance planning. I visited the National 
Archives three times to apply for a reader ticket, identified relevant materials and 
collected data,17 staying near the National Archives from 1 to 10 July 2014 and 17 to 
23 June 2015 collected the archive documents for Singapore and Hong Kong cases. 
Data were copied using professional digital cameras. I have adopted two strategies in 
my data collection. The first is a common practice of historically oriented social 
scientists: ‘ordering a series of events or processes chronologically and without gaps’ 
(Kapiszewski et al. 2015: 167). Another strategy is identifying a cut-off point (see 
Saunders 2010), i.e. the transitional period in Hong Kong before the 1984 Sino-British 
Joint Declaration and the independence of Singapore in 1965. 
There are several advantages and disadvantages to archival research. The 
researcher can use this method to build theories, develop research questions, select 
cases, generate and test hypotheses, and illuminate causal processes and mechanisms 
(see Kapiszewski et al. 2015: 160-164). It also helps clarify the dilemmas and decisions 
of leaders (see Mahoney 2001). However, there are also limitations. First, archive data 
was not originally created for academic research. As Kapiszewski et al. (2015) note, 
‘[t]he archives were not organized to fit your project!’ (p. 165). Second, the data may 
be biased. As Kapiszewski et al. (2015) stated, ‘such sources’ pre-existing nature 
means that they are remnants and artefacts that reflect the choices and interests of 
other scholars or cross-influences that often remain unknown to a researcher who 
pulls them from an archive box decades or centuries later’ (p. 157). In some extreme 
cases, for example in the context of authoritarian regimes such as China, there are 
biases in state-generated archives (see Chen 2010: 22; Stoler 2002: 108-109). To 
overcome these problems, I have read significant amounts of archive documents18 to 
dig out the relevant data for analysis. I also adopted the triangulation method 
discussed above. In addition, I concur with Kapiszewski et al. (2015) that scholars must 
                                                          
17 From March to May 2014, preparation work have been done to search and identify relevant archives 
information from the National Archive’s catalogue for the Hong Kong case; From February to April 2015, 
the same procedure was conducted to prepare for the Singapore case’s materials. 
18 For both Singapore and Hong Kong cases, I have analysed around 20,000 pages of archive documents. 
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‘take any biases they encounter into account as they interpret the sources’ and ‘report 
them in their scholarship so that readers can also take them into consideration’ (p. 
176). In short, archive data must be examined carefully and critically with reference 
to the historical context of the archives’ original creation, and cross checked with 
other material sources. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A more sophisticated and holistic analytical framework, the neo actor-based approach 
with supporting empirical evidence, is in my view needed for understanding the 
political development of deviant autocracies from three perspectives: elite 
negotiation, elite competition and state capacity. The existing actor-based approach 
focuses on the interaction of internal elites. While it is valuable for explaining 
democratic transition and consolidation, it is inadequate for understanding the non-
transition to democracy among deviant autocracies in Asia. The neo actor-based 
approach solves this problem by considering a wider range of elites, including 
international and domestic actors. The British, as the former colonial master of 
Singapore and Hong Kong, had significant political and economic influence during the 
transitional period, i.e. the process of decolonisation and transfer of sovereignty. 
Another external actor, communist China, also shaped the resultant system due to the 
influence of the Chinese diaspora, China’s geopolitical influence in Asia and the 
ideological confrontations of the Cold War era. 
The factionalisation of interest-oriented local elites in Hong Kong and Singapore 
has also played an important role in sustaining autocratic regimes. The period 
following the transfer of sovereignty became an arena for competition between 
colonial rulers, business elites associated with former rulers, external actor(s) involved 
in sovereignty disputes, local business and professional elites and opposition factions. 
The former colonial ruling elites and international actors had to decide which elite 
faction to support, to represent their perceived interests in the resultant system. They 
consequently empowered a specific group of local elite, so that it became the ruling 
129 
 
elite in post-transitional society. These empowered elites gained a robust coercive 
state capacity to protect the interests of different involved actors, in the form of 
institutional arrangements deterring potential challenges from the opposition and 
safeguarding the political domination of ruling elites.  
This analytical framework for interaction between the major internal and 
external elites during transition aims to shed light on how elite competition shapes 
the state to protect their interests. The following chapters use archival data from 
Singapore and Hong Kong to examine how international actors interacted with local 
elites, and how the empowerment of post-transitional ruling elites led to coercive 
state capacity in the resultant system. It is expected that the domination of political 
power and a corresponding absence of limitations on rulers’ power has resulted in 
persistently non-democratic regimes.  
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Chapter 5: Elite Competition and 
Communist Threat in Singapore 
 
Introduction 
 
Singapore has been an important trading hub in Southeast Asia since the 19th century, 
and has had a higher income than other countries in the region since the 1960s (see 
Daquila 2004: 8-9; Tan 2007: 854-855; Trocki 2006: 8-18; United Nations Development 
Programme 2015: 208). As discussed in the previous chapter, Singapore has also had 
a distinctive political system since independence. Political power in the city-state is 
dominated by the People’s Action Party (PAP), which has implemented various 
mechanisms of electoral and social control to eliminate potential opposition. This 
qualifies Singapore’s political regime as a deviant autocracy. 
This chapter presents a case study with process tracing to explain how 
Singapore became a deviant autocracy. Based on qualitative analysis of government 
archival materials from the United Kingdom, Singapore and the Federation of Malaya, 
three periods of Singapore’s political history are addressed in chronological order: 1) 
a pre-transitional colonial period, prior to the initial attempt to reform Singapore’s 
political system in the early 1950s by introducing a ‘member’ system and indirect 
elections; 2) a transitional period from the mid-1950s to 1965, when the Rendel 
Commission introduced elections and party politics as part of a decolonisation 
framework; and 3) a post-transitional period beginning in August 1965, when 
Singapore became an independent sovereign state. 
Using the neo actor-based analytical approach developed in Chapter 4, this 
chapter investigates three major factors – state capacity, external actors and internal 
elites – to explain the failed transition to democracy in Singapore. Several groups of 
elites are shown to have interacted and competed to protect and maximise their own 
interests. This conflict of interests was particularly intense in the transitional period of 
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decolonisation and nation building, which offers crucial insights into the genesis of 
Singapore’s autocratic regime prior to the transfer of sovereignty. Singapore had a 
fully elected legislature for the first time during this period, in the 1950s. In addition, 
Singapore merged with the Federation of Malaya in 1963, then dramatically separated 
from the Federation and became an independent state in 1965. Detailed investigation 
of the interactions between major elites involved in this series of incidents can help 
us to explain the emergence of a deviant autocracy in Singapore. 
The major finding of the empirical case study analysis reported here is that 
Singapore’s failure to transition to democracy was mainly due to economic, political, 
military and community-based conflict among elite groups fragmented both internally 
and externally.19 During decolonisation, Britain’s ‘divide and rule’ policies and the 
Malayan Emergency exacerbated conflict between elite factions divided along racial 
and occupational lines. In addition, the Cold War mentality compelled British decision 
makers to transfer power from business elites, who had led Singapore during the 
colonial period, to professional technocrats who exhibited both an anti-Communist 
orientation and loyalty to Britain. During the transitional period, the former British 
elites entrusted local Singapore ruling elites, namely the PAP and its leader, with 
political responsibility, enabling them to exercise authoritarian rule for more than half 
a century.  
This chapter is divided into three parts, corresponding to the three periods 
highlighted at the beginning of this chapter. The analytical framework is designed to 
address the connections between state capacity, external elites (such as British 
officials,20 Federation of Malaya ruling elites and Communists) and internal elites (such 
as professional and business elites, elites from different ethnic groups and traditional 
                                                          
19 Elite fragmentation, as opposed to elite cohesion, led potential autocrats to compete with each other 
during the transitional period. However, on assuming power, the authoritarian elites adopted various 
measures to promote elite cohesion, such as co-opting potential opponents to ‘consolidate a fully 
closed regime’ (see Levitsky and Way 2002a: 62). Hadenious and Teorell (2007: 150-152) discuss types 
of authoritarian regime and their durability in relation to elite cohesion. 
20  The term ‘British colonial ruling elites’ refers to colonial officers based in Singapore and the 
Federation of Malaya, such as the Governor and the High Commissioner; Cabinet ministers; and officials 
affiliated with the London-based Colonial Office. 
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indigenous rulers) to shed light on the reasons for the emergence of a deviant 
democracy in Singapore (see Appendix A). 
  
5.1 Pre-transitional Period 
 
In the pre-transitional period, the colonial ruling elites in Singapore exercised effective 
control of society, with a relatively stable autocratic polity. During the 1950s, however, 
political reform incited conflict between local elite factions, who competed to secure 
their own interests. This section also provides an overview of the process by which 
China and Malaya became influential external actors in Singapore’s transitional period.  
 
State Capacity 
 
The British colonial rulers successfully deployed Singapore’s coercive state capacity to 
control society. Singapore’s political system in the British colonial period was non-
democratic (see Chapter 4). The colonial Governor and the Colonial Office in London 
possessed absolute power over the colony. Singapore was officially under the control 
of Britain from 1824, with the signing of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, and attained Crown 
colony status in 1867. As in other former British colonies, the Governor was appointed 
by the British government and senior government positions were held predominantly 
by British expatriates. In the early 1950s, after the Second World War, the political 
structure of Singapore was still dominated by officials appointed by the British 
government (see Means 1996; Pepper 2000; Wight 1952). 
In the early 1950s, immediately before Singapore’s decolonisation, the colonial 
ruling elites proposed political reforms to meet administrative needs, particularly the 
need for more officials to help the Governor run the government after the Second 
World War. This constraint was acknowledged in an secret internal government 
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document of 25 February 1952, entitled Proposed Introduction of a ‘Member’ System 
in Singapore.  
The increase in volume and scope of Government business post war 
causes a serious bottleneck in the Colonial Secretariat and the Colonial 
Secretary… The basis of the Member system which has been introduced 
into the Government of the Federation of Malaya and elsewhere is the 
devolution of responsibility to Members (Official or Unofficial) who are 
made directly responsible to Government for the efficient functioning 
of a department of departments. (TNA: FCO 141/14499) 
The author of a secret document dated 6 December 1951 and entitled Scheme for 
‘Member’ System in the Colony suggested that the Legislative Council should have 
‘three elected members’, and that the Executive Council should be increased by two 
unofficial members, ‘elected by the Unofficial Members of [the] Legislative Council 
from amongst themselves’ (TNA: FCO 141/14499). However, the elected members 
came mainly from a business chamber with a narrow mandate, loyal to the colonial 
ruling elites (see TNA: DO 35/6288; TNA: FCO 141/14499). The purpose of increasing 
the number of elected members in the Legislative Council and introducing a member 
system was merely ‘to relieve the bottle-neck in the Secretariat’, as noted in 1951 by 
the Governor of Singapore, Sir Franklin Gimson, in a letter to Sir Thomas Lloyd, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (TNA: FCO 141/14498).  
The proposed introduction of a representative government in Singapore was 
criticised by the local elites. For example, R. Jumabhoy, Legislative Councillor and 
unofficial member of the Executive Council, asked how ‘the Member System is 
working in the Federation. I do not know what happened to the promise made for 
introduction of the same system here… No concession or reform could be expected 
from them [the Conservative Party] unless forced by circumstances’ (TNA: FCO 
141/14498). Clearly, political reform in Singapore in the early 1950s was implemented 
primarily to meet administrative needs and to facilitate decolonisation. Even more 
importantly, the above excerpt demonstrates the important role played by British 
government elites in shaping the political structure of Singapore, especially during the 
transitional period.  
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Singapore went through four main constitutional changes prior to 
independence in 1965, in which external actors played significant roles. In particular, 
the threat posed by Communist China and Communist insurgency groups from Malaya 
led the colonial ruling elites to use Singapore’s coercive state capacity to contain 
Communism. The introduction of a member system was discussed in this light in the 
Singapore Political Report for October 1951, excerpted below. 
More fundamentally, only in this way can the democratic constitutional 
procedure be a living part of the life of the Colony, a part vital and 
healthy enough to resist the sneering infiltrations of Communism. (TNA: 
FCO 141/14498) 
In a memorandum prepared in 1953, the secretary of the Council of Action to the 
Rendel Constitutional Commission made the following observations and 
recommendations. 
The power of Communism is a real one and we must not minimise the 
attractions it has for the embittered, the desperate, and the 
dispossessed… The best defence against Communism is an immediate 
and direct stake in democracy. (TNA: CO 1022/92) 
In the same document, the council secretary suggested that the ‘[l]egislature itself 
must be fully elected. We are of the opinion that nominated seats and special 
representation for sectional interests are antiquated and repugnant to the ideals of 
democracy’ (TNA: CO 1022/92). It is worth noting that the British government elites 
did not wholeheartedly promote democracy. Although unsurprising, it is somewhat 
ironic – given the British rhetoric opposing free societies to Communism – that in the 
above internal government document, emphasis was placed on merely a ‘democratic 
way of life’ (TNA: CO 1030/82), rather than the development of a genuine democratic 
society with free and fair elections and protected civil liberties. The election was 
perceived as an anti-Communist tool, in line with the goal of the British ruling elites 
during the transitional period to design a political structure headed by local anti-
Communist elites. 
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International Actors 
 
In this section, the process by which China and Malaysia became major external actors 
in Singapore’s transition is elaborated. The influence of China was due mainly to the 
absence of a national identity as perceived by citizens of Singapore. Before Singapore 
became part of the British Crown colony of the Straits Settlements, the island had only 
a sparse indigenous population. After Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles made Singapore 
the region’s trading hub in the early 19th century, traders from Europe and nearby 
countries, such as China, India and Malaya, began to settle on the island, forming the 
city-state’s major founding population (see Chua 2012; Huang and Hong 2007; Lam 
and Yeoh 2004; Lee 2000: 573-594). As a result, most Singaporean families today have 
roots in neighbouring countries; for example, most members of the Chinese 
population of Singapore have a significant number of relatives residing in mainland 
China. The term ‘birds of passage’ was used to describe these citizens by M. P. D. Nair, 
an unofficial member of the Legislative Council, in a meeting held on 16th June 1953 
to discuss a motion for the amendment of Section 6(3) of the Municipal Ordinance 
(TNA: CO 1022/385). This nostalgic form of nationalism was reflected in the secret 
monthly emergency and political report for 15 November to 15 December 1954: ‘[t]he 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce has launched a strong but belated campaign for the 
abolition of the English language qualification for candidates for the Assembly. This 
manifestation of Chinese nationalism is receiving strong support from both the 
Kuomintang and the left section of the Chinese’ (TNA: DO 35/6288). The Chinese 
origins and familial connections of many Singaporeans were a problem for the British 
government, which was concerned about the general failure of Chinese residents to 
seek naturalisation, unlike citizens of the United Kingdom and its colonies (TNA: DO 
35/6289). Members of the Chinese ethnic group in Singapore maintained close 
connections with mainland China, and thus had the potential to be manipulated by 
Chinese Communists.  
Two strategies were adopted by the ruling elites to solve the problem of 
China’s potential role in diffusing Communism and anti-colonial sentiment. First, 
democracy was promoted in the 1950s to contain the influence of Chinese 
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Communism in Singapore. This strategy was described in a document entitled 
Constitutional Development, as follows. 
[P]olitical advance is required not only as a part of progress toward 
eventual self-government but also to satisfy public demands for 
democratic as opposed to Communist methods. (TNA: FCO 141/14499) 
Second, to solve the problem of a lack of perceived national identity, the British ruling 
elites deliberately fostered nationalism among the Singaporeans. Sai (2013: 50) 
argued that the British colonial administrator artificially developed a form of ‘colonial 
nationalism’ during decolonisation. This artificially created national identity was 
beneficial to the rulers. According to Liu and Wong (2004: 93), the increased degree 
of political participation among the Singaporean Chinese was mainly due to the 
Communist victory in China in 1949. The British colonial government attempted to 
‘Malayanise the Chinese’ to disrupt the relationship between mainland China and the 
Chinese population of Singapore. The resulting absence of a perceived national 
identity led local elites in Singapore to prioritise their own interests over ‘national’ 
interests, which explains their competition for various political and economic 
resources during the transitional period. 
The Federation of Malaya and later Malaysia also had an important external 
influence on the political regime in Singapore. In the 1950s and 1960s, the British 
government elites were eager to maintain cooperation between the Federation of 
Malaya and Singapore, as indicated in the following excerpt from a government report.  
[T]he policy of her Majesty’s Government is to favour a closer 
association or union between the two territories [the Federation of 
Malaya and Singapore]… In their institutions of government Singapore 
and the Federation have since 1946 gone their separate ways, but their 
economic welfare and social and cultural interest are so closely allied 
that co-ordination of policy is of importance to both. (TNA: DO 35/6289) 
Nevertheless, the relationship between Singapore and Malaysia was complicated. The 
Federation of Malaya and Singapore were administratively separate under British rule 
in the 19th century. The Malay peninsula was divided into three political groups: the 
Straits Settlements (Crown colony), the Federated States and the Unfederated States 
(the latter two were under British protection) (TNA: DO 35/6289). The Federation of 
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Malaya was in the Federated States, whereas Singapore was part of the Crown colony. 
Therefore, as observed by Quah (2015): ‘Malays were the indigenous people of 
Malaya and the Chinese were perceived as outsiders’ (p. 104).  
Indeed, internal government documents suggested that ethnic conflict not only 
prevented cooperation between the Federation of Malaya and Singapore but 
exacerbated their competition. For example, in the political arena, the ruling elites of 
Singapore and the Federation of Malaya remained at a distance, avoiding cooperation. 
In an internal government document dated 28 April 1953, J. J. Paskin of the Colonial 
Office noted that ‘[t]o my mind it is quite shocking that neither Singapore nor the 
Federation have kept each other informed of proposals which would involve the 
setting up of Constitutional Commissions or Committees in the two territories’ (TNA: 
CO 1022/92). Surprisingly, the major political party in the Federation of Malaya, the 
United Malays National Organisation, was not intended to establish a party branch 
and run the election in Singapore, according to a secret monthly emergency and 
political report covering the period from 15 November to 15 December 1954 (TNA: 
DO 35/6288). 
 
Local Elites 
 
In response to changes in state capacity and the international situation, local elites 
competed with each other to safeguard their own interests. Internally, the political 
reforms of the early 1950s provided an opportunity for political transition by allowing 
political parties to compete in elections. This incited local elite groups to compete for 
scarce resources, i.e. political power. This intense competition led to the 
fragmentation of Singapore’s elite groups, ultimately hindering the development of a 
genuinely democratic form of government during the transitional period.  
There was intense competition between ethnic-group leaders. The populations 
of both the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, as multi-ethnic societies, consisted 
of Malays, Chinese, Indians and Europeans or Eurasians. However, ethnic composition 
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differed considerably between the two populations. Malays constituted a majority in 
the Federation of Malaya, whereas the Chinese were the dominant ethnic group in 
Singapore (see Lee 1998: 14). During the transitional period, the Malays and the 
Chinese competed for both political and economic resources. The British authorities 
were aware of the fault-lines between ethnic groups in Malaya. In a telegram (No. 276) 
sent to the Colonial Office on 25 February 1952, Gerald Templer, High Commissioner 
of the Federation of Malaya, made the following statement.  
The first Malacca Municipal elections were somewhat disappointing… 
The discouraging feature of the results of the Kuala Lumpur election 
was the clear indication that, although the composition of all three 
parties was inter-racial, voting followed strictly on racial community 
lines, the predominantly Chinese Wards returning Chinese only, the 
predominantly Malay Wards returning Malays only and the 
predominantly Indian Wards returning Indians only. (TNA: FCO 
141/14429) 
Chinese community leaders expressed concerns about the political reforms initiated 
in the Federation of Malaya, as indicated in a letter written by H. S. Lee, President of 
the Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Chairman of the Associated Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce of Malaya, to Jim Griffiths, Secretary of State for Colonies, on 
16 January 1951. Lee reported that ‘[w]hen the constitution of the Federation of 
Malaya was announced there was a strong section of the Chinese community who felt 
that the constitution was so unfair and so unjust to the Chinese that they advocated 
non-participation in the Federal Legislative Council’ (TNA: FCO 141/14429). Prior to 
this letter, a statement issued by the Colonial Secretary’s House, Singapore on 11 
September 1950 indicated that ‘[t]he rejection of Western control by Asian peoples 
under the leadership of their Western-educated political intelligentsia… started 
before the War and is now a commonplace… with British withdrawal, the struggle 
would be between Chinese and Malays for control’ (TNA: FCO 141/14429). Ethnic 
competition for political resources took place not only in the Federation of Malaya, 
but also in Singapore. 
The introduction of direct elections in the Legislative Assembly in the 1950s 
deepened the division of factional interests along ethnic and occupational lines. 
Workers competed with elites from various ethnic communities, such as the Chinese, 
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Malay and Indian populations, and occupational communities, such as business and 
professional groups, to maximise their own influence in the Singapore government. 
Political power in Singapore shifted from Indian to Chinese citizens after 1950 due 
to the growing Chinese adult population and the increasing political consciousness of 
the Chinese community. This shift was clearly depicted by W. L. Blythe, Colonial 
Secretary of Singapore, on 26 September 1950. 
Although the Indian influence is at present predominant in politics in 
Singapore, I think that it is quite possible that the Chinese may, before very 
long, play a much bigger part than they have done up till now… we wish to 
avoid communalism in Singapore politics, it is a fact that almost 78% of the 
population of Singapore is Chinese, and that a spread of political 
consciousness is required. Of this large population, 60% is local born, and 
although a large proportion (say 60%) of non-adults is included in this 
percentage, it will not be long before the majority of our adult population is 
local born and entitled to vote. (TNA: FCO 141/14429) 
Indeed, the composition of ethnic groups in Singapore was relatively stable between 
the 1950s and 2015 (see Table 5.1). Official statistics provided by the Singapore 
government show that the Chinese have remained the dominant social group, 
representing approximately 75% of the total population, while Malays represent 
approximately 13% and Indians less than 10% (Singapore Department of Statistics 
2015). However, as most members of the Chinese population in the early 1950s were 
non-adult and ineligible to vote or stand for election, the Indian population accessed 
a greater share of political resources. 
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Table 5.1 Singapore Residents by Ethnic Group, 1960 to 2015 
Year  
(Total 
Residents) 
Chinese Malays Indians Other 
1960 
(1,646,400)  
76.0% 14.1% 8.1% 1.8% 
1965 
(1,886,900) 
76.3% 14.7% 7.4% 1.6% 
1970 
(2,013,563) 
77.0% 14.8% 7.0% 1.2% 
1975 
(2,268,600) 
76.6% 14.8% 6.6% 2.0% 
1980 
(2,282,125) 
78.3% 14.4% 6.3% 1.0% 
1985 
(2,482,615) 
78.0% 14.2% 6.7% 1.0% 
1990 
(2,735,868) 
77.8% 14.0% 7.1% 1.1% 
1995 
(3,013,515) 
77.4% 14.0% 7.3% 1.3% 
2000 
(3,273,363) 
76.8% 13.9% 7.9% 1.4% 
2005 
(3,467,814) 
75.7% 13.9% 8.4% 2.0% 
2010 
(3,771,721) 
74.1% 13.4% 9.2% 3.3% 
2015 
(3,902,690) 
74.3% 13.3% 9.1% 3.3% 
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics (2015) 
 
Competition was intensified between Chinese and Indian leaders, especially in 
debate on the right to vote. This severely injured the political status of Indians residing 
in Singapore. In response, British officials attempted to balance the power of the 
Chinese and Indian populations, as indicated in the following excerpt from an internal 
Colonial Office letter from J. D. Higham to Thomas Lloyd, dated 8 October 1952.  
The more I look at this the less I like the idea of increasing the residence 
qualification from three to seven years, and I think it would be no bad 
thing if Mr. C. C. Tan and his Progressive Party were made to see that they 
cannot rely for ever on legislation to protect the local born against the 
highly politically conscious Indian immigrants. (TNA: CO 1022/385) 
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Lloyd replied on 8 May 1953 with the following suggestion.  
It will, of course, be obvious that any legislation of this kind is a deliberate 
deterrent to Indian participation in local politics. I asked Sir John how 
representative bodies of Indian opinion in Singapore would view it; he 
says that the Indian Chamber of Commerce would favour restrictive 
legislation but that it would be strongly opposed by Indian political groups 
– mostly in the local Labour Party. The Government of India could, of 
course, be expected to protest. (TNA: CO 1022/385). 
In the final verdict, the Singapore 1955 Constitution clarified that a voter must be 1) 
at least 21 years old, 2) a British subject or 3) born in the Federation of Malaya, 
Sarawak, North Borneo or Brunei; and in all cases an ordinary resident of the colony 
for the 3 years immediately preceding an election (TNA: CO 1030/79). This 
arrangement significantly shifted political power from Indians to Chinese in elections 
during the transitional period. 
Due to an absence of perceived national identity, as discussed in the previous 
section, the political elites in Singapore tended to compete with each other in pursuit 
of their own interests, rather than prioritising state interests. This was repeatedly 
evident in discussion of the introduction of a member system to the Singapore 
government in the early 1950s, as indicated in the following excerpt from a letter 
dated 5 April 1952 from W. L. Blythe to J. D. Higham of the Colonial Office.  
[O]ur original intention [was] that two Unofficials should become 
Members, but then this was discussed with Tan Chin Tuan,21 C. C. Tan22 
and Thio Chan Bee, they quite frankly said they did not want this at 
present. C. C. Tan and Tan Chin Tuan said that they were professional 
and business men and [had] their clients to consider and that they could 
not, without a year or so of preparation, arrange their business affairs 
so that they could take on the responsibilities of Members… Thio Chan 
Bee is not in quite the same position as the other two for he, as you 
know, is a schoolmaster, but he accepted their argument. (TNA: FCO 
141/14498) 
In their political appointments, the elites of Singapore simply prioritised their private 
interests.  
                                                          
21 Tan Chin Tuan was the managing director of the Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC), one 
of the leading banks in Southeast Asia. 
22 Tan Chye Cheng was a prominent Chinese lawyer. 
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Indigenous rulers comprised another major stakeholder group in Singapore. 
For historical reasons, the British authorities were responsible for upholding the 
interests of local indigenous rulers in the Federation of Malaya and the Strait 
Settlements. In 1819, Thomas Stamford Raffles and other British officials signed 
various treaties and conventions with Tengku Long, Sultan of Johor, and other Malay 
rulers, which not only protected Britain’s economic and political interests in the region, 
but recognised the special interests of the local Malay rulers. For detailed information 
on the agreements reached with the indigenous rulers in the early 19th century, please 
refers to the following historical analyses (see Abshire 2011: 39-41, 45; Chew 1991: 
36-39; Dobbs 2003: 5-7; Turnbull 1989: 35). 
During the political reforms, Singapore’s rulers were eager to maintain their 
privileges and social status. A secret document sent by Gerald Templer, High 
Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya, to Oliver Lyttelton, Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, on 5 March 1953, highlighted the concerns expressed by the indigenous 
rulers, i.e. the Sultan, about the introduction of elections and democracy (TNA: FCO 
141/14508).23 Interestingly, Templer also reported in the letter that ‘[t]hough I failed 
to see the logic of some of these arguments, I did my best to answer them and, at the 
same time, to assuage to some extent the anxiety as to their own position which must 
be bulking large in the minds of the Rulers at the moment’ (TNA: FCO 141/14508). It 
is clear that local rulers’ interests and concerns had to be accommodated by the British 
ruling elites, although the latter did not view the rulers’ arguments as logical and 
reasonable. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Singapore’s political reforms tended to uphold 
local rulers’ interests by hindering the development of a more democratic form of 
government. 
                                                          
23 ‘There was a division among the Rulers on the question whether there should be a minority or 
majority of elected members in the new Council… [The rulers] said that the mass of the people were 
completely ignorant of the principles of democracy and, when elections were introduced they would 
be extremely susceptible to the few vocal elements who were clamouring for elections. These elements, 
they added, were seeking to gain power and riches by winning over an electorate suitability of the 
candidates presented to it. They contended that there were, therefore, obvious dangers in having 
elections at a time when the electorate was politically immature… They considered that the successful 
attainment of a fully self-governing constitution on the pattern of democracy was too precious to justify 
proceeding at a pace which might well endanger the whole process, and they preferred to move 
cautiously stage by stage from one successful measure to another to achieve the purpose in view’ (TNA: 
FCO 141/14508). 
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5.2 Transitional Process 
 
The introduction of the Rendel Constitution in 1955, during the decolonisation process, 
intensified the competition between elites in Singapore. This conflict was also 
deepened by the international situation, especially the pressures of decolonisation, 
anti-colonial sentiment and the perceived threat of Communist infiltration from China 
and the Federation of Malaya. Local elites fragmented further along ethnic, 
occupational and ideological lines. The colonial leaders were forced to seek reliable 
anti-Communist rulers for Singapore’s post-transitional society from a group of 
unreliable, self-interested local elites. Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP managed to refashion 
the party as an anti-Communist rather than radical pro-Communist group. This gained 
Lee Kuan Yew the confidence of the colonial ruling elites, and enabled him to become 
the leader of Singapore. 
 
State Capacity 
 
A watershed in the elites’ competition occurred in 1955, when the recommendations 
made in a 1954 report by the Rendel Commission introduced drastic changes to 
Singapore’s political structure. The Governor of Singapore appointed the members of 
the Rendel Commission (TNA: CO 1022/92) on 2 August 1953.24 A report by the Rendel 
Commission published in February 1955 changed the composition of the Singapore 
Legislative Council in April 1955, significantly increasing the number of elected 
members and reducing the importance of ex-officio and nominated officials (see Table 
5.2). This provided favourable conditions for the emergence of democracy in 
                                                          
24 Tan Chin Tuan, managing director of the OCBC; Lim Yew Hock, trade-union activist and former leader 
of the Labour Party of Singapore; Nazir Ahmed Mallal, advocate and solicitor of the colony of Singapore 
and the Federation of Malaya; Ahmad bin Mohammed Ibrahim, advocate and solicitor, Singapore; Tan 
Chye Cheng, advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court, Singapore; and Cecil Francis Smith, managing 
director of Sime Darby & Co., Ltd. 
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Singapore. However, as discussed in the previous section, the ruling elites’ primary 
goal in promoting democratic governance was to counteract the influence of 
Communism.  
The introduction of the Rendel Constitution and Legislative Council elections in 
1955 led to additional significant changes to Singapore’s political structure, which 
further intensified the conflict of interests between domestic elites. The state 
structure was no longer dominated by the colonial ruling elites. Most of the members 
of the legislature were elected by the public. Subsequently, the traditionally appointed 
pro-British business elites were no longer able to protect their interests through over-
representation in the Singapore government. In an intelligence report (No. 102, 5 May 
1954) prepared by the Foreign Office on constitutional development in the colony of 
Singapore, it was reported that the seats reserved for the Chamber of Commerce had 
to be ‘represented through the normal political channels’ (TNA: CO 1030/80). As a 
result, some traditional business leaders, such as Tan Chin Tuan and Tan Chye Cheng, 
were no longer active on the Singapore political scene. 
 
Table 5.2 Composition of Legislative Council in 1951 and 1955 
 Composition of Legislative 
Council in 1951 
Composition of Legislative 
Council in 1955 
President/speaker 1 president  
(the Governor) 
1 speaker  
(appointed by the 
Governor) 
Ex-officio members 4 3 
Nominated officials 5 4 
Elected members 9 25 
Source: Extracted from Summary – Constitutional Progress in the Federation of Malaya and in 
Singapore, p. 11 (TNA: DO 35/6289). 
 
From the British perspective, the newly elected members were still elites and 
professionals representing different segments of society. According to Liu and Wong 
(2004: 99, Table 3.1), there were 79 candidates in the 1955 elections, of whom 45 and 
20 were from the business and professional sectors, respectively. In a top-secret 
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document addressed to Lennox-Boyd, Colonial Secretary, on 25 July 1955, Goode 
discussed several questions related to the election and performance of the incumbent 
elected government before meeting with the Secretary of State about the 
Constitution. On 28 July 1955, Chief Secretary analysed the affiliation of elected 
members within the legislature (TNA: CO 1030/79).25    
The British colonial ruling elites further evaluated the consequences of the 
1955 election. A major issue was highlighted in the government document excerpted 
below: the increasing number of elected representatives with worker and socialist 
backgrounds. The following predictions were made in the same document. 
An increase in the total number voting would [give] even greater 
strength to the extreme Left… Their second interest is in Chinese 
nationalism. The P.A.P. and to some extent the Labour Front Parties 
offer them what they want and the dangers and economic 
consequences are not put to them nor are they likely to be much 
heeded if they were. (TNA: CO 1030/79) 
In Singapore’s 1955 election, the Democratic Party, representing the interests of the 
Chinese business and traditional professional sectors, was defeated by the Labour 
Front, a pro-labour political party (Liu and Wong 2004: 99). The newly emerged 
professional elites, who were mainly middle class and English-educated (Andrew and 
Tan 2003: 6; Yap et al. 2010), and represented the interests of workers, gained the 
attention of the British ruling elites.  
The Rendel Constitution further accelerated competition between racial and 
interest groups, leading to a drastic redistribution of political power and social 
fragmentation. Due to conflicts of interest among elites, Singapore’s constitution 
underwent two major revisions in 1955 and 1958, followed by another two major 
revisions in 1963 and 1965 that saw Singapore merge with and separate from the 
                                                          
25 ‘The Assembly is no longer controlled by European officials and nominated representatives of British 
commercial interests. It is popularly elected and has a Left Wing Socialist majority, but it contains a 
number of persons who represent and are themselves persons of reasonable substance in the Colony. 
The four Progressive members are drawn from the business and professional class, and the Party had 
the support of the European commercial and banking community. The two Democrats represent the 
very substantial commercial interests of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. One of the Independents 
is the leader of the Indian Chamber of Commerce. Two of the opposition Nominated Members 
represent European and Chinese banking and business… On the Government side two are lawyers, one 
an European school master, and several persons with business interests’ (TNA: CO 1030/79). 
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Federation of Malaya, respectively. These rapid changes in constitutional 
documentation and political power instigated many political and constitutional 
problems and exacerbated the competition for power between elites (see Tan 1989: 
8-16). In response to the growing power of pro-worker political parties, British elites 
meticulously scrutinised the ideologies and political motives of the parties’ leaders, 
such as Lee Kuan Yew. The British authorities had to ensure that the future leader of 
Singapore would embrace anti-Communism and protect British interests in the post-
transitional period. 
Evidence also suggests that the British government elites wanted to retain a 
significant political influence during transition and decolonisation. When the principle 
of representative government was introduced to Singapore in the early 1950s, various 
mechanisms were imposed to ensure that British incumbents could exercise power 
smoothly. In an internal Colonial Office letter to A. M. MacKintosh on 17 September 
1954, Ian Watt reported that ‘I suggested that it would be appropriate to include [a] 
provision restricting the right of the Legislative Assembly to proceed on Bills or 
Motions which would affect the Public Service’ (TNA: CO 1030/85). Among the bills 
not to be assented to without instruction from the Secretary of State were ‘any Bill 
establishing any banking association, or altering the constitution, powers, or privileges 
of any banking association’, ‘any Bill affecting the discipline or control of Our naval, 
military or air Forces’ and ‘any Bill containing provisions to which Our assent has once 
been refused, or which have been disallowed by us’ (TNA: CO 1030/85). Clearly, the 
above restriction not only weakened state capacity but hindered Singapore’s 
democratic development. Even more importantly, these mechanisms provided useful 
guidelines for future authoritarian leaders seeking to control political power through 
rules and regulations. 
 
International Actors 
 
Several major areas of competition between external and internal elites during the 
transitional process shaped political development in Singapore. First, nationalism was 
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promoted and manipulated by the colonial ruling elites to ease the tension created by 
global independence movements and anti-colonial sentiment fused with Chinese 
nationalism among local elites. Second, Singapore and the Federation of Malaya 
competed for economic and military resources. The perceived external threat from 
Malaysia enabled the government of post-colonial Singapore to justify impeding the 
introduction of democracy. Third, the ruling elites in Britain, Malaya and Singapore 
competed to protect their economic, defence and military interests. Last but not least, 
the perceived threat of a Communist infiltration of Singapore from China and the 
Federation of Malaya severely affected the decisions of the British ruling elites. Anti-
Communism was the guiding force in the process of transition. The leader of PAP, Lee 
Kuan Yew, successfully refashioned his own and his party’s image, rebranding the PAP 
as an anti-Communist party rather than a pro-Communist radical leftist party. 
Consequently, his party won the general election in 1959 and went on to hold political 
power in Singapore for half a century. 
 
Nationalism and Anti-colonial Sentiment   
 
The British colonial ruling elites were cautious in their promotion of nationalism in 
Singapore, wishing to ensure that nationalist sentiment did not breed anti-colonial 
attitudes. In a secret ‘off the record’ interview (report no. 0950) on Singapore’s future 
constitution held in November 1956, Lim Yew Hock and Tengku Long ‘both agreed that 
there was virtually no danger that Malay nationalism or religious prejudices would be 
over inflamed against the British, as “the British had never behaved here as the Dutch 
did in Indonesia towards the native peoples”’ (TNA: FO 1091/44). However, the notion 
of nationalism was influenced by global decolonisation and independence movements. 
In a top-secret letter to Singapore’s Commissioner of Police on 12 January 1957, R.W. 
Calderwood, Director of Singapore’s Special Branch, attached a translation of a 
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) document entitled ‘Freedom News’, Issue No. 78 
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(October 1956), published by the Singapore Freedom Press. The author of the article 
described the anti-colonial sentiment of local elites (TNA: FCO 141/15063).26  
British officials also sought to avoid promoting a form of nationalism that 
risked direct confrontation between Singaporean elites and the British government. 
In the early 1950s, several Chinese middle schools were suspected by the colonial 
authorities of having been infiltrated by underground Chinese Communists (see Quah 
2015: 106). In response to the danger of nationalism fused with Communism, J. D. 
Hennings of the Colonial Office prepared a brief for the United Kingdom’s delegation 
on 27 January 1959 in advance of a meeting between the United Kingdom, the United 
States and French officials in Washington to discuss the situation in Singapore. The 
following statement was made in the document.  
Nationalism and Communism are the two contending forces in South 
East Asia. It is United Kingdom policy to attempt to satisfy the 
nationalist forces by granting constitutional advance in the belief that 
this offers the best counter to Communism. (TNA: DO 35/9877)  
In other words, the British ruling elites attempted to re-forge ‘colonial nationalism’ 
with the principal aim of instating a representative government to limit Singapore 
nationalism and thereby resist communism. The same document prepared by the 
Colonial Office provided the following clarification.  
[The] main threat to Singapore is one of Communist subversion, which 
has to date been contained by the elected Government… It might be 
thought that our colonial policy is contradictory with our defence 
interests, but this is not really so. What we are trying to do is to strike 
a balance between the political and military means of defending the 
free world against Communism and of building up a stable democratic 
bloc in S. E. Asia. (TNA: DO 35/9877)  
This indicates a trade-off between measures taken to protect Singapore from 
Communism and measures taken to implement a stable democracy. As the colonial 
                                                          
26 ‘Lim Yew Hock thinks that, under support of the colonialists, he can continue to carry out this type of 
unreasonable and savage actions for a long time… If he is willing to open his eyes to look around and 
observe the world situation, to look at the violent upsurge of national struggles for independence in 
Asia and Africa, and at the miserable retreat and failures of the colonialists everywhere, it is not difficult 
for him to perceive that the life of colonialism is not as long as he imagine it to be’ (TNA: FCO 141/15063). 
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powers focused on the former goal, the development of democracy in Singapore was 
stunted. 
Anti-colonial sentiment also intensified the conflict between local and colonial 
ruling elites. The British ruling elites possessed overwhelming political power during 
the transitional period. The local elites attempted to increase their own political 
power by, for example, appointing ministers in the early stages of political reform and 
negotiating during the Singapore constitutional debate in the 1950s. The competing 
political interests of elites gave the PAP the opportunity to acquire political power, 
especially when this competition led to the resignation of the leader of the Labour 
Front. David Marshall resigned as Chief Minister in 1956, immediately after the 
unsuccessful constitutional talks in London with the British ruling elites.  
In the early stages of Singapore’s political transformation, the tension between 
Marshall, the governor, oppositional leaders and British ruling elites was intense. 
Internal document governments reveal vigorous competition between these elites to 
appoint ministers immediately after the 1955 election. In a telegram (No. 59) to the 
Secretary of State for Colonies on 10 July 1955, Sir Robert Black wrote that Lim Choon-
Mong, leader of the Progressive Party, was strongly against the political appointment 
of four assistant ministers nominated by Marshall (see TNA: DO 35/6288). In addition, 
a fault-line emerged between the leader of the Labour Front and the British ruling 
elites, mainly due to Marshall’s radical anti-colonial attitude. In a secret telegram (No. 
63) to Lennox-Boyd on 12 July 1955, Robert Black reported that ‘Marshall took 
extreme line that Labour Front was “fighting Colonial regime” and this was issue of 
confidence between him and me’. As a consequence, the colonial governor agreed to 
only two appointments (TNA: DO 35/6288).  
The competition between Singapore’s ruling elites and British government 
officials was also manifested in the negotiations on constitutional change in Singapore. 
On 1 January 1956, a secret brief was drafted for the Secretary of State of Singapore 
against Marshall’s ‘dominion status’ proposal in paragraph 9 of CA(55)2, regarding the 
future of Singapore. The proposal referred to ‘an escape clause providing for the 
resumption of control by H.M.G. if there were serious danger of the Communist 
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obtaining control… at the same time hand[ing] back to H.M.G. by treaty or agreement 
full control over external affairs and external defence’ (TNA: DO 35/6289). Marshall’s 
proposed clause would undoubtedly have sped up the process of self-government – 
but at Britain’s expense, as full responsibility for defence and military expenditure was 
conferred on Britain in the event of a serious Communist threat. As Marshall’s 
proposal was considered to diverge from the development trajectories of other 
former British colonies or Commonwealth countries, it was rejected.27 
However, the major reason for British officials’ rejection of Marshall’s proposal 
lay in the shared anxiety of British ruling elites about the threat posed by Communism 
during the Cold War era (TNA: CO 1030/82). Communism was spreading all over the 
world, and infiltrating countries near Singapore, such as China, Korea and Vietnam. 
Even more importantly, local political parties such as the Malaysian Chinese 
Association (MCA) and the PAP were perceived to be maintaining a close relationship 
with the Chinese Communist Party. At that time, the leaders of the MCA and the PAP 
were themselves very closely connected, and their parties had a similar political 
orientation (see Lee 1998: 181). As a result, British officials feared that expediting self-
government in Singapore would simply transfer political power to a leader strongly 
affiliated with Communism, resulting in the loss of Singapore to the Communist bloc.  
 
                                                          
27 The proposal was immediately rejected in London. In a speech delivered to the Legislative Assembly 
on 6 June 1956 (TNA: CO 1030/82), Marshall made the following comments on the rejection of his 
proposal.   
 
‘We the people of Singapore took this as a good augury of the possible success of our Merdeka Mission 
with its modest plan for limited freedom. It did not take us long in London to learn that with the Colonial 
Office the Washington Declaration was just a quixotic document useful only for external decoration… 
“Liberate Singapore? Don’t be infantile; we need Singapore more than ever now. Freedom? We will 
give them the freedom to serve our interests”. This, as we saw it, was the attitude of the Colonial Office, 
matured in the tradition of the exploitation of human beings… Whilst the Prime Minister seeks the 
welfare of Britain with humanity, the Colonial Office seeks the welfare of Britain at the expense of 
humanity… We went to London full of faith. Historically, we recognised the radical and humane 
difference between British approach and that of other European Imperial powers… the English people 
in transforming their Colonies into friends and allies. This process started many decades ago. I think it 
was in 1867 when Canada was given self-government… after the war the humanity and statesmanship 
of the British Government extended this principle to Asian colonies – India, Burma and Ceylon… Why is 
Singapore made an exception?’ 
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Competition or Cooperation with Malaya? 
 
The relationship between Singapore and Malaysia was complicated. In a secret paper 
addressed to Sir Berkeley Gage, British Ambassador to Thailand, and dated 17 August 
1956, A. M. MacKintosh captured the British government’s view of the relationship 
between the Federation of Malaya and Singapore.  
It remains the view of H.M.G. that the only fully satisfactory 
arrangement is some form of union which will make the Federation 
and Singapore a single country. This however, will become possible 
only on the joint initiative of both territories, and although relations 
have improved since in Singapore Mr. Lim succeeded Mr. Marshall as 
Chief Minister, the divergence is still great and there is at present no 
prospect of any such union for years to come. (TNA: CO 1030/83) 
Disagreement between the Malayan and Singaporean leaders was also reported in a 
secret document prepared on 5 August 1955 by Malcolm MacDonald, Commissioner-
General for Southeast Asia, as a note on a talk with Marshall (TNA: CO 1030/79).28 
The hostile attitude of the ruling elites in the Federation of Malaya toward 
Singapore was partly due to a miscalculation by Tunku Abdul Rahman, Chief Minister 
of Malaya from 1955 to 1957 and Prime Minister of Malaysia from 1957 to 1970. 
Rahman noted that the ‘Federation did not wish its pace of political advance to be 
slowed down by association with Singapore. The Tunku expressed the view that Her 
Majesty’s Government would not give Singapore independence, because British 
defence interests there are so vital’ (TNA: CO 1030/79). Despite the enormous policy 
gap and lack of cooperation between the leaders of Singapore and the Federation of 
Malaya, Singapore merged with Malaya for 2 years, beginning in 1963, due to military 
concerns. In an internal government document dated 15 March 1960 and addressed 
to Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of Selkirk, United Kingdom 
Commissioner for Singapore and Southeast Asia, reported as follows. 
                                                          
28 ‘In the course of a talk with David Marshall yesterday morning, he expressed to me great concern at 
the attitude of Tunku Abdul Rahman to constitutional progress in Malaya and Singapore. He has 
discussed the question with the Tunku, and told me that Abdul Rahman wishes to progress much too 
fast. He hopes to achieve self-government for the Federation in all internal affairs in two years and 
complete independence in four years’ time’ (TNA: CO 1030/79). 
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The P.A.P. Government are at present in a dilemma about merger with 
the Federation. They continue to proclaim this as their objective, but 
every time the Tengku [Tunku] slaps it down their position becomes 
more and more difficult…  Lee Kuan Yew does not want this 
[independence], and indeed he is mortally afraid of it, since he has the 
sense to see that an independent Singapore, standing by itself, would 
rapidly be engulfed. (TNA: DO 35/9877)  
In short, disagreement between and miscalculations by the leaders of Singapore and 
the Federation of Malaya, together with conflicting ethnic interests, led to the 
expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965 (see Crouch 1996: 14; Lee 1998: 474, 
507-510, 615, 628-647). 
 
British Interests and Competition with Other Actors 
 
The government of the United Kingdom, as Singapore’s colonial administrator, also 
had an enormous interest in the region (see TNA: FO 1091/44). In a secret document 
dated 24 August 1956 and prepared by the Far Eastern Department of the Colonial 
Office, a strategy for negotiating with the political leaders of Singapore on the city-
state’s constitutional development was proposed. Singapore was intended to 
‘preserve its character as a major international sea port and a centre of economic 
activity in which there is a large British investment’, while being maintained ‘as an 
effective military base for United Kingdom forces’ in Southeast Asia (TNA: FO 1091/44). 
Archival data suggest that in the early stages of Singapore’s transition, various 
major external and internal actors competed to protect their own economic interests. 
In the 1950s, a proposal was made for protecting business and other sectoral interests 
(TNA: CO 1022/92). An emphasis on protecting British business interests was clear in 
the dialogue between senior British government officials. For instance, the 
importance of British commercial interests was highlighted in a secret telegram (No. 
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101) sent by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Robert Black, Governor of 
Singapore, on 17 August 1955 (TNA: DO 35/6289).29 
Due to the threat of Communist infiltration and a series of leftist movements in 
Singapore during the 1950s, the British ruling elites were concerned about their 
defence and military interests during the transitional period. In particular, the 
government feared losing its military bases and air-control rights in the region when 
the Federation of Malaya and Singapore became independent states. This concern 
was raised in a top-secret telegram sent by the Commonwealth Relations Office to the 
High Commissioners to the United Kingdom in Australia, New Zealand, India and 
Pakistan on 30 November 1955, regarding future defence arrangements with the 
Federation of Malaya and Singapore.  
There is no doubt, that not only in the first stage of self-government 
but even after full independence has been achieved, it will be 
necessary for United Kingdom and, subject to the agreement of the 
Australian and New Zealand Governments, Commonwealth forces to 
remain in Malaya and for the Singapore base to be kept in being. (TNA: 
DO 35/6289)  
In another secret document dated 27 November 1956, E. N. Larmour emphasised the 
need to protect Britain’s external defence arrangements in Singapore, as follows.  
Our objective in Singapore is to retain full control over the bases etc. 
which we at present occupy and absolute freedom to use them for any 
purpose we may wish, both for the external defence of Singapore and 
for the fulfilment of our other Commonwealth and International 
obligations. (TNA: FO 1091/44)  
The ‘international obligations’ referenced here denoted the United Kingdom’s joint 
operation with the United States against Communism. These obligations were also 
recognised in a top-secret document produced by the Commissioner General for the 
Colonial Office (No. 38) on 18 April 1956: ‘[t]he value of the naval and air bases in 
Singapore will be slight if the Americans cannot use them in war’ (TNA: FO 1091/41). 
                                                          
29 ‘The following points were made in Cabinet discussion of Secretary of State’s memorandum: (a) Point 
should be made that if Malaya wants self-government it must make every effort to pay its own way. If 
U.K. assistance continued to be necessary every effort should be made to safeguard our commercial 
interests in view of the importance of the Federation within the sterling area’ (TNA: DO 35/6289). 
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Diffusion of Communism from China and Malaya 
 
The potential infiltration of Communism was another important external influence 
during the transitional period. There were two major actors in this process, namely 
Communist China and MCP leaders. These two sources of Communist threat placed 
tremendous pressure on Singapore’s colonial ruling elites. This section first 
investigates the general fear of Communism among the British ruling elites, and then 
shows how these elites learned from various actors to evaluate the threat of 
Communism in the region. The next section illustrates the increasing influence of 
Communism and Communist-affiliated actors in Singapore, which led the British ruling 
elites to search for a reliable and anti-communist Singaporean leader during the 
transitional period. 
 
Threat of Communist Infiltration  
 
The British government elites were particularly afraid of the infiltration of Singapore 
by Communism due to the region’s predominantly Chinese population. In a secret 
letter to A. M. MacKintosh on 5 November 1955, Robert Black reported on a discussion 
with Marshall about the Constitution of Singapore. Black and Marshall expressed the 
concern that due to the increased enfranchisement of Chinese citizens, the extreme 
left-wing PAP might take over the government and thereby increase the chance of 
Communist infiltration (TNA: CO 1030/80). The concerns of the British ruling elites 
were not ungrounded. Lee Kuan Yew (1998) recalled that during the early formation 
of the PAP, ‘[m]any of the MCP cadres had been lying low, or had been under cover’ 
(p. 195). 
The threat of Communism not only affected Singapore’s political development, 
but hindered the merger between the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, as 
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illustrated in the following excerpt from the minutes of the ninth Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers’ Conference, held on 4 June 1956. 
The negotiations with Singapore would have been greatly eased if it had 
been possible to envisage an early link with the Federation of Malaya. 
This was historically justifiable, but the large Chinese population of 
Singapore and the extent of Communist infiltration there made the 
Government of the Federation reluctant to contemplate the inclusion of 
Singapore in the Federation at this time. (TNA: CO 1030/82) 
In a letter dated 18 June 1958 to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations, G. W. Tory, High Commissioner to Malaya, also 
acknowledged the role of Communism in impeding the political union between the 
Federation of Malaya and Singapore. 
It is quite clear that so long as the present conservative government 
remains in power in Malaya the prospect of a political merger of the two 
territories will continue to be remote. The victory of the PAP in the 
municipal elections in Singapore and the antics of the PAP Mayor since 
in their determination to resist contamination from Singapore. (TNA: 
FCO 141/14914) 
At that time, the PAP was accused of maintaining close links with the Chinese 
Communist Party, and the Communists affiliated with the PAP were actively involved 
in various strikes and anti-colonial government demonstrations.  On 15 April 1959, 
after the PAP won the city-council election in Singapore, a group of British subjects 
born in Singapore wrote a letter to Queen Elizabeth II in which they accused PAP and 
its leaders, namely Lee Kuan Yew, Toh Chin Chye, Goh Keng Swee and Ong Eng Guan 
and Lim Chin Siong, of being ‘sponsored by the Communist[s] of Red China and 
financed by them’. The authors of the letter further opined ‘that this Party should be 
banned for ever and their leaders should be banished from the Colony of Singapore 
to Red China’ (TNA: CO 1030/448).  
 
External Influence of Communism in Singapore 
 
The British ruling elites were suspicious about the political orientation of the PAP from 
its formation in 1954. Its leaders were responsible for organising various general 
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strikes against Marshall and the colonial government. A confidential telegram (No. 108) 
sent from the Commonwealth Relations Office to the High Commissioners on 24 June 
1955 highlighted the tense political situation in Singapore. ‘It is clear that the calling 
of this general strike was a further attempt by the leaders of the People’s Action Party 
to test the strength and resolution of the Labour Front Government’ (TNA: DO 
35/6288). Immediately after the election in 1955, the PAP was categorised as a left-
wing radical party with close connections with Communist activists. In an internal 
government document, the PAP was described as ‘an extreme left wing group with 
strong Communist affiliations’ (TNA: DO 35/6288). 
The British ruling elites were extremely concerned about the infiltration of the 
region by Communism, as indicated in the following excerpt from a secret paper 
entitled Counter-subversion in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, dated 17 
August 1956.  
In order to counter the Communist threat to the Federation of Malaya 
and Singapore the United Kingdom has spent very considerable 
resources during the last eight years in the prosecution of the 
Emergency and is prepared to continue to make forces available until 
Communist terrorism has been completely defeated. With the switch 
of Communist tactics away from armed rebellion to an United Front 
policy, the danger of long-term subversion has grown and is already a 
serious menace in Singapore. The United Kingdom’s primary answer to 
this has been constitutional change in both territories, with the result 
that the Communists have been unable to capture the genuine and 
healthy national movement for independence. (TNA: CO 1030/83). 
The British ruling elites believed that the main targets of Communist infiltration were 
Chinese schools and industries in Singapore. In a secret letter to J. B. Johnston, Head 
of the Far Eastern Department of the Colonial Office, on 26 July 1956, Robert Black 
reported on ‘the dangerous subversive activities of the Students’ Union’ as follows. 
‘The strike in the private Chinese Primary School, to which I referred, has high-lighted 
opposition to the Government’s new educational policy, and has given me the 
opportunity to develop the theme of action against the Students’ Union and 
subversive elements in schools [i.e. Communism]’ (TNA: CO 1030/83). The PAP was 
actively involved in these strikes, furthering the British suspicion that the party was 
associated with Communism. The involvement of PAP in various demonstrations and 
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strikes was described in detail in internal government documents (see, e.g., TNA: DO 
35/6288).30  
Additional evidence was obtained of a connection between the PAP 
and Communism. In a telegram sent to Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, on 30 April 1955, Sir J. Nicoll, Governor of Singapore, reported that 
before the elections, the PAP made ‘an attempt to control the Trade Unions 
and foment labour unrest in order to embarrass the new Government’ (TNA: 
DO 35/6288). Due to the popularity of the PAP and its leaders among workers 
and students, the British ruling elites were particularly concerned about its real 
political intentions. In numerous internal documents, government officials 
attempted to assess the political orientation of the PAP and its leaders. An 
example is provided in the following excerpt from a government report. 
The People’s Action Party, which forms the extreme Left Wing of the 
opposition,… formed shortly before the elections, [have] achieved an 
unexpected degree of success. Many of the speeches made by 
candidates and supporters of this party during the election campaign 
were inflammatory in tone, and in one or two cases might have been 
considered to border on sedition. Its official leader, Lee Kuan Yew, 
recently stated in an interview with the Singapore correspondent of a 
Sydney newspaper that if he had to choose between Communism and 
Colonialism, he would choose Communism. (TNA: DO 35/6288) 
After a series of political campaigns in Chinese schools and labour unions, the PAP was 
perceived by the ruling elites as a highly Communist-associated political party. This 
was reflected in a secret monthly emergency and political report in 1954, which is 
excerpted below. 
The People’s Action Party has been formed by an extreme left-wing 
socialist group which has found itself, after many months of discussions, 
unable to come to any compromise with various organisations 
                                                          
30 ‘The People’s Action Party chose as the immediate arena for a trial of strength an industrial dispute 
between the management and employees of the Hock Lee Amalgamated Bus Company. This dispute 
had been going on for some time and the strikers were incited by students and other agitators to use 
violence to prevent the Company’s buses being operated… The campaign continues until by the 
afternoon of the 12th May a crowd of about 1,000 students and strikers were repeatedly attacking with 
stones and bottles the police who were trying to keep the road clear near the bus depot. The situation 
deteriorated during the night and culminated in riots during which four men were killed. The situation 
was brought under control in the early hours of the 13th May by the firmness and self-restraint of the 
police’ (TNA: DO 35/6288). 
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representing labour. The prime movers are a small group of dissident 
English-educated intelligentsia… The People’s Action Party is a perfect 
front organization for Communist manipulation. (TNA: DO 35/6288) 
The leader of the PAP, Lee Kuan Yew, was concerned about how the British ruling 
elites perceived his own and his party’s political orientation, and was thus careful to 
avoid links with Communism, as reflected in an incident recalled in Lee’s memoirs. On 
recruiting Jamit Singh Sikh, Lee double-checked his background through various 
channels to ensure that the new recruit was not a secret member of the Anti-British 
League, i.e. a Marxist or a Communist (Lee 1998: 195). As the leader of the PAP and a 
Cambridge-trained professional lawyer, Lee was fully aware that if the PAP was 
labelled as a branch of the Communist Party or a supporter of Communism, the 
survival of the party would be compromised and Lee’s own political career would end. 
Therefore, Lee sought to re-imagine himself and his party as anti-Communist in 
orientation to ensure that the PAP was not suppressed by the British authority. 
 
Local Elites 
 
Internal actors also played important roles during the transitional period. While 
indigenous rulers continued to enjoy political privileges and a high social status, the 
interests of other domestic actors were fragmented along both ethnic and 
occupational lines. Conflict between actors seeking political power was particularly 
severe immediately after the introduction of direct elections in 1955. This conflict 
between elites impeded the promotion and maintenance of already fragile and 
immature electoral procedures in Singapore. 
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Indigenous Rulers 
 
The High Commissioner collaborated with the indigenous rulers and taught them how 
to monopolise power despite the introduction of elections and democracy. In a secret 
memorandum entitled Introduction of Elections to the Federal Legislative Council and 
dated 27 March 1954, the High Commissioner Gerald Templer reported on his 
dialogue with the rulers and explained that under the reformed system, the ruling 
elites would still enjoy political power (TNA: FCO 141/14508).31 Together with other 
British colonial administrators, the High Commissioner acknowledged the status of 
local rulers and worked to protect their interests in the transitional period. In a 
confidential report dated 10 January 1956 and entitled Self-government for the 
Federation of Malaya and Singapore, prepared by the Far East and Pacific Group, a 
sub-section on Malaya clarified the relationship between the colonial elites and the 
Malay rulers.  
We cannot adopt any policy which looks like betraying the Rulers. Our 
whole juridical position is based on the Treaties between them and the 
Crown, and it should be realised that at present constitutional changes 
can only be properly affected with the agreement of the Rulers freely 
given. Their consent to further constitutional changes must be obtained 
without pressure being exerted upon them by Her Majesty’s 
Government. (TNA: CO 1030/101) 
Consequently, a new constitution for Malaya was promulgated in April 1957 and came 
into force in June 1959. The power and status of the rulers was guaranteed by the 
creation of a new figurehead position, Yang di-Pertuan Agong or head of state of 
Malaysia, ‘who [was] elected for a term of five years from the leaders of the eleven 
states’ (TNA: DO 35/9877). This position remained largely in place after Singapore’s 
                                                          
31 ‘You have mentioned the danger that many may regard the acquisition of power merely as a road to 
the acquisition of riches and that whilst there is in certain vocal quarters a desire and demand for 
power… Let us consider the position, first as it would be if there were 45 elected members in a Council 
of 92, and secondly as it would be if there were 55 elected members in a Council of 102, remembering 
in both cases the likelihood of any one party or group of parties winning more than, say, 80% of the 
elected seats at the most in remote. With 45 elected members, the number in the largest group could 
not therefore reasonably be expected to be greater than 36, in which case, the votes of which the 
Government could be certain… the Government would be dependent, to carry its measures on support 
from among the State and Settlement members and the nominated members representing the 
scheduled interests who will therefore be in a position to exercise considerate influence’ (TNA: FCO 
141/14508). 
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independence in 1965; in Singapore, the equivalent ceremonial title was ‘President of 
Singapore’ (see Thio 2007). 
 
Fragmentation of Elite Interests based on Ethnicity  
 
The relationships between the major ethnic groups were extremely tense during the 
transitional period. The tension between Chinese and Malays was due not only to 
Singapore’s majority Chinese population, but to a discrepancy in the groups’ socio-
economic status. According to a government document, statistical data gathered in 
Singapore indicated that ‘the Chinese have tended to concentrate in the commercial 
and industrial areas, while the Malaysians have remained primarily an agricultural 
people’ (TNA: DO 35/6289). For further discussion of the discrepancies between 
Chinese and Malays in Singapore, please see Barr and Jevon (2005), Poon (2009), 
Rogers (1971), Shamsul (1999), Stimp (1997) and Tan (2003).  
The competition between the Chinese and the Malays significantly affected 
policy making. In a document sent to Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
on 16 February 1957, Robert Scott, Commissioner General in Southeast Asia, 
highlighted that ‘there is the possibility of communal tension and perhaps 
disturbances in the Federation. The cost to the Tunku to keeping the peace between 
Chinese and Malays may well include losing the support of many of his Malay followers’ 
(TNA: FCO 141/15063). In another secret document sent to Lennox-Boyd, dated 18 
December 1956, Scott made the following observations. 
In the long run the struggle for political power in Singapore is not 
between the local inhabitants and the British but between two group 
of Chinese, on the one hand those with roots in Singapore and Malaya 
over several generations and on the other hand the relative newcomers 
who with the powerful support of many of the Chinese youth want to 
retain and foster their links with China, not because of Communism but 
because it is their homeland. (TNA: FO 1091/44)  
Intriguingly, in a confidential letter to Robert Scott, Commissioner-General for the 
United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, on 8 April 1958, W. A. C. Goode, the last Governor 
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of Singapore, even argued that ‘[t]he battle for South East Asia will be fought not by 
troops and conventional weapons… but is being fought now by ideas, subversion, 
economic weapons and racial politics’ [emphasis added] (TNA: FCO 141/14914).  
This conflict of interests was not restricted to the Chinese and the Malays; it 
also involved elites from other ethnic groups. For example, after the introduction of 
the Singapore Constitution in 1955, ethnic communities were still keen to secure their 
rights by petitioning British authorities. On 4 March 1957, racial organisations in 
Singapore, such as the Eurasian Association, the Malay Union, the British European 
Association and the Malay-Indian Congress, urged the Governor of Singapore to fulfil 
their demand for ‘community representation’ in the Legislative Assembly. They 
argued that the proposed council ‘might well provide the best means of bringing the 
various races together in harmony, and, if they had seats in the Assembly, their 
standing would be more assured’ (TNA: CO 1030/448). The proposal to reserve 
Assembly seats for minority communities was rejected by the British government, as 
clearly stated in a confidential letter to W. A. C. Goode on 2 June 1958, Lennox-Boyd, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. ‘I should be glad, if you see no objection, if you 
would cause the Secretary-General of the Singapore Indian Congress to be informed 
that I have noted the representations contained in his letters of the 17th April and 12th 
May, but that I am unable to support his request for the creation of reserved seats in 
the Singapore Legislative Assembly for representatives of the minority communities 
in Singapore’ (TNA: CO 1030/448). 
In short, the above illustration was merely the tip of the iceberg of ethnic 
tension in the region. The literature in this field provides a vibrant discussion of British 
officials’ use of divide and rule policies to manipulate ethnic tension and thereby 
shape the process of decolonisation (see Christopher 1988; Blanton et al. 2001; Furedi 
1990; Lange et al. 2006; Pollis 1973). Competition within Singapore was not restricted 
to the Chinese and Malay ethnic groups; in addition, this period saw conflict for 
political, economic and military resources between the indigenous rulers (notably the 
Sultan), the British ruling elites and local elite groups divided by community and 
occupation. 
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Fragmentation of Elite Interests based on Occupation and Ideology 
 
Although the Rendel Commission introduced genuine elections to Singapore, the 
political context at this time was fragmented, and few parties were ready to articulate 
their political goals to the electorate. Most of the major political parties had been 
formed just a few months before the election; for example, the Labour Front was 
founded in August 1954 and the PAP in November 1954. The problem of political 
immaturity was highlighted by the British ruling elites in discussion of the difficulties 
of introducing a member system to Singapore’s governance. A secret internal 
document of 1951 (No. 00189/51), entitled Scheme for ‘Member’ System in the Colony, 
revealed that ‘[i]t was the general opinion that the Member system (with Unofficials 
as Members) would not be workable until the stage had been reached when all 
members of Legislative Council were democratically elected and political parties were 
more strongly developed’ (TNA: FCO 141/14498). Without well-established political 
parties to articulate societal interests, the election campaign was oriented towards 
narrowly defined personal or sectoral interests. The result of the election surprised 
not only the British colonial elites but the leaders of the major political parties, as 
indicated in another internal government report: ‘[t]he result of the elections was 
unexpected as it had been considered that the right wing parties [e.g. the Progressive 
Party] would probably be returned to power’ [emphasis added] (TNA: DO 35/6288). 
Details on the election result can be found in Table 5.3. The Labour Front won 10 of 
the 25 available elected seats. David Marshall,32 the leader of the Labour Front, was 
appointed by the Governor of Singapore as Chief Minister (April 1955 to June 1956). 
He was the major stakeholder involved in negotiating with the British government on 
constitutional change and self-rule. However, the Labour Front party members held 
few ideals in common, and had a relatively loose coalition, as confirmed in a letter 
written by the Governor of Singapore on 6 April 1955, following a conversation with 
Marshall (TNA: DO 35/6288). As illustrated by Yeo (1973: 114), the coalition between 
                                                          
32 Marshall was 46 in 1955. Of Baghdadi Jewish origin, he was born and educated in Singapore and 
received a call to the English bar in 1937 (TNA: DO 35/6288). 
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the Singapore Labour Party and the Singapore Socialist Party was undertaken merely 
to secure public office in the 1955 election. 
 
Table 5.3 Results of Election on 2 April 1955, Singapore 
Political Party Elected Members 
Labour Front 10 
Progressive Party 4 
Democratic Party 2 
PAP 3 
Alliance 3 
Independent parties 3 
Source: Extract from Colonial Political Intelligence Summary No. 4 – April, 1955 (TNA: DO 35/6288). 
 
Competition in Singapore occurred not only between ethnic communities, but 
between groups divided by occupation, with a particularly deep rift between the 
business/professional sectors and workers. Before the 1955 election, the political 
structure of Singapore was dominated by business and professional elites, as noted by 
Liu and Wong (2004) below.  
One major characteristic of Chinese communal leadership in Singapore 
was that the merchants served as the leaders of the whole Chinese 
community… As successful businessmen occupied the top hierarchy of 
Chinese society, their key institution, the Singapore Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce (SCCC), became the sole organization capable of leading 
the (traditional) Chinese community, particularly during the first decade 
after the end of the war. (pp. 49-51) 
The conflict between community leaders was captured in debate within the legislature. 
In a motion created by Lim Yew Hock in a Legislative Council Review of the Constitution 
of the Colony on 19 May 1953, Lim highlighted problems with the Singapore 
Legislative Council Election Ordination of 1947: ‘[t]he number of persons which any 
specified Association of Body or any combination of such specified Associations or 
Bodies may elect from among its or their members as a Member or Members of the 
Legislative Council’ (TNA: CO 1022/92). Lim was unhappy with the over-representation 
of business and professional citizens in the Legislative Council. He pointed out that 
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‘[t]he workers in this Colony have at various times demanded… equal representation 
with the Chambers of Commerce on the grounds of fairness and equity’ (TNA: CO 
1022/92). Tan Chin Tuan replied to Lim as follows.  
[F]rom the earliest history of Singapore, trade has been the 
preoccupation of the Government of Singapore, besides law and order 
and the welfare of its people which are the usual functions of all 
government. The politics of Singapore has always been the politics of 
trade and in this the Government of Singapore had early discovered the 
soundness of close interdependence between Government and the 
properly constituted trade bodies found in the local Chambers of 
Commerce. Any threat to this interdependence is a treat to the 
historical bedrock of the stability of the country and the well-being and 
prosperity of its people. This link between the Government and the 
Chambers of Commerce has been the anchor-sheet of Singapore’s 
prosperity and any attempt to tamper with this link is to embark on the 
unpredictable. (TNA: CO 1022/92) 
However, it is also worth noting that the British colonial rulers had lost 
confidence in the wealthy Chinese business leaders as early as the mid-1950s. In a top-
secret document of 25 July 1955, Goode addressed several questions related to the 
election and performance of Singapore’s existing government before meeting with 
the Secretary of State about the Constitution. ‘The fact must be faced that the majority 
of the population of Singapore is Chinese, Chinese speaking, wage-earning, envious of 
the wealth, position and power of the English educated upper class. An Assembly 
elected by popular vote is elected by this majority’ (TNA: CO 1030/79). British officials 
echoed this concern about the professional wealthy Chinese elites who dominated the 
political arena in Singapore: ‘Chinese big business men and the Chinese press go with 
the tide and look for the winning side. As a whole they have no real loyalty to Britain’ 
(TNA: CO 1030/79). This affected the attitude of the colonial ruling elites towards 
Singapore’s wealthy professional Chinese leaders. The British ruling elites tended to 
support local political elites with the same principles and priorities as the British 
government, especially those with an anti-Communist leaning. This provided an 
opportunity for the PAP and Lee Kuan Yew to take power in the 1959 election. 
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Lee Kuan Yew’s Rise to Power 
 
The following section illustrates the rise of Lee Kuan Yew as an anti-Communist and 
subsequently as leader of Singapore. Lee was suggested as the future leader of 
Singapore by the British ruling elites immediately after the 1955 election. However, 
Lee and his party’s attitude towards Communism remained unclear, which annoyed 
the British leaders. In a top-secret document of 25 July 1955 addressed to Lennox-
Boyd, W. A. C. Goode answered the question ‘what hope is there in the next twelve 
months of any outstanding leaders appearing – men with more stability than the 
present Chief Minister, and with organized Party support?’ as follows. 
I see only one, Lee Kuan Yew and People’s Action Party. If he can wean 
his Party from Communism and Chinese nationalism, he will provide a 
possible alternative leader; but European business will take time to 
digest him. I think the Progressive party are hopelessly discredited at 
least for the next 12 month; and I cannot see the Chinese business 
community risking a clash with the Labour Front and P.A.P who would 
join forces against them. (TNA: CO 1030/79) 
The British government elites held a very firm anti-Communism stance. In a secret 
letter sent within the Colonial Office to Robert Scott, dated 9 July 1956, J. B. Johnston 
made the following statement.  
You say… if elections were held after a new constitution had been agreed 
and the P.A.P. won them they would then repudiate the agreements and 
seek to go to London at once to get what they themselves want. You then 
say that H.M.G. would have to choose between sweeping concessions to 
the P.A.P. and suspension of the constitution… in any subsequent 
negotiation the P.A.P.’s demands will be so radical that H.M.G. would have 
either to let the negotiations break down again, or sell Singapore down 
the river. (TNA: CO 1030/82) 
Robert Scott clearly indicated that if the PAP was simply a Singaporean branch of 
the Communist Party, the British government would be willing to suspend the 
constitutional talks and avoid reaching an agreement with the PAP. The leader of 
the PAP, Lee Kuan Yew, fully aware of the bottom line of the British ruling elites, 
began to re-imagine himself and his party as fighters against Communism. In his 
memoirs, Lee (1998) described the use of various measures to draw a line 
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between the PAP and Communism; in August 1955, for example, he leaked a story 
to the Straits Times containing the statement that PAP stood for ‘an independent, 
democratic, non-communist, socialist Malaya’ (pp. 268-269). The British ruling 
elites reacted promptly to this statement. According to a report by the Governor 
of Singapore, Robert Black told Lennox-Boyd on 22 October 1955 that ‘Mr. Lee 
Kuan Yew has publicly stated that he is not a Communist and that he stands for 
an independent non-Communist Malaya’ (TNA: DO 35/6289). In addition, Lee was 
eager to cut his ties with Communist subversion activities in Singapore, as 
indicated below.  
Mr. Lee Kuan Yew was away from Singapore at the time [of the general 
strike], and I am informed that he departed deliberately in order to 
have no part in the violence. His return, when his colleagues had the 
broken pieces of their plan lying at their feet, placed him in a strong 
moral position with his party. (TNA: DO 35/6289)  
On 25 May 1956, a secret internal document was sent from General Headquarters, Far 
East Land Forces to the Ministry of Defence, London for the attention of the British 
Defence Co-ordination Committee (Far East) concerning internal security in Singapore. 
The document indicated that Lee had ‘come to realise the danger of continued co-
operation with the Communist group in the PAP’ (TNA: CO 1030/82). Indeed, 
immediately after the 1955 election, Lee (1998) involved himself eagerly in ‘flushing 
out the communists… [he] decided to tighten constitutional control of the party so 
that the left wing could not capture it and use us’ (p. 268). This was a turning point in 
the political career of Lee Kuan Yew. Lee began to gain the trust of the British ruling 
elites, allowing him to lead his party to victory in the next general election, in 1959.  
To further consolidate Lee Kuan Yew’s power within the PAP, suspected pro-
Communist party leaders were removed. A top-secret monthly intelligence report (No. 
4, covering the period from 13 October 1956 to 30 November 1956) provided an 
account of Lee Kuan Yew’s strategy for consolidating his power within the PAP 
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immediately after the government arrested core extremist and pro-Communist party 
leaders such as Lim Shin Siong (TNA: FCO 141/15063).33  
Finally, in a secret document addressed to Iain Macleod and dated 15 March 
1960, the Earl of Selkirk stated that ‘I do not doubt that the present leaders in the 
P.A.P. Government are anti-Communist. I think they are sincerely so, and I think they 
are fighting a courageous battle and have a fair chance… of winning’ (TNA: DO 
35/9877). The British perception of Lee as anti-Communist led to the victory of the 
PAP in the general election in 1959, and enabled Lee to maintain the status of the PAP 
as the ruling party. The Foreign Office (No. 73 Intelligence Report on 2 June 1959) 
reported that ‘[t]he general elections on May 30 resulted in an overwhelming victory 
for the People’s Action Party led by Lee Kuan Yew which won 43 out of 51 seats… The 
election was quiet and orderly. Nearly 90% of the electorate voted, and the PAP 
received 54% of the votes cast’. The report also emphasised that ‘PAP will not be, and 
will not seem to appear to be, a handmaid of Communism’ (TNA: DO 35/9877). Lee 
and the PAP had evidently made successful use of various channels and actors to 
convince the British ruling elites that the party was genuinely against Communism. 
In sum, the empirical evidence presented in this section clearly indicates that 
the interaction of and competition between elites accounted for the rise of the PAP 
and the emergence of an autocracy. Constitutional changes and the introduction of 
governmental elections were merely tools to contain the influence of leaders affiliated 
with Communism, in response to the threat of Communist infiltration of the Singapore 
community from surrounding countries. At the same time, the leader of the PAP 
recognised the importance of severing the party’s ties with Communism. Lee’s anti-
Communist rebranding gained the party the trust of the British ruling elites, enabling 
Lee to retain his leadership of Singapore for half a century. 
                                                          
33 ‘A confusion resulting from the arrests of Lim Chin Siong and other extremist leaders has temporarily 
left the right wing of the People’s Action Party in full command. Lee Kuan Yew sees his chance of gaining 
effective control and is reported to be making the most of his opportunity. He appears to be avoiding 
any entanglement with the affairs of the Chinese Middle Schools’ students and is restricting himself to 
paying lip service to their general defence while taking no practical steps on their behalf. At the same 
time Lee Kuan Yew is seizing what chance he has of increasing his influence in the Middle Road Trade 
Unions’ (TNA: FCO 141/15063). 
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5.3 Post-transitional Period 
 
After independence, Lee and his party were effective in controlling Singapore’s 
coercive state capacity to discourage opposition. Conflict with neighbouring countries 
was manipulated to justify authoritarian governance to ‘protect’ the country against a 
so-called common enemy. The ruling elites also adopted measures such as legitimation, 
repression and co-optation to resolve conflict with local elites and thereby increase 
the durability of the autocratic regime.  
 
State Capacity 
 
From 1959, the PAP and its leader Lee Kuan Yew held political power in Singapore 
(Table 5.4). As discussed in Chapter 4, various measures were adopted to eliminate or 
‘neutralise’ political opposition, especially after Singapore was expelled from Malaysia 
in August 1965. Leaders of trade unions and oppositional parties such as the Barisan 
Sosialis were subject to stringent control measures imposed by the PAP. Ultimately, the 
Barisan and other oppositional parties boycotted the 1966 election (see Curless 2016: 
64), allowing the PAP to secure full political power. In 1963, PAP members held 
approximately 70% of the seats in the legislature; between 1968 and 1983, the PAP 
occupied 100% of the parliamentary seats. In Singapore’s most recent election, in 2015, 
the PAP still managed to gain more than 90% of the seats; oppositional parties were 
unable to compete with the incumbent (see Chee 2012: i; George 2007: 133-137; 
Mauzy and Milne 2002: 128; Means 1996: 109-110; Rodan 2003, 2004: 16). In his 
latest publication, Lee (2013) continued to disparage the two-party system on the 
grounds that competition in ‘uncivil, and even vicious’ political campaigns wasted the 
talent of young people (pp. 210-211). Clearly, the measures implemented by the PAP 
from 1959 to the present day consolidated the party’s leadership and ensured the 
survival of deviant autocracy in Singapore. 
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Table 5.4 Results of PAP in Singapore General Elections, 1955 to 2015 
Year Total seats won/Seats up for 
election 
Share of votes 
1955 3/25 8.7% 
1959 43/51 54.1% 
1963 37/51 46.9% 
1968 58/58 86.7% 
1972 65/65 70.4% 
1976 69/69 74.1% 
1980 75/75 77.7% 
1984 77/79 64.8% 
1988 80/81 63.2% 
1991 77/81 61% 
1997 81/83 65% 
2001 82/84 75.3% 
2006 82/84 66.6% 
2011 81/87 60.1% 
2015 83/89 69.86% 
Source: Singapore Elections Department (2015); Singapore Elections (2015); TNA: DO 35/6288; TNA: 
DO 35/9877 
 
International Actors 
 
The conflict between Singapore and neighbouring countries was manipulated by the 
Singaporean ruling elites to justify the continuation of authoritarian rule. Singapore 
became independent in 1965, after its expulsion from Malaysia (see Lee 1998). 
However, conflict between Singapore and Malaysia persisted. For example, the author 
of a secret document sent from the Commonwealth Office to Holmer of the British 
High Commission in Singapore on 5 September 1967 wrote that ‘we imagine in light 
of your telegram number 558 that Lee will not wish to come out whole-heartedly in 
support of the Tunku’s proposals for an early five-power meeting on defence’ (TNA: 
PREM 13/1833). 
In addition to conflict over military policy, the region saw considerable economic 
competition. In an internal government document sent to the Commonwealth Office 
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on 9 November 1966, J. V. Rob of the British High Commission in Singapore quoted 
part of a speech made by Lee Kuan Yew at a district meeting in Singapore on 20 
October 1966. 
At present there is still the British military base in Singapore. Within five or 
ten years no problems will arise – nobody would dare to come and attack 
us… Hitherto, the British enjoyed preferential treatment in Malaysia and 
Singapore. Their cars and textile products were imported into Singapore and 
Malaysia under the shield of preferential treatment. Now, however, the 
Malaysian Government has abolished these preferences, British goods have 
to compete with German and American goods on an equal footing. Thus, 
ten years hence, the British may say this is not conducive to their interests. 
Therefore, they may want to withdraw. (TNA: PREM 13/1833) 
Due to the intensity of the conflict between Singapore and Malaysia, the ruling elites 
in Singapore perceived Malaysia as a hostile neighbour with the potential to launch a 
full-scale attack on Singapore in the foreseeable future. The Singapore government 
proposed a major expansion of the Singapore Armed Forces, sent to the British Prime 
Minister on 31 October 1966, on the following grounds. 
It is not unreasonable that Singapore Ministers should regard Malaysia as 
the main threat… it is clear, however, that, if only because of the disparity 
of size and population, Singapore could not hope to raise and maintain 
forces on a scale comparable with those of Malaysia or able to effectively 
to resist an outright Malaysian attack. (TNA: PREM 13/1833) 
The military threat and the problem of unemployment may have been exaggerated by 
Singapore’s leader to justify his resistance to democracy. In a letter to Harold Wilson, 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, on 1 April 1966, Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister 
of Singapore, mentioned that Singapore’s economic development was very robust: 
from 1959 to September 1963, the gross national product had increased from £226.3 
to £321 million. ‘In spite of a rapid population growth of 3.5 per cent per annum, the 
per capita income increased by no less than 26 per cent during this period’ (TNA: PREM 
13/1833). However, Lee also argued that the ‘unemployment position in 1966 is worse 
than it was in September 1963… With nearly 20 per cent of the working population 
unemployed, a revolutionary situation would develop which will make democratic 
representative government impossible’ (TNA: PREM 13/1833). In this way, the 
Singaporean government made successful use of the spurious external threat from 
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Malaysia (and later Indonesia) and internal socio-economic problems to justify the 
expansion of Singapore’s military forces and the maintenance of an authoritarian 
regime (see Lee 2013: 174-181, 229; Liu et al. 2002: 7-8; Rodan 2004: 13; Huxley 1991: 
204, 2000: 24). 
After Singapore’s independence, China remained an influential external actor. 
According to Lee Kuan Yew (2000), ‘[n]o foreign country other than Britain has had a 
greater influence on Singapore’s political development than China, the ancestral 
homeland of three-quarters of our people’ (p. 564). The attitude of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) toward Singapore changed in the 1970s. From 1965 to 1970, 
the PRC did not recognise Singapore as an independent sovereign state. In the 1970s, 
however, Singapore became China’s second biggest foreign exchange partner. Formal 
meetings were held between the leaders of the PRC and Singapore, and their bilateral 
relationship was normalised. For example, Lee met with the Chinese leaders Chairman 
Mao and Hua Guofeng in May 1976.34 In his meeting with Hua, Lee urged the PRC not 
to support the MCP in attempting to ‘liberate’ Singapore. In return, Hua asked Lee to 
break Singapore’s military ties with Taiwan. Even more importantly, Hua explicitly 
stated that ‘the Chinese government recognises and respects the independence and 
sovereignty of Singapore’ (Lee 2000: 575-585). Unsurprisingly, when Lee passed away 
in 2015, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping described him as ‘an old friend of the Chinese 
people’ in his message of condolence (Ortmann and Thompson 2016: 39; The Wall 
Street Journal 23 May 2015; South China Morning Post 26 March 2015). Having 
secured a promise from the Chinese leaders not to intervene in Singapore’s internal 
affairs, Lee was able to ensure the continued leadership of the PAP in Singapore 
without significant challenges from Communist China. 
 
  
                                                          
34 Lee also held a meeting with Deng Xiaoping on November 1978 in Singapore, and met Zhao Ziyang 
Deng again on September 1988 in Beijing. In the 1980s and 1990s, Lee ‘visited China almost every 
year’ (Lee 2000: 595-618). 
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Local Elites 
 
In Singapore’s post-transitional society, the ruling elites adopted various measures to 
resolve conflict with and between ethnic and occupational groups of elites, such as 
legitimation, repression and co-optation, as outlined in the literature on the self-
maintenance of autocratic regimes. These measures helped the ruling elites to 
consolidate their power and weakened the bargaining power of the opposition. 
Perceptions of the legitimacy of the Singapore government was based mainly 
on government performance. First, the PAP ruling elites were eager to ensure that the 
government remained free of corruption. The incumbent severely punished ministers 
and government officials involved in corruption, such as Tan Kia Gan in 1966, Wee Toon 
Boon in 1975, Phey Yew Kok in 1979 and The Cheang Wan in 1986. As a result of these 
stringent anti-corruption measures, Singapore became one of the least corrupt 
countries in the world (Lee 2000: 160-163). Under the leadership of the PAP, Singapore 
experienced rapid economic growth. According to Lee Kuan Yew, the Singapore 
government sought to achieve economic success and create an international financial 
centre (Lee 2000: 71-82, 2013: 228).  
In addition to implementing measures to obtain the support of fragmented local 
elites, as discussed in Chapter 4, the ruling elites were also very keen to resolve racial 
tensions in society. The Singapore government believed that racial tension between 
ethnic groups affected the internal security and stability of the regime, as indicated in 
the following excerpt from a secret document sent by the Singapore government to 
the Commonwealth Relations Office on 1 February 1966. 
Lee Kuan Yew sent for me urgently this afternoon. He said that as a result 
of ham-handed handling of a recruiting situation at Singapore Infantry 
Regiment Recruiting Depot this afternoon minor riot had been caused 
between Malays on the one hand and Chinese and Indian recruits on the 
other… He feared, however, the possibility that 1st Battalion, Singapore 
Infantry Regiment, which still contains a number of Malays from Malaya…, 
would refuse to obey orders. (TNA: PREM 13/1833) 
As a result, the ruling elites in Singapore sought to build an army with full loyalty to 
the government (see Lee 2000: 11-29). In addition, the PAP government formulated a 
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national-culture policy to enhance Singaporeans’ sense of a national identity. The new 
national-culture policy had two major goals: to de-emphasise Chinese, Malay and 
Indian identity and culture, and to promote the use of the English language (see Chong 
2006: 289-290). It is interesting to note that both the British colonial rulers of 
Singapore and the post-independence PAP government manipulated Singaporeans’ 
perceptions of national identity to serve their own political interests.  
The PAP government also implemented measures to suppress challenges from 
the opposition. After April 1968, various acts were introduced to discourage strikes, 
such as the Employment Act, the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act and acts 
relating to trade unions (Lee 2000: 87). For example, the union leader K. Suppiah, 
president of the Public Daily Rated Employees’ Unions Federation, was arrested and 
charged with organising an ‘illegal strike’, as ‘the government could not allow any 
union to jeopardize Singapore’s survival’ (Lee 2000: 85-86). Further measures taken by 
the government to control the opposition are described in Chapter 4.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter shows that the fragmentation of the interests of elites, both internal and 
external, during Singapore’s transitional period helped an autocratic leader to take 
power. The rise of the PAP ruling elite was also aided by various external factors, 
especially decolonisation, nationalism manipulated by the British and fused with anti-
colonial sentiment, the perceived threat of Communism from China and Malaysia and 
the complicated relationship between Singapore and Malaysia. The British ruling elites 
had to rely on institutional arrangements, such as carefully drafted constitutional 
documentation and election procedures, to ensure that the post-transitional society 
was attuned to British’s political, economic, defence and military interests. Most 
importantly, it was believed that these interests could be safeguarded as long as 
Singapore was free of the control of Communism. 
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Internally, the competition between local elites in Singapore was tense and 
severe during the transitional period. It involved indigenous rulers and elite groups 
fragmented along both ethnic and occupational lines. The introduction of direct 
elections in 1955 intensified the competition among elites. This chapter investigates 
the conflict between Chinese, Malay and Indian ethnic leaders. There was also 
competition between other political leaders with different interests, such as 
traditional Chinese business elites and elites representing the interest of workers and 
workers’ unions. In the process of decolonisation, the British colonial ruling elites 
searched for a reliable leader for Singapore’s post-transitional society capable of both 
protecting British interests and embracing anti-Communist ideals. 
The leader of the PAP, Lee Kuan Yew, successfully rebranded his party as anti-
Communist, dispelling its former radical, left-wing and pro-Communist associations. 
As discussed, it was within the power of the Colonial Office to suspend Singapore’s 
Constitution if the PAP proved to be too radical and incapable of safeguarding British 
interests (TNA: CO 1030/82). Lee was fully aware of the stance of the British ruling 
elites, and made use of various channels to express his anti-Communist ideas, thereby 
regaining the trust of the colonial authority. During the post-transitional period, after 
the PAP and Lee had secured power in the 1959 election, measures were adopted to 
ensure the survival of autocratic rule, as widely documented in the literature. Among 
these measures were the promotion of economic performance (Bell 1997: 6; Chua 
1995; Huff 1994; Thompson 2004), depoliticisation (Chua 1983: 32) and the 
manipulation of electoral laws, rules and regulations (Barr 2014: 29; Gomez 2006; 
Rodan 2006; Tan 2013: 633; Tremewan 1994). This case study is not designed to 
repeat previous researchers’ analysis of autocratic consolidation. Instead, 
examination of the interaction of elite groups and the process by which the PAP and 
Lee came to power during the transitional period offers valuable insights into the 
emergence of deviant autocracies. 
The next chapter presents another case study of deviant autocracy, in a Hong 
Kong setting. Neo actor-based analysis of Hong Kong’s transitional period and troubled 
decolonisation, together with the intersection of internal and external elite interests, 
is shown to shed light on the emergence and development of deviant autocracies.  
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Chapter 6: Dominance of Business 
Elites in Hong Kong 
 
Introduction 
 
During decolonisation, both Hong Kong and Singapore engaged in dispute with the 
same international actor, Communist China. However, considerable bargaining and 
competition between external actors occurred in the former case, as China sought to 
revoke Britain’s sovereignty over Hong Kong. In contrast, Singapore’s colonial ruling 
elites were concerned only about the infiltration of Communism from China and 
Malaya. During Hong Kong’s transitional period, actors from both the Chinese 
government and the British government implemented checks and balances and 
manipulated the interests of business elites to derive a non-democratic political 
structure to protect the interests of external actors in post-transitional Hong Kong 
society. 
To investigate the origin and development of Hong Kong’s deviant autocracy, 
the following three periods are analysed by process tracing, using predominantly 
empirical archival data. 1) A pre-transitional period: the British colonial period before 
the British and Chinese governments discussed Hong Kong’s future. 2) A transitional 
period from September 1982, when the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, 
made an official visit to Beijing to discuss Hong Kong’s sovereignty with the Chinese 
ruling elites, until the handover of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China in June 1997. The 
focus of this chapter is the negotiation between actors from China and the United 
Kingdom from 1982 to 1984, which determined the major features of the economic 
and political framework of Hong Kong’s post-transitional society. 3) A post-transitional 
period, from July 1997 to the present day.  
 To understand Hong Kong’s failure to transition to democracy, one must 
closely examine the interaction of various actors during the Chinese and British 
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governments’ negotiations on Hong Kong’s sovereignty. Hong Kong reached a 
crossroads in the 1980s due to the impending expiry of the lease of the New Territories 
(constituting 92% of the total area of Hong Kong), in 1997. This presented an 
opportunity for political transition in Hong Kong. The associated negotiations involved 
various external actors from the United Kingdom, China and the United States, and 
internal actors such as business elites, indigenous leaders and members of opposition 
parties (see Appendix B). The relationships between these actors played important 
roles in determining the pace and direction of democratisation in Hong Kong.  
The major finding reported in this chapter is that Hong Kong’s failure to 
transition to democracy was mainly due to mistrust between ruling elites in Britain 
and China, which enabled business elites to gain political control of Hong Kong. Indeed, 
business elites have long dominated Hong Kong’s political arena. During the pre-
transitional period, Hong Kong’s major business elites were absorbed into the 
government. During the transitional period, neither side of the negotiations 
wholeheartedly promoted democracy in Hong Kong, as the installation of a genuinely 
democratic system was expected to harm the interests of both governments. The 
sovereignty and administration of post-handover Hong Kong provided an arena for 
competition between elites with different interests. Due to mutual distrust between 
the Beijing and British governments, and the great divisions revealed in negotiation 
on the political economy of Hong Kong during the transitional period, business elites 
in Hong Kong entrenched their position to secure the region’s prosperity and stability. 
State capacity was hampered by the efforts made by these elites to preserve external 
actors’ interests and pursue their own political and economic interests. Therefore, the 
oppositional forces were unable to push forward genuine democracy. 
This chapter is divided into three parts corresponding to the three 
abovementioned periods of Hong Kong’s history. The neo actor-based analytical 
approach developed in Chapter 4 is used to scrutinise the intersections between state 
capacity, internal elites and external actors to account for the emergence of a deviant 
autocracy in Hong Kong. 
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6.1 Pre-transitional Period 
 
The colonial structure of Hong Kong before the transitional period was largely non-
democratic and strictly controlled by the Governor. The international bargaining 
situation was mainly affected by decolonisation, the Cold War in Asia, the rise of 
Communist China in 1949 and the Cultural Revolution in China from the 1960s to 
1970s. It involved various international actors such as China, the United States and 
Britain, whose representatives interacted with each other to secure their own 
interests. In the pre-transitional period, local business elites were generally absorbed 
into government bodies as a strategy of co-optation to safeguard business and 
investment interests. The resulting business and government coalition reinforced the 
status of pro-establishment business elites, enhancing the durability of the non-
democratic regime. 
 
State Capacity 
 
Hong Kong’s coercive state capacity was monopolised by the British colonial ruling 
elites. As in Singapore, the structure of the colonial government in Hong Kong’s pre-
transitional period was dominated by British elites with few significant challenges 
from the opposition, if any. The Governor was subordinate to the Colonial Office and 
principal government officials, and the members of the Executive Council (ExCo) and 
Legislative Council (LegCo) were appointed by the Governor (see Miners 1998: 53-58; 
Wight 1952: 17). The colonial government operated on the principle of benevolent 
paternalism (see England 1971: 214-215; Pepper 2000: 416-417; Tsang 2004: 27). In a 
report prepared by the Commonwealth Office for circulation in a meeting of the 
Defence Review Working Party on 18 August 1967, the following reasons were 
provided for delaying the introduction of ‘representative institutions’.  
We are inhibited from developing representative institutions by the 
danger that any politics in Hong Kong would be the politics of the two 
Chinas and that a determined Communist minority in a generally 
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apathetic electorate would engineer control of such institutions. 
(TNA: FCO 40/78) 
In other words, the state capacity of Hong Kong was to a very large extent influenced 
by the international bargaining situation between Communist China and the United 
Kingdom. 
The local elites in Hong Kong generally lacked a sense of national identity, due 
to the region’s colonial history and lack of capacity for independence. The common 
decolonisation trajectory of former British colonies involved self-determination and 
the establishment of a democratic political structure. However, the situation in Hong 
Kong was different. After 1972, when Hong Kong was removed from the list of United 
Nations colonies, local elites generally agreed that Hong Kong society lacked the 
capacity for independence (Chung 2001: 48). Two major factors were responsible for 
this incapacity. First, there was no demand for independence in Hong Kong, as 
indicated in a letter to Sir Hilton Poynton of the Colonial Office on 30 October 1962 
from Robin Black (Governor of Hong Kong from 23 January 1958 to 1 April 1964). 
There has been no substantial or sustained movement towards self-
determination and self-government in Hong Kong. People who have, 
from time to time, advocated such a course have been generally 
dismissed as unrealistic, irrational or disingenuous. There is 
emphatically no emotional popular support for such a course. (TNA: CO 
1030/1300) 
In the Defence Review Working Party meeting of the Cabinet’s Defence and Oversea 
Policy (Official) Committee on 26 June 1967, it was suggested that ‘[a] separate 
existence for Hong Kong independent of British or China, under some neutral United 
Nations status is impracticable’ (TNA: FCO 40/77). Therefore, the only viable solution 
to the Hong Kong problem was either to retain the status quo – i.e. continued British 
administration – or to return Hong Kong’s sovereignty to the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). 
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International Actors 
 
When tracing back to the historical record, it reveals that the status of Hong Kong was 
disputed due to various international events in the 19th century. Hong Kong has three 
major parts: Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula and the New Territories. Hong 
Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula were ceded to the United Kingdom in 1842 
and 1860, respectively, after the Anglo-Chinese Wars. In 1898, the Qing government35 
leased the New Territories to the British government for 99 years in the Convention 
for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, while scrambling for concessions in China 
(see Hsü 1995: 348-349). These distinctive historical events complicated the status of 
Hong Kong’s sovereignty, giving it a combination of free-holders and lease-holders 
(see Patten 1999: 12-13). The events involved a range of major international actors, 
which prevented decolonisation from proceeding as normal in Hong Kong. Talks 
officially began on 22 September 1982. On 19 December 1984, after 5 secret unofficial 
talks and 22 rounds of official talks, the British government and the Chinese 
government agreed to sign the Sino-British Joint Declaration in Beijing to solve the 
historical problem of Hong Kong’s disputed status. However, this also stunted the 
development of democracy in Hong Kong (Lu 2009: 40-41). 
 
International Bargaining Situation 
 
The situation was further complicated by the post-war international bargaining 
situation, combined with the Cold War mentality in Asia in the 1940s (see Cheung 2012: 
329-330; Mark 2000: 837-839). An internal British government document suggested 
that the leader of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek, was eager to maintain a good 
relationship with the United States after the Second World War; therefore, the British 
government was under less pressure to give up Hong Kong. In the post-war period 
                                                          
35 China’s last imperial dynasty. 
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before 1949, there was no significant threat to Britain’s authority in Hong Kong after 
the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong (TNA: FCO 40/424). 
However, when the Republic of China was defeated by the Chinese Communist 
Party in 1949, Britain was forced into a more passive role in negotiations with China 
on the subject of Hong Kong. As China was under the control of the Communist Party 
from 1949, its conflict with other international actors was inevitably exacerbated by 
the Cold War mentality. In addition, Hong Kong was subject to potential military and 
economic threats due to its geographical proximity to mainland China (see TNA: CO 
537/6045). In a secret internal report issued by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) on August 1982, entitled The Future of Hong Kong: A Special Study, the following 
statement was made: ‘[n]o solution will in any case be possible without Chinese 
cooperation. The territory is indefensible against military or economic pressure from 
the PRC’ (TNA: T 442/52). With insufficient military or economic capacity to oppose 
Communist China, the British government was unable to initiate constitutional 
changes in Hong Kong.  
The British government was reluctant to initiate official negotiations with 
China on the future of Hong Kong due to the establishment of Communist control over 
China in 1949 and the internal political turmoil in mainland China created by the 
Cultural Revolution. In a document produced for consideration at a meeting of the 
Defence Review Working Party on 26 June 1967, Arthur N. Galsworthy of the 
Commonwealth Office clearly illustrated the concerns of Hong Kong’s ruling elites (see 
TNA: FCO 40/77).36 
As a result, Hong Kong became a disputed territory influenced by a single 
external actor, Communist China. This complicated status was reflected in an internal 
policy paper prepared by the FCO on 13 June 1975 on the future of Britain’s dependent 
territories. This paper revealed that the status of Hong Kong would ‘remain dependent 
for the foreseeable future [on] extraneous factors… Our freedom of action is limited 
                                                          
36 ‘Sir David Trench and General Worsley believe that there is nothing we can do at present to organise 
a general withdrawal from Hong Kong… we are trapped in Hong Kong… if we possibly can, until the 
post-Mao period, in the hope that we might then get back to a less dangerous relationship with 
mainland China… we should then very seriously look for a suitable opportunity of extricating ourselves 
from Hong Kong by a negotiated settlement with Peking’ (TNA: FCO 40/77). 
181 
 
by our bilateral relations with China’ (TNA: FCO 40/911). Dispute between Britain and 
China regarding Hong Kong’s sovereignty and the expiry of the lease on the New 
Territories in 1997 limited the scope for constitutional development in Hong Kong, 
such as the introduction of democracy.  
Eventually, the two governments had to decide on Hong Kong’s future. The 
British ruling elites considered the interests of other external actors when formulating 
Britain’s approach to the relationship with China. The United States was one of the 
major international actors shaping British policy towards China, due to the Vietnam 
War and Cold War sentiment (see Cheung 2012: 330). Internal government 
documents revealed that Britain would be unable to rely on the United States in the 
event of a military threat from China. In a top-secret letter to T. A. K. Elliott dated 21 
June 1967, E. Bolland reported that ‘I am myself very doubtful whether we could ever 
manage to persuade the Americans to give some form of open-ended guarantee to 
Hong Kong… any discussion about the long term future of Hong Kong must take into 
account American interests there and what they would be prepared to do to protect 
them’ (TNA: FCO 40/77). Due to changes in the international political bargaining 
environment, particularly the PRC’s new membership of the Security Council (as 
described in the abovementioned 1972 paper on the future of Hong Kong), the British 
government had to handle its relationship with China with particular care. In the event 
of a serious dispute with China, the British government might not have received full 
and unconditional support from the world’s super-powers (see TNA: FCO 21/1023). 
From the perspective of the United States, Hong Kong had little strategic value, 
serving only as a ‘recreational centre for [United States] forces engaged in the Vietnam 
war’ – a role that could have been filled by either the Philippines or Taiwan. According 
to an internal British government report in November 1967, ‘[t]he Americans also 
use[d] Hong Kong as their major centre for “China watching”’ (TNA: FCO 40/78). The 
British navy welcomed the visits of United States naval vessels to Hong Kong despite 
the lack of a concrete promise to defend Hong Kong against an attack from China. 
According to the Ministerial Committee, ‘the presence of United States ships had a 
good effect on local confidence, could be useful if an emergency evacuation became 
182 
 
necessary and could be expected to have some deterrent effect on the actions of the 
Chinese Government’ (TNA: FCO 40/78). 
 
Crown Colony versus Leased Territory 
 
The intention of the Chinese leaders, driven by nationalism, was simply to recover the 
sovereignty of Hong Kong. In addition to pursuing official negotiations, the Chinese 
leaders repeatedly criticised the treaties signed by the Qing government that ceded 
Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula to British control, namely those agreed 
upon by Lord Thomson and Zhou Enlai in 1973 (TNA: FCO 40/424); during Crawford 
Murray MacLehose’s official visit to Beijing on 29 March 1979 (Miners 1992: 278; 
Tsang 2004); and during a telephone conversation between Edward Heath and Deng 
Xiaoping on 6 April 1982 (TNA: CAB 133/528). In Defence Expenditure Study No. 13: 
Special Study on Hong Kong, prepared by W. S. Carter of the Commonwealth Office on 
March 1967, the statement was made that ‘China regards Hong Kong as Chinese 
territory to be recovered in due course. No Chinese Government is likely to agree to 
renewal of the lease of the New Territories in 1997; and return of the New Territories 
(without which the reminder of the Colony could hardly be viable) is certain to be 
accompanied by a demand for return of the ceded areas’ (TNA: FCO 40/77).  
Nevertheless, conflict arose between the ruling elites of the United Kingdom 
and China regarding the sovereignty, administration and structure of Hong Kong 
during the transitional period and after the handover in 1997. In an internal document 
prepared by the Hong Kong and General Department on 3 September 1982 for the 
British Prime Minister, prior to the latter’s Beijing visit, the problems related to Hong 
Kong’s sovereignty were clearly outlined. The British government was fully aware of 
the intention of the Beijing government to ‘“recover” sovereignty over it all’, but 
recognised that ‘subject to this they wish to preserve the prosperity and stability of 
Hong Kong... under a similar system [as] the present but without continued British 
administration’ (TNA: PREM 19/789). In general, the Beijing and British governments 
interpreted the sovereignty of Hong Kong differently. The major difference lay in the 
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Chinese government’s refusal to recognise the Treaty of Nanking and the Treaty of 
Beijing, which were signed by the Qing leaders and British government officials in 1842 
and 1860, respectively. The following account was provided in a Foreign Office archival 
document of 1968, 37  entitled Future Sovereignty of Hong Kong: Defence Review 
Working Party Long-term Study.  
The Chinese regard Hong Kong [Island, the Kowloon Peninsula] and the 
New Territories as part of China. It is doubtful whether they see any 
essential difference between the status of the Crown Colony and the 
leased territory. They consider that all the 19th century treaties with 
the Great Powers were “unequal” and that the present Chinese 
Government should not necessarily continue to be bound by them. 
The most specific official statement about the way in which the 
Chinese regard the treaties relating to Hong Kong appeared in a 
People’s Daily editorial of 9 March, 1963, which said that “with regard 
to the outstanding issues which are a legacy of the past we have always 
held that when conditions are ripe (such questions) should be settled 
peacefully through negotiations. Pending a settlement, the status quo 
should be maintained”. (TNA: FCO 40/79) 
In light of the above differences regarding the sovereignty of Hong Kong, the British 
government sought to maintain Hong Kong’s administration after 1997 to uphold the 
interests of business elites, especially companies based in the United Kingdom. In 
December 1970, K. M. Wilford offered the following advice in an FCO document 
addressed to Sir L. Monson: ‘if possible, maintain our presence in Hong Kong, even 
post 1997’ (TNA: FCO 40/265). There is also evidence that the British government 
manipulated the sovereignty and administration of Hong Kong to safeguard Britain’s 
interests. In a letter to Sir Arthur Galsworthy of the Commonwealth Office, dated 19 
July 1967, H. L. Jenkyns of the Department of Economic Affairs made the following 
observation.  
We have leases on the main part of the territory of Hong Kong which 
expire in 1997, and it has, I think, been generally accepted that we could 
not hang on to the ceded territories beyond that date; the early 
surrender of leases and ceded territories ought to be a bargaining 
factor. (TNA: FCO 40/77)  
                                                          
37 The Foreign Office (1782-1968) combined with the Commonwealth Office (1966-1968; known as the 
Colonial Office in 1925-1966) to become the FCO (1968-present). 
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The negotiations provided a means for the British elites not only to bargain with the 
Chinese authority to avoid a humiliating takeover and forced retreat, but to protect 
British investors’ interest in Hong Kong by preserving the capitalist system. 
 
China’s Interests38 
 
MacLehose, among others, suggested that the Chinese government had certain 
economic incentives to take back Hong Kong from Britain, as follows.  
They [the Chinese government] might see merit in some continuing 
arrangement for Hong Kong whereby a special regime was established 
that nominally removed the colonial stigma, but preserved for China 
some of the economic and other material and political benefits of the 
present status, saved them from having to absorb a population with 
such different standards of living and attitudes of mind, and on the 
other hand preserved for foreigners a tolerable trading base, some 
security for investment and acceptable living conditions while 
concentrating them in a single area where they did not affect life in the 
rest of China. (TNA: FCO 21/1023)  
Another report in November 1967 suggested that the ‘strength of our negotiating 
position lies in the economic value of Hong Kong to China as a source of foreign 
exchange’ (TNA: FCO 40/78). In 1976, Anthony Crosland also reported that ‘[t]here 
have been reliable indications that the new Chinese leadership, like its predecessors, 
is content with the status quo and does not wish to undermine the security of 
prosperity of Hong Kong from which China derives major economic benefits’ (TNA: 
PREM 16/1533). This assumption can be verified by cross-checking the economic 
                                                          
38  The original intention was to collect the majority of the archival data from the State Archives 
Administration of the PRC. However, there are three hurdles to the procurement of archival data from 
the Chinese government, as follows. 1) The materials are subject to security clearance, and prior 
approval from relevant government departments is needed to access the archives. In addition, no 
information on sensitive topics is available to the public; the materials available cover only economics, 
sciences, technology and culture. 2) The service is not available to foreigners; only citizens with valid 
identity cards can gain access to the premises. 3) As the Archives Law of the PRC was ratified in 1987, 
the most valuable materials from Hong Kong’s transitional period in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
were not protected (see the State Archives Administration of the PRC, 2016). To overcome the above 
problems and ensure the validity of the findings, archival materials from the National Archives in 
London were analysed and cross-checked with the memoirs of various Chinese officials with active roles 
in the transitional period, such as Lu (2009) and Chung (2001). 
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activities of Hong Kong, United Kingdom and China during the period under study 
(Table 6.1). There was a substantial increase in imports from China via Hong Kong from 
1969 to 1978, with import value rising from $2,700 million to $10,549.99 million. China 
was also the second largest importer from Hong Kong. Undoubtedly, the absorption 
into China of a formerly British-administered Hong Kong would significantly enhance 
China’s economic competitiveness and provide up-to-date Western insights into the 
operation of various legal, social, economic and financial systems. Therefore, 
according to Premier Zhou Enlai, China’s long-term strategy in relation to Hong Kong 
was ‘long-term planning and full utilisation’ (Lu 2009: 5). 
 
Table 6.1: Hong Kong’s Trade with Major Countries in 1969 and 1978 (in Million $)  
 Imports Exports 
Year Japan China United 
States 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
United 
Kingdom 
Fed. Rep. 
of 
Germany 
Canada 
1969 3,484 2,700 2,002 1,201 4,428 1,465 765 352 
1978 14,404.74 10,549.77 7,519.29 2,975.25 15,124.51 3,870.77 4,426.48 1,271.40 
Source: Census and Statistical Department of the Hong Kong government (1970; Table 6.6, p. 26); 
Census and Statistical Department of the Hong Kong government (1980; Table 5.5, p. 18) 
 
China’s pragmatic leaders were eager to help Hong Kong through various crises, 
such as riots and constraints on water and other resources, to maintain the stability 
and economic prosperity of the region. During the 1956 riots in Hong Kong, ‘Zhou En-
lai delivered oral protest to British Chargé in Peking on riots in Hong Kong. 
Subsequently he told journalists that the Chinese Government would not allow such 
disorder on the doorstep of China’ (TNA: PREM 19/792). Zhou En-lai thus provided 
verbal consent for a hard crackdown on the leftist movement in Hong Kong. The 
internal document excerpted above also acknowledged practical help from China. ‘On 
a number of occasions the Communist authorities showed a helpful attitude to Hong 
Kong, e.g. during the severe drought of 1963-64, and on more than on occasion they 
took steps to moderate the activities of their local supporters in Hong Kong’ (TNA: FCO 
40/77). In an internal brief (No. 12) created on the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister 
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from 10 to 14 October 1978, this ‘helpful attitude’ was again acknowledged. ‘Glad that 
our relations over Hong Kong are so good and are developing well. Grateful for the 
rapid and constructive Chinese response on the question of water. Hope that our 
practical co-operation and mutual interest in the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong 
will continue to flourish to the benefit of all concerned’ (TNA: PREM 16/1534). 
Maintaining prosperity and stability in Hong Kong seemed to be a goal shared by the 
British and Chinese governments. An aide-memoire released by the FCO on 7 June 
1973 also revealed that the British and Chinese governments had ‘two important 
interests in common… to preserve the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and to 
preserve the relationship which has developed between our two countries’ (TNA: 
PREM 15/1328). 
Deng Xiaoping, who came to power after China’s Cultural Revolution, provided 
a pragmatic solution to the problem of Hong Kong’s disputed sovereignty. Hong Kong 
had practised capitalism under the British administration for more than 150 years, 
whereas China’s political system was socialist; nevertheless, Deng suggested 
maintaining the political status quo in Hong Kong after 1997. A breakthrough in the 
talks between Britain and China came in August 1982, when the former British Prime 
Minister, Edward Heath, visited Beijing. Deng’s suggestion is paraphrased below.  
Sovereignty over Hong Kong would belong to China, but… Hong Kong 
itself could remain a free port and an international financial centre… 
there could be local government in Hong Kong. The new Chinese state 
constitution would specifically allow for the creation of Special 
Administrative Zones. The local government would be formed by the 
inhabitants… The “various systems” of Hong Kong would remain 
unchanged. (TNA: CAB 133/528)  
The proposed solution was an early manifestation of the concept of ‘one country, two 
systems’. It paved the way for the official negotiations between Thatcher and Deng in 
September 1982. 
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Britain’s Interests 
 
Hong Kong’s distinctive geographical location offered the United Kingdom an 
important vantage point in the international arena. In a top-secret document dated 
24 February 1960, in which the main objectives of the United Kingdom’s overseas and 
strategic policies were discussed, the following account was provided of the 
usefulness of Hong Kong. 
Our presence in Hong Kong brings us economic advantage and useful 
intelligence… Without the leased territories the Colony is not viable… 
Our position in Hong Kong may be expected to give us some influence 
over the Americans when they are ready to reconsider their policy 
towards Communist China and Formosa. Meanwhile, we have no choice 
but to remain in Hong Kong and should, without provoking the Chinese, 
show that we intend to do so. (TNA: CO 1030/1300) 
According to another internal government document, Future of Hong Kong in 1949-
1957, the main financial consideration governing Britain’s decision on Hong Kong’s 
future was the ‘British capital invested in Hongkong… Sterling is the traditional 
currency of Far Eastern trade, and the loss of Hongkong would be very serious to the 
prospect of re-establishing economic stability in that area’ (TNA: T 236/4274). Due to 
the British government’s desire to maintain Britain’s influence in Asia and worldwide, 
Hong Kong became an arena for competition between various major external actors 
seeking to maximise their influence and power and uphold their own interests. 
After the early 1970s, the colonial government was eager to develop Hong 
Kong’s economy to increase its bargaining power with China and thereby achieve a 
better deal. The main reason for fostering economic development in Hong Kong is 
clear from a review of following secret British government internal documents. 
According to the abovementioned paper on the future of Hong Kong between 1 
January 1972 and 31 December 1972, ‘our objective should be… to gain 10 or 15 years 
in which Hong Kong can have time to grow and prosper in confidence, suppress its 
warts and wrinkles, and become as hard for China to absorb as possible, and in which 
post Mao/Zhou China can emerge and show its credentials as a negotiating partner’ 
(TNA: FCO 21/1023). Policy makers in both Hong Kong and the United Kingdom were 
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eager to promote Hong Kong’s socio-economic development to maximise their 
bargaining power with China on the issue of Hong Kong’s sovereignty. 
According to a top-secret memorandum produced by the Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on 18 January 1973, Lord Thomson learned from 
Zhou Enlai that the Chinese government was willing to negotiate with Britain on ‘the 
lease of the New Territories’ and the settlement of ‘unequal’ treaties (TNA: FCO 
40/424). To prepare for the talks with China, the British government re-evaluated its 
negotiating position in 1967 (see TNA: FCO 40/78). 39  Returning only the New 
Territories to China in 1997 was expected to be technically impossible, as the Kowloon 
Peninsula and Hong Kong Island ‘could not be viably separated from the main 
industrial areas in the New Territories… Continued retention of these areas would 
make no sense, either economically or politically’ (TNA: FCO 40/78). Therefore, 
anticipating rapid economic growth in Hong Kong, the British government planned a 
tentative timetable for negotiation with the Beijing government in the mid-1980s. 
According to an internal document written in 1967, the British government expected 
this negotiation to occur in ‘about 1985 (possibly a few years earlier)’ (TNA: FCO 
40/77).  
 
Local Elites 
 
Local pro-Communists constituted one of the major local elite groups in Hong Kong in 
the pre-transitional period. China, as a Communist regime, placed considerable 
emphasis on ideological indoctrination following the outbreak of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966 to 1976). In response to China’s internal turmoil, pro-Communist 
insurgency groups in Hong Kong were mobilised to launch worker strikes, anti-
imperialist campaigns and terrorist attacks in the city area, collectively known as the 
                                                          
39 ‘The weakness of our negotiating position is that we have many hostages in Hong Kong in terms of 
people and assets… Our military capability (including nuclear capability) could hardly be a factor in a 
situation in which we were trying to get China to the conference table – particularly since China’s 
assessment is probably that we would not use it even in defense of Hong Kong against a military take-
over’ (TNA: FCO 40/78). 
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1967 riots. The mob forced the British colonial government to retreat from Hong Kong. 
After weeks of confrontation, Hong Kong’s police force managed to stabilise the 
situation by implementing ferocious crackdown operations and arresting the leftist 
leaders (see King 1975; Scott 1989; TNA: PREM 19/792). 
Business elites, especially those in the banking industry, also played an 
important role during the pre-transitional period. The urgent need for talks regarding 
the future of Hong Kong intensified in the late 1970s, when investors became 
increasingly worried about their investment in Hong Kong; and further after 1997, 
especially in relation to loan agreements and land leases (Chung 2001: 28-29; Lu 2009: 
7). The banking industry was reluctant to approve mortgage applications beyond 1997, 
which severely limited loan repayments, liquidity and property development in Hong 
Kong. It was believed that if the ruling elites failed to retain the confidence of the 
business elites, the latter would relocate their wealth, assets and investments to other 
countries, which would be unfavourable to both the British government and the 
Chinese government. Archival data show that as a result, government officials on both 
sides were eager to reassure local elites that their status would be preserved. This 
protected both British and Chinese interests and smoothened the transfer of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong from Britain to China (TNA: PREM 19/1056; TNA: PREM 
19/1057). 
During the negotiations, the Beijing government was keen to build stronger 
ties with young Hong Kong professionals to foster confidence, stability and prosperity 
in the region. The memoirs of Lu Ping, head of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office 
of the State Council of the PRC, reveal that the Chinese authorities expended 
considerable effort and time on lobbying Hong Kong-based British investors not to 
change the domicile of their investments. The Chinese authority believed that 
protecting the interests of British companies in Hong Kong would help to stabilise the 
Hong Kong economy as a whole (Lu 2009: 35, 47). Historically, local business elites 
were closely integrated with the colonial administration. The directors/senior 
managers of conglomerates based in the United Kingdom, such as Jardine Matheson, 
the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Wheelock Marden and Swire, had 
long been appointed by the Governor to occupy key positions in the Hong Kong 
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government, such as membership of the Executive Council, the LegCo, the Urban 
Council and various consultative committees (see So 2000: 365). According to Tsang 
(2004), ‘[t]he main driving force behind the British mercantile community’s political 
activism was self-interest’ (p. 3). British interests in Hong Kong could only be 
safeguarded if the region was politically and economically stable. To further increase 
their bargaining power, young professionals established close links with the Beijing 
officials and played a key role in transmitting messages from Beijing officials to British 
officials. This enabled the local elites to build up a social network or guanxi with Beijing 
officials to pave the way for their future business and career development in Hong 
Kong after 1997, and helped the Chinese government to select potential candidates 
to ensure that Hong Kong was ruled by Hong Kong people. 
 
6.2 Transitional Process 
 
During the transitional period, the ruling elites manipulated state capacity to protect 
their own interests. Similar to the strategy adopted in Singapore during decolonisation, 
the British colonial ruling elites attempted to develop an electoral autocracy to resist 
the influence of Communism. The election process mainly involved selecting 
representatives from business elites willing and able to safeguard British interests in 
the post-transitional society. Those measures were adopted and further refined by 
the Chinese ruling elites to consolidate their own power after the handover. 
 To capture the dynamics of international interaction during the transitional 
period, this section investigates the following four major areas. First, the competition 
for Hong Kong’s sovereignty between Chinese and British ruling elites. Second, 
international bargaining between various external actors. Third, the major concerns 
of the Chinese ruling elites about the situation in Hong Kong. Fourth, the ways in which 
the Chinese ruling elites interacted and bargained with local Hong Kong elites to attain 
their support and confidence. 
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The local elites in Hong Kong hoped to seize the opportunity to empower 
themselves during the transitional period. Although local elites were officially 
excluded from the negotiation process, they had informally built up a network and 
trust with the British and Chinese ruling elites. As a result, the local business elites 
were expected by both the Chinese and the British to reliably protect the interests of 
their respective governments in Hong Kong’s post-transitional society. 
 
State Capacity 
 
To safeguard Britain’s interests, it was urgently necessary to develop an electoral 
autocracy in Hong Kong, as indicated in the secret minutes drafted on 25 June 1984 
by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, for 
the attention of the Prime Minister: ‘[i]t is likely that in Hong Kong and the UK the 
main interest will focus on the proposed arrangements for the indirect election of 
members of the Legislative Council and the arguments put forward for not introducing 
any element of direct elections at this level… Some may also point out that the 
proposals would mean that the last real chance of introducing a western-style 
democracy in Hong Kong before 1997 is being wasted’ (TNA: PREM 19/1265). Another 
secret document, Future of Hong Kong: Policy Review – Discussion Paper for EXCO, 
conveyed a similar idea: ‘[t]here should be [an] evolution of the system of Government 
gradually over the years up to 1997 in a manner which would strength its ability to 
resist interference’ (TNA: PREM 19/1059). To recapitulate, the introduction to Hong 
Kong of democracy, or more accurately partial direct elections, was intended to 
empower local business elites to protect British’s capital investment in Hong Kong 
without interference from the Chinese government after 1997. 
The Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Edward Youde, gave a similar reason for the 
British promotion of democratic institutions in a telegram (No. 1973) sent to the FCO 
on 19 December 1983, as follows. 
[T]he attitude of the Chinese government has always been 
considered a major obstacle to the introduction of a more 
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representative form of government in Hong Kong… Moving too 
quickly could lead to rapid polarisation of the community and might 
create a danger of political rivalries (e.g. between pro-Taiwan and 
pro-China) irrelevant to Hong Kong’s real concerns… At the same 
time checks and balances must be buil[t] in to minimize opportunities 
for Chinese interference. (TNA: PREM 19/1059)  
Accordingly, checks and balances were implemented to secure the role of business 
elites in Hong Kong and thereby counteract the influence of China on local Hong Kong 
politics (see Lau and Kuan 2000: 720; Pepper 2000: 422).  
During the transitional period, it was imperative for senior positions in the 
Hong Kong government to be filled by Chinese elites. This provided another favourable 
condition for the dominance of local business elites. The Hong Kong colonial 
administration had been controlled by the British since 1842. The Governor of Hong 
Kong was a former London official with the power to appoint all senior government 
officials and members of ExeCo and LegCo. During the negotiation, both governments, 
albeit for different reasons and with different intentions, recommended that more 
local Hong Kong elites be given senior positions in Hong Kong. The concerns of the 
British were captured in a report by Lord Belstead after a meeting (in the presence of 
Sir Percy Cradock) with the Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislative 
Councils (UMELCO), students, members of District Boards and leading bankers on 6-
10 December 1982. Lord Belstead reported that the reassignment of senior 
government roles from expatriates to local Chinese was crucial to prevent the 
exploitation of these roles by Hong Kong’s future Communist Chinese government 
(TNA: PREM 19/1053).40 
The rationale for hindering the promotion of democracy in Hong Kong can be 
found in various internal government documents. On 29 December 1983, Youde 
telegraphed (No. 2034) a draft ExeCo paper entitled Future of Hong Kong: 
                                                          
40 ‘I was struck by a growing sense of frustration among younger Chinese people that they do not have 
greater participate in decisions, and that Hong Kong is beholden to an expatriate administration at the 
very top, e.g. there is no Chinese Official member of EXCO, a remarkable state of affairs considering 
that it is the future of the Hong Kong Chinese which is at stake in the talks. I believe that as soon as 
possible the Hong Kong government would be wise to ensure appointment of more Hong Kong Chinese 
to top posts in the Government administration and in the consultative political bodies… [Lord Belstead] 
found the lack of Hong Kong Chinese in more senior positions very worrying. This represents a gap 
which needs to be filled otherwise it can be exploited all too easily by the Chinese’ (TNA: PREM 19/1053). 
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Constitutional and Governmental Development to the FCO. In response to a demand 
for the election of Western-educated professional middle class members to LegCo, 
the following options were suggested.  
Progressive development, building on existing institutions… the 
selection of the unofficial membership of the Legislative Council in 
part through elections from an electoral college made up of people 
who had themselves been directly elected to lower level bodies 
(Regional Councils and District Boards) and in part through 
elections from identified functional groups such as industrial 
associations, the universities, the medical profession, labour 
boards and so on. The relationship with the administration would 
be retained by the membership on this council of a few key 
officials… The post of Governor or Chief Executive to be filled 
through a consultative process, confirmed by election, again on an 
electoral college basis similar to that proposed for the Legislative 
Council… [The second option is] to move directly to the 
introduction of a fully elective system based on adult suffrage 
involving: Direct elections of all unofficial members of the 
Legislative Council… The Governor to be directly elected. (TNA: 
PREM 19/1059)  
However, the second option was not appealing to senior British government officials. 
In a letter to the British Prime Minister on 23 December 1983 (PM/83/103), Geoffrey 
Howe offered the following caveats.  
The Governor puts considerable emphasis on the need to build on 
Hong Kong’s existing institutions and to retain continuity. For that 
reason he favours a system of collegiate, rather than direct election, 
whereby various boards and councils produce the indirectly elected 
Legislative Council which in turn would elect Governor… I am not yet 
quite so convinced of the wisdom of going too far down the 
democratic road… there was some signs of Chinese reservations on 
this point – for example, from Ji Pengfei. And we both, I think, have 
some anxieties about the risk that elections might stir up conflict in 
Hong Kong itself. Even so we cannot escape the need to suggest some 
mechanism to replace existing procedures, so as to avoid leaving a 
constitutional vacuum which the Chinese could exploit. (TNA: PREM 
19/1059) 
In other words, the introduction of democracy to Hong Kong, especially elections, was 
hindered by the following three factors: the threat of Chinese intervention, the need 
to retain the confidence of business elites in Hong Kong and the need to prevent 
confrontation within Hong Kong society. The strategy adopted by the colonial 
194 
 
administration was to rely on professional business elites from various sectors to 
formulate an electoral college to indirectly elect the Governor and members of LegCo 
(after 1997).  
Youde elaborated further on the goals of the reform in the above paper (TNA: 
PREM 19/1059).41 One of the objectives was to provide additional protection for the 
interests of business elites. The colonial administrators were aware that if business 
elites competed freely in the direct elections, they would receive few votes from the 
general public. This problem was outlined in a telegram (No. 1973) from Youde to the 
FCO on 19 December 1983, which is excerpted below. 
The proportion of the population taking part in elections is still 
small; and many community leaders would not be willing to submit 
themselves to election outside their social and professional group. 
Until Hong Kong has gained greater experience and public support 
for the elective process, direct elections based on universal adult 
suffrage would be likely to produce distorted representational 
structures. To ensure that all sectors of society were fairly 
represented, the constituencies would need to be functionally as 
well as territorially based… an electoral college of professional and 
commercial associations had been established to generate 
members of the Executive and Legislative Councils. (TNA: PREM 
19/1059)  
This recommendation further highlighted the absence of a transition to democracy in 
Hong Kong. To justify the monopoly of political power by business elites, democracy 
was conceptualised by the ruling elites as populism, unfavourable to stability and 
prosperity (Lu 2009: 70). Various constitutional arrangements were developed to 
ensure the continued political monopoly of the business elites and block any potential 
shift in the political system towards genuine democracy. 
                                                          
41 ‘To move immediately to [a] directly elected Legislative Council would not be practical option. The 
membership of the Legislative Council could however be generated in part through elections by an 
electoral college of District Board and Regional Council members; and in part through elections from 
identified functional groups such as industrial associations, the universities, the medical profession, 
labour boards and so on… Such a process would diffuse political power widely in the community and 
avoid the risks of manipulation… The dangers of simple direct election to the post of Governor are the 
same as for the Legislative Council. To survive, the Governor would need to be not only sufficiently 
independent to give assurance to the people of Hong Kong but also acceptable to Peking as not hostile 
to their interests’ (TNA: PREM 19/1059). 
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Surprisingly, this reform direction was extremely well received within the 
British government, as indicated in the following excerpt from an internal government 
document. 
The Green Paper rightly stresses that the present system of 
Government in Hong Kong operates on the basis of consultation and 
consensus and that any developments should aim to maintain this. 
Thus the proposals in the paper aim to extend political power more 
deeply into the community, but they also seek to maintain the 
“corporate” format of the organs of government in Hong Kong in 
order to reduce wherever possible the opportunities for ambitious 
individuals on either the right or the left to dominate particular areas 
of government. (TNA: PREM 19/1265) 
The proposed changes in 1984 to the composition of LegCo and ExeCo and the 
process of selecting council members were basically intended to undermine the power 
of future Hong Kong leaders after 1997. Before the reform, all ExeCo and LegCo 
members were appointed by the Governor or by ex-officio members, who were also 
appointed by the Governor (see Table 6.2). After the reform, the Governor (or Chief 
Executive after 1997) was to be appointed by the Central People’s Government of the 
PRC by either election or consultation. The Chief Executive would then inevitably 
obtain full control of the government by appointing pro-Beijing elites to fill all senior 
government positions. To alleviate this potential threat, the reformers recommended 
that 24 seats (48%) of LegCo be elected by the electoral college and functional 
constituencies made up of the following main groups: industrialist organisations, 
labour organisations, the financial sector, the legal profession, academics (including 
educators), the medical sector and other professionals (see TNA: PREM 19/1263). This 
arrangement was believed to offer an effective means of resisting potential 
interference by the Beijing government. A proposal was also made for 8 of the 14 
ExeCo members to be elected by LegCo. Ultimately, only the formation of LegCo was 
changed; the proposed alteration to the composition of ExeCo was not recommended 
by the British government.  
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Table 6.2 Proposed Changes to Formation of LegCo in 1984 
LegCo Members Current 1985 1988 
Elected by electoral college 0 6 (12.5%) 12 (24.0%) 
Elected by functional 
constituencies 
0 6 (12.5%) 12 (24.0%) 
Appointed by Governor 29 (61.7%) 23 (47.9%) 16 (32.0%) 
Official members 18 (38.3%) 13 (27.1%) 10 (20.0%) 
Total 47 48 50 
Source: TNA: PREM 19/1265 
 
In short, similar to their counterparts in Singapore (as discussed in the previous 
chapter), the British colonial ruling elites in Hong Kong used checks and balances to 
manipulate local elites and thereby alleviate risks in the transitional period. Indirect 
elections were implemented and business and professional elites in the electoral 
college and functional constituencies were empowered to resist the influence of the 
Chinese government. The political reforms initiated by the British ruling elites during 
the transitional period accounted for Hong Kong’s non-democratic political structure 
after transition. The last section of this chapter shows that Hong Kong’s political 
system after the handover was still monopolised by business elites.  
  
International Actors 
 
Competition for Sovereignty  
 
There is evidence to suggest that China’s leaders were eager to demonstrate China’s 
sovereignty over Hong Kong during talks with Britain in the 1980s. The Chinese 
government officially stated that any involvement of the Hong Kong people in the 
negotiation progress was forbidden. In a telegram (No. 416 of 9 May 1983), Percy 
Cradock, the British ambassador to Beijing, reported that Yao Guang, the Chinese 
negotiator and Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, believed that ‘the great 
majority of Hong Kong people were Chinese. Being Chinese, they were clear about 
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history. There was therefore no question of whether the arrangements would be 
acceptable to the Hong Kong people or not’ (TNA: PREM 19/1055). In another 
telegraph (No. 1050 of 19 October 1983), Cradock described Yao’s insistence on the 
following.  
China’s intended policies towards Hong Kong were part of her internal 
affairs as a sovereign state. However, because of the friendly relations 
with the UK and because of British willingness to co-operate over the 
maintenance of stability and prosperity in Hong Kong, China was willing 
to brief the UK in advance of a public statement of her intended policies 
and to listen to her useful opinions and proposals. (TNA: PREM 19/1057)  
In other words, the Beijing government did not recognise Britain’s authority in Hong 
Kong, and was determined to resume sovereignty over Hong Kong after the lease on 
the New Territories had expired. This led to conflict between key actors in the two 
governments over the sovereignty and administration of Hong Kong after 1997. 
The dispute over Hong Kong’s sovereignty between the British and Beijing 
governments was mainly due to their different interpretations of the treaties signed 
in the mid-19th century. The Chinese government intended to revoke the treaties 
signed by Britain and the Qing Dynasty government and fully resume sovereignty over 
Hong Kong in 1997. Meanwhile, the British government sought to ensure Hong Kong’s 
stability and prosperity to maximise its own interests in the region by bargaining with 
China regarding the future administration of Hong Kong. When the British Prime 
Minister, Margaret Thatcher, visited China in September 1982, she conveyed the 
following message to the Chinese leaders. 
To settle the future of Hong Kong by abrogation [of the treaties in 
1842 and 1860] alone would be unthinkable. It would produce 
immediate panic in Hong Kong. It would be a dereliction of UK 
responsibility and would be rejected by the British Government and 
Parliament and by the people of Hong Kong.  
But if our two governments could agree [to] define arrangements 
about the future administration and control of Hong Kong, and I was 
satisfied that they would work, that they would command 
confidence and if I could justify them to the British Parliament, and 
they were acceptable to the people of Hong Kong, there would then 
be a new situation in which I could consider the question of 
sovereignty. (TNA: PREM 19/792) 
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In notes on a meeting with Deng and Zhao sent by telegram (No. 610) to A. E. Donald 
on 30 September 1982, Cradock suggested that ‘[a]lthough they are immovable on 
sovereignty they maybe [sic] ready to make concessions on administration’ (TNA: 
PREM 19/790). He referred here to the British government’s notorious proposal to 
exchange sovereignty for the administration of Hong Kong after 1997. However, 
Cradock’s optimism regarding concessions was ungrounded. Youde reported in a 
telegram (No. 102 of 21 January 1983) on a Peking visit made by a New Territories 
group in January 1983. After three meetings with Liao Chengzhi, local elites in Hong 
Kong learned that ‘the talks were at an impasse. This was because Britain insisted in 
talking about prosperity first while China insisted on talking about sovereignty. The 
Prime Minister’s emphasis on the treaties had made the negotiations difficult’ (TNA: 
PREM 19/1053).  
 
International Bargaining Situation 
 
There is also evidence to show that the British decision makers learned from other 
Asian leaders, which eventually affected their stance towards China. On 25 March 
1983, A. J. Coles, private secretary to the Prime Minister, reported that during a visit 
to London, Mahathir Mohamad, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, had suggested to 
Prime Minister Thatcher that ‘something would be necessary to save Chinese face’ 
regarding Hong Kong. The author of an internal document government dated 19 
March 1983 also stated that both the Singaporean and the Malaysian leaders believed 
that if the business environment were to be disturbed, they would experience ‘a mass 
exodus of rich Chinese capital from the area, which [would] take their money to the 
United States and Canada, rather than counties nearest to Hong Kong’ (TNA: PREM 
19/1054). The British negotiating team had originally adopted a stronger stance to 
obtain a better deal in the talks. However, this friendly reminder from the Asian 
leaders softened the Prime Minister’s stance in relation to the Peking government (see 
TNA: PREM 19/1057). 
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The policy makers also learned from overseas disputes. The territorial disputes 
over Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands in the 1970s may have influenced British policy 
towards other dependent territories/colonies. In a letter of 8 August 1973, E. N. 
Larmour explained that the dispute over Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands ‘would 
affect our position in our territorial disputes with Guatemala over Belize, and with 
Argentine over the Falkland Islands: it could also affect our position in Hong Kong… Its 
effect in Hong Kong might be less significant but there could be awkward 
repercussions there too’ (TNA: FCO 40/424). In a letter written to Larmour on 7 August 
1973, R. B. Crowson of the Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department made the 
following suggestion. 
In the short term, the proposals for Gibraltar might have an adverse 
effect on Hong Kong’s position vis-à-vis China. Recognition of Spanish 
sovereignty over Gibraltar might encourage the Chinese to press us to 
accept their view that the whole of Hong Kong was an integral part of 
China. Equally if not more important, if the Spaniards were allowed to 
appoint a representative in Gibraltar, this might encourage the 
Chinese to step up the pressure on us to agree to some form of official 
Chinese representation in Hong Kong. (TNA: FCO 40/424)  
The above empirical data support the claim that the British decision makers 
considered the international bargaining situation when handling the issue of Hong 
Kong. 
In contrast, the Chinese leaders were clearly more strongly influenced by 
nationalist concerns when dealing with the Hong Kong problem. In a morning meeting 
between Margaret Thatcher and Deng Xiaoping in the Great Hall of the People, Beijing 
on 24 September 1982, Deng emphasised these concerns as follows. 
[I]f in 1997 the People’s Republic of China had not recovered Hong Kong 
the Chinese leaders and the Chinese Government would not be able to 
account for it to the Chinese people or to the people of the world. If 
sovereignty were not recovered, it would mean that the new China was 
like the China of the Ching [Qing] dynasty and the present leaders were 
like Li Hongzhang [the official representative of the Qing government, 
who signed the treaty with Britain in 1842]. (TNA: PREM 19/790)  
Therefore, the Chinese government was interested solely in regaining sovereignty 
over Hong Kong; as long as the British government was willing to return the entire 
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Hong Kong territory (not just the New Territories), the Beijing officials were ready to 
make certain concessions on social, economic and political arrangements, for example. 
The British officials believed that the business elites in Hong Kong could be 
manipulated to resist potential interference from China after the handover.  
 
Chinese Concerns 
 
The Chinese leaders were eager to build up a good mutual relationship with local 
business elites in Hong Kong. Before the official negotiations, the interests of the 
business elites were clearly acknowledged by the Chinese officials. On 5 July 1979, the 
British ambassador asked China about the New Territories lease, and the Beijing 
government replied on 24 September 1979 as follows, ‘recall[ing] the remarks made 
to the Governor by Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping in March’. 
[H]e said that China regarded Hong Kong as Chinese territory but that 
when the time came to deal with this question in the future, the 
Chinese would take account of the special circumstances of Hong 
Kong and would not harm the interests of the investors. (TNA: PREM 
19/789) 
This explicit reassurance was given because the Chinese Communist Party had gained 
a bad reputation for confiscating private assets after gaining power in 1949. Chinese 
officials repeatedly sought to elicit and retain the trust of Hong Kong capitalists. On 5 
January 1982, for example, Vice-Premier Ji Pangfei reassured Humphrey Atkins, Lord 
Privy Seal, in a meeting in the Great Hall of the People, Beijing that ‘China would not 
take measures such as those taken in the early years of the Revolution, when they had 
confiscated property. They would not confiscate capitalists’ assets in Hong Kong’ (TNA: 
CAB 133/528). In the same meeting, Ji ‘assure[d] the UK side that in the future China 
would preserve the interests of existing industrialists and business circles’ (TNA: CAB 
133/528). 
To further secure the confidence of business elites in Hong Kong, the Chinese 
authority guaranteed that the status quo would be maintained in Hong Kong after the 
handover. In his memoirs, Sir S. Y. Chung (2001) recalled that in January 1982, the 
201 
 
Chinese leader told Humphrey Atkins, the British Lord Privy Seal, that the Chinese 
government ‘would in due course talk to various circles in Hong Kong and would 
preserve the interests of investors in Hong Kong’ (p. 39). A government telegram (No. 
006 of 27 September 1983) provided an account of a private meeting with the Chinese 
Foreign Minister, Wu Wueqian, who explained that ‘[t]o allay the fears of Hong Kong 
entrepreneurs, Deng has suggested that this arrangement should last for 50 years’. 
The author of the telegram went on to report that ‘[w]hatever happened in the talks, 
China would announce its policies for the future of Hong Kong in September 1984. He 
[Wu] hoped that this would be a joint statement’ (TNA: PREM 19/1057). 
The Chinese leaders were concerned about the smooth transition of 
sovereignty. Once Hong Kong had been returned to China, the former ruling British 
officials would have to hand over their power and positions to local elites. If this power 
transfer happened in 1997, it would be quite difficult for local Hong Kong officials to 
assume government roles and exercise power without jeopardising Hong Kong’s 
stability and prosperity. To avoid this problem, the Chinese authority used various 
channels to urge the British authority to speed up the process of appointing local elites 
to senior government positions. In a telegram sent to the FCO on 7 March 1983 (No. 
311), Phillip Haddon-Cave, Chief Secretary of Hong Kong, reported on the publication 
of an article in a pro-Peking newspaper in which the composition of political power in 
Hong Kong was criticised. 
Wen Wei Po on 3 March published a rather long article reproducing 
a report by a pressure group, the New Hong Kong Institute, about 
what it described as a highly uneven distribution of political power in 
Hong Kong. The report focused on the small number of people 
holding important posts in public and business life. But did not do 
well on the racial factor. (TNA: PREM 19/1054) 
Meanwhile, Chinese officials disseminated the government’s plans for exercising 
power in Hong Kong after 1997 among various international actors. Donald C. 
Jamieson of the Canadian Higher Commission sent a letter to Margaret Thatcher on 
21 October 1983 to report on a meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wu 
Wueqian. Wu had described ‘the Chinese Government’s policy vis-à-vis Hong Kong 
following 1997’ as follows: ‘general elections would allow Hong Kong residents to 
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administer Hong Kong as a “Special administrative region”’ (TNA: PREM 19/1057). The 
principle of ‘one country, two systems’, the promise of a high degree of autonomy and 
the emphasis on rule by Hong Kong people required a significant number of Hong 
Kongese to take up positions in the government. They needed to accumulate hands-
on experience before 1997 to implement these ideas. In a telegram sent on 19 April 
1983 (No. 536), Youde reported on the media coverage in Hong Kong of the territory’s 
future.  
[T]he Chinese government hoped that Hong Kong Chinese would 
progressively take over the senior positions within the Hong Kong 
Government within seven or eight years. Promotion of local Chinese 
into these posts should begin within two or three years. By 1997 the 
Chinese flag would have replaced the British flag, and the Governor, 
the Secretary for Security and the Commander, British forces would 
have to return to Britain. (TNA: PREM 19/1054) 
In short, Hong Kong elites were given the chance to acquire senior government 
positions during the last decade of the colonial period. This opportunity was 
particularly favourable for local business elites, the stakeholders most eager to protect 
their interests by retaining the status quo and guarding against Chinese intervention 
in Hong Kong society. Therefore, the political reform initiated by Youde in Hong Kong 
during the transitional period was relatively conservative, to avoid any direct 
confrontation with the Chinese authority. The negotiation process was lengthy, and 
each government had its own concerns and agenda regarding the future of Hong Kong. 
Ultimately, the negotiations simply provided a foundation for the development of a 
non-democratic form of government after 1997, with the election of the Chief 
Executive (formerly the Governor) and the members of LegCo and District Boards 
skewed towards the interests of pro-establishment business elites and patron-client 
politics (see Kwong 2007). 
 
Promoting Democracy? 
 
It seems that neither the leaders of the British government nor their Chinese 
counterparts were interested in promoting genuine democracy in Hong Kong. The 
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Member of Parliament (MP) Robert Adley visited Hong Kong in November 1983 and 
stressed ‘the need for more democracy in Hong Kong’ to Geoffrey Howe. In response, 
P. F. Ricketts of the FCO wrote a letter to A. J. Coles, the Prime Minister’s secretary, in 
which he suggested that Adley’s request was ‘unrealistic’ (TNA: PREM 19/1059).  
Political arrangements and the introduction of a representative government 
were not part of the early agreements between China and Britain. Political 
arrangements were not addressed until very late in the negotiations. As of 4 April 1984, 
according to a report drafted by the Hong Kong Department of the FCO, the talks had 
covered only Hong Kong’s legal system, monetary system, public services, external 
economic relations, civil aviation and shipping, in addition to the rights of individuals 
in Hong Kong  (TNA: PREM 19/1264). In short, constitutional arrangements and an 
electoral system had not been agreed upon by the two governments. In a secret 
internal document written on 19 March 1984, Geoffrey Howe quoted Governor 
Youde’s list of ‘the problems in moving more quickly to direct elections’, as follows. 
(a) The relatively retarded state of Hong Kong’s political development. 
There are still strong Chinese traditions in the community in Hong 
Kong. Policy formation at the moment is based on consultation and 
consensus and not on an adversarial party system as in the United 
Kingdom. It will be easier to maintain stability if a new structure is 
built progressively on what already exists. (b) The elective system in 
Hong Kong is in its infancy… (c) Moving too quickly could lead to rapid 
polarisation of the community and might create a danger of political 
rivalries, for instance between pro-Taiwan and pro-China elements, 
with the obvious risks for stability that this would bring. (d) Power 
must be diffuse to prevent domination and manipulation by any 
political interest group… [The report also highlighted] We need to 
take the Chinese attitude into account. Chinese views on democracy 
in Hong Kong are far from clear. At all events they are highly 
suspicious that we may try to exploit calls for “democracy” in order 
to negate in practice their resumption of the right of administration 
under an agreement. The Chinese would probably thus object to a 
proposal for direct elections in the immediate future, though they 
might be prepared to accept some form of indirect elections and 
greater democratization along the lines proposed by the Governor… 
Subject to your views, I propose that we approve the Governor’s 
recommendations in principle… We should however follow the line 
of gradually moving to indirect elections; this will still allow us the 
possibility of moving to direct elections in the 1990s. (TNA: PREM 
19/1263)  
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The British government was responding to the concerns of both Hong Kong business 
elites and the Chinese government. A pro-business elite political structure emerged 
immediately after the publication of the Green Paper: The Further Development of 
Representative Government in Hong Kong by the Hong Kong Governor, Edward Youde, 
in 1984. The corresponding political reforms determined the direction of future 
constitutional development and government structure in Hong Kong under the 
external influence of China. Specifically, the reforms affected Hong Kong’s post-1997 
state capacity by continuing to ensure the dominance of professional business elites 
in the electoral college and indirect elections. 
 
Local Elites 
 
Maximising Interests of Business Elites 
 
Business elites in Hong Kong played an important role in transferring messages from 
the Beijing officials to the British government. In a telegram sent on 19 July 1983 (No. 
1031), Edward Youde reported that Allen Lee, an unofficial member of LegCo and 
leader of the Young Professionals Delegation, held a meeting with Deng during which 
the latter voiced the concerns of the Beijing government regarding a potential loss of 
‘face’ and urged the British to ‘acknowledge China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong’ (TNA: 
PREM 19/1056). In 1993, Lee founded and subsequently chaired a political party made 
up of businessmen and tycoons, named the Liberal Party. This was one of the major 
pro-Beijing political parties in Hong Kong. Later, in 1997, Lee was appointed as deputy 
to the National People’s Congress. Other business elites in Hong Kong also maintained 
a good relationship with senior Chinese government officials. A document issued by 
10 Downing Street on 28 September 1982 indicated that Sir Y. K. Pao met with Deng 
prior to a meeting with the Prime Minister. Conveying Deng’s message, Pao reported 
that ‘[i]t was not Peking’s intention to send anyone to govern Hong Kong; instead the 
Chinese Government intended to appoint a Hong Kong Chinese to the top post. They 
also intended to put “low level” Hong Kong Chinese into the future Government’ (TNA: 
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PREM 19/790). This reflects China’s determination to train up a group of local elites to 
rule Hong Kong after 1997.  
Unsurprisingly, the business elites who maintained a good relationship with 
China subsequently became Hong Kong’s political leaders. In a letter written on 2 
February 1983, Robin Butler of 10 Downing Street reported that ‘[t]he Chinese 
Government in their propaganda messages to Hong Kong had introduced the theme 
of “rule by Hong Kong people”… this would have some considerable appeal to certain 
elements of the Hong Kong Chinese’ (TNA: PREM 19/1053). 
Meanwhile, business elites in Hong Kong became aware of another potential 
opportunity to maximise their power. They used various channels to lobby the British 
government to protect their interests in Hong Kong after 1997. In September 1982, 
the general public was informed that Margaret Thatcher would make an official visit 
to Beijing to discuss Hong Kong’s future with the leaders of China. There is 
considerable empirical evidence of the eagerness of Hong Kong’s business elites to 
communicate with the British Prime Minister. For example, Daniel Koo, chairperson of 
Shui Hing Co., Limited, wrote a letter to Margaret Thatcher on 7 September 1982 to 
express his concerns about the future of Hong Kong. Koo was also a member of the 
General Committee of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, and Vice-
Chairman of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce of Hong Kong. He made the 
following suggestion.  
[T]he present British legal system and full British responsibility for the 
maintenance of law and order should be retained… An agreement which re-
establishes Chinese sovereignty over the territory must therefore require the 
present treaties of tenure to be invalidated… An agreement to replace the 
present treaties could be negotiated under Article 30 of the revised Chinese 
constitution which appears to have been worked with such a possibility in 
mind. (TNA: PREM 19/789)  
In his reference to Article 30 of China’s Constitution, Koo echoed the proposal made 
by Chinese leaders to allow Hong Kong to retain political and economic systems 
distinct from those of mainland China. In short, Koo wished to maintain the existing 
capitalist system, which was crucial to the activities of local entrepreneurs. 
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Members of Heung Yee Kuk,42 a very influential statutory advisory body made 
up of billionaire indigenous landowners in rural areas of Hong Kong, wrote a letter to 
Margaret Thatcher on 2 March 1983 to express their views and concerns regarding 
Hong Kong’s future stability and prosperity. After a meeting with Liao Chengzhi, Vice-
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress, in 
Beijing on 12 January 1983, the leaders of Heung Yee Kuk believed that if Britain were 
to ‘make an early promise to return the sovereignty over Hong Kong to China, all over 
problems can be settled through negotiations so long as both China and Britain can be 
benefited on an equal and mutually beneficial basis’ (TNA: PREM 19/1054). Heung Yee 
Kuk had already established a very good relationship with the Beijing government. Its 
leaders, such as Lau Wong-fat, held important positions in Hong Kong before and after 
the handover. Lau Wong-fat was appointed as a member of LegCo in 1985, a member 
of ExeCo in 2009 and a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CCPCC) in 2003. 
In addition, members of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Trade Unions Council 
wrote a letter to Margaret Thatcher on 14 September 1983 to voice their concerns 
about Hong Kong’s future.    
The majority of them [Hong Kong people] confide that the communist 
Chinese systems will not suit the Hong Kong society and the public 
trends. They also hold that the philosophies of “Hong Kong people to 
rule Hong Kong” and “Rule Hong Kong in its own way” are most in-
effective. (TNA: PREM 19/1057) 
The letter also expressed the concerns of other business elites. The Hon. Mrs. Saline 
Chow Liang Shuk-yee, an unofficial member of LegCo, pointed out that ‘if Hong Kong 
on one day flies the communist Chinese regime flag it will be the end of stability and 
prosperity here-at… Communism and Capitalism are two extremely contrasting and 
conflicting political systems. Both are unable to co-exist’ (TNA: PREM 19/1057). With 
a political career trajectory similar to that of other business elites in Hong Kong, Chow 
was appointed as a member of LegCo in 1981, a non-official member of ExeCo in 1991, 
chairwoman of the Hong Kong Tourism Board in 2002 and a member of CCPCC in 2008. 
                                                          
42 For the history of Heung Yee Kuk, please refer to Sit and Kwong (2011). 
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Secret internal documents also captured the activities of other business elites, 
such as Christine Loh, director of Philipp Brothers and Phibro Energy in the 1980s, who 
subsequently helmed various think-tanks and political groups. A position paper was 
submitted by Loh in the capacity of chairperson of the Hong Kong Observers to A. J. 
Coles, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, on 21 December 1983, when Loh 
returned to London after visiting Beijing to meet with senior Chinese officials such as 
Premier Zhao. These meetings were arranged by the New China News Agency. The 
following suggestion was made in Loh’s paper.  
The future government of Hong Kong should be elected by the people 
of Hong Kong to ensure that it is accountable to the people. The present 
Hong Kong government is based on a system of appointments. Although 
many of the individuals have contributed significantly to Hong Kong, 
they owe their office to the people who appointed them and therefore 
cannot be consider to be true representatives of the Hong Kong people. 
(TNA: PREM 19/1059) 
This example illustrates that the business elites in Hong Kong maintained a good 
relationship with both the Beijing government and the British government. 
Unsurprisingly, Loh was appointed as a member of LegCo in 1992, and became a senior 
government official, Undersecretary for the Environment, in 2012, in the 
administration of C.Y. Leung, the third Chief Executive of the Government of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). 
Local business elites also voiced their concerns privately to the British leaders 
about the introduction of full democracy to Hong Kong. In a meeting between Sir 
Geoffrey Howe (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs), the 
Governor of Hong Kong and ExeCo unofficial members on 13 January 1984 in London, 
‘Sir Geoffrey Howe raised the question of constitutional development in Hong Kong 
between now and 1997. He detected a wish in Hong Kong for greater democracy and 
more representative structures’. Lydia Dunn, an appointed member of ExeCo and 
LegCo, executive director of John Swire and Sons Limited and director of Swire Pacific 
Limited, believed that full universal suffrage and direct elections would prove 
dangerous. She argued that the ‘key thing was the caliber of the Governor. The 
community was not ready and candidates would be hesitant about coming forward. 
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Any development should be controlled and allowed to evolve step by step’ (TNA: 
PREM 19/1262).  
The above examples provide just a few illustrations of the effort made by both 
Chinese and British government officials to establish and preserve good relationships 
with local business elites in Hong Kong to maintain stability and prosperity during the 
transitional period. Indeed, after the handover, business elites’ monopoly of tightly 
knit business-state networks in Hong Kong spread at a furious pace (see Ho et al. 2010; 
Kwong 2007).  
 
Exclusion of Opposition and Democratic Parties 
 
In response to the demand from opposition and democrats for genuine democracy in 
Hong Kong, both the British and the Chinese government officials emphasised the 
need to ensure that the distribution of political power in Hong Kong posed no threat 
to the interests of the business sector or to the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. 
The following excerpt from an internal document indicates that Youde did not 
anticipate installing a full democracy in Hong Kong, on the grounds that such a system 
would threaten Hong Kong’s stability. 
The Governor believes that it is important not to over-estimate the 
demand in Hong Kong for direct elections. This demand comes 
mainly from academics and members of small pressure groups. While 
there is general support for more representative government, there 
is also a strong expression of concern, both in the business 
community and at the grass roots level, that the Hong Kong 
Government might move too far and too fast and in consequence 
introduce a factor of instability at this highly sensitive time. (TNA: 
PREM 19/1265) 
Therefore, most of the major stakeholders in Hong Kong were excluded from the talks 
between Chinese and British representatives. Some pressure groups voiced concerns 
about this exclusion; for example, Mildred Neville of the Catholic Institute for 
International Relations wrote to the British Prime Minister as follows. 
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We are most concerned that in your forthcoming discussions with 
the Chinese authorities and the Hong Kong Government, full 
account should be taken of the rights and reasonable expectations 
of the people of Hong Kong, whose present situation is, we believe, 
increasingly invidious to them and difficult for a British government 
committed to democracy to defend. While we recognise the 
complexity of the issues involved in deciding the future of Hong 
Kong, we believe that a solution which visibly excludes consultation 
with the people most concerned will be seen to be unjust. (TNA: 
PREM 19/790) 
Ultimately, no representatives from Hong Kong were involved in the official talks (see 
Lu 2009: 45; Patten 1999: 33), which caused a minor disagreement.43 The exclusion of 
Hong Kong representatives was explained in a telegram (No. 605 of 29 June 1983) to 
the FCO in which Cradock reported on a telephone conversation with the Chinese 
Assistant Minister Zhou Nan as follows: ‘[t]he Chinese had made it plain the 
negotiations were bilateral between Britain and China and that there should be a Joint 
Sino-British Announcement. If there were a separate Hong Kong announcement it 
would give the impression that Hong Kong was an equal third party’ (TNA: PREM 
19/1055). 
Intriguingly, the negotiation process was almost entirely conducted by senior 
government officials from China and the United Kingdom; senior government officials 
in Hong Kong were not even given the security clearance required to access 
information on the talks (Chung 2001: 30-31, 60-61). Therefore, the British and Beijing 
ruling elites held almost all of the power to decide Hong Kong’s future.  
 
6.3 Post-transitional Period 
 
Once British sovereignty over Hong Kong had been revoked, Hong Kong’s political 
system inherited the non-democratic features developed during the transitional 
                                                          
43 According to a government telegram (No. 651) on 8 July 1983, Youde’s statement to a journalist that 
he ‘was coming to Peking to represent the views of the Hong Kong people’ angered Zhou Nan, who 
refused to issue a visa to Peter Tsao, Director of Information Services of Hong Kong, to travel to China 
during the second phase of the talks, on the grounds that Tsao ‘was not a British official nor was he a 
member of the British delegation’ (TNA: PREM 19/1056). 
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period. Elite factions competed via various institutional mechanisms, such as 
functional constituencies and proportional representation by geographical 
constituency in the legislature and executive-led government. The opposition was 
largely unable generally lack of any capacity to challenge the power of the business-
oriented pro-Beijing ruling elites. 
Britain was no longer an influential international actor after the handover – 
practically by definition, as Hong Kong had become part of China under the principle 
of ‘one country, two systems’. In the mid-1990s, conflict had arisen between the last 
Hong Kong Governor, Chris Patten, and Beijing officials regarding political reform in 
Hong Kong. Patten attempted to use democratic policies to counteract Communism, 
mainly in response to the June Fourth Incident in Beijing in 1989. However, following 
the transfer of sovereignty from Britain to China in 1997, all debate and disputes had 
ended, and pre-Patten election methods were restored (see Lu 2009: 69-70, 84-101; 
Patten 1999: 34-35). Once Hong Kong had become part of China, external actors other 
than China had no significant influence on the pace and direction of democratic 
development in Hong Kong. 
 The business elites who maintained a good relationship with the Beijing 
government formed a ruling coalition in Hong Kong, monopolising political power and 
resisting any attempt to change the status quo. The appointment of local elites to 
government positions during the transitional period intensified the competition 
between elite factions to secure their own interests. Political power shifted from a 
pro-British faction to a pro-Beijing faction. The pro-Beijing ruling elites were supported 
by China’s coercive state capacity, such as the Hong Kong-based garrison of China’s 
Liberation Army. The opposition was generally weak and lacked the capacity to 
infiltrate the government.  
 
  
211 
 
State Capacity 
 
A non-democratic political system was installed in Hong Kong in line with an 
agreement between the British and Chinese governments in 1984. This system 
involved the indirect election of LegCo members from functional groups dominated 
by business elites. This electoral practice was maintained from the 1990s onwards, 
which contributed to the development of a non-democratic polity in Hong Kong. The 
oppositional forces, i.e. pro-democratic activists, were unable to initiate democratic 
reforms within Hong Kong’s highly pro-business political structure. 
After the handover, the political structure in Hong Kong was still heavily 
influenced by the principle of checks and balances (as discussed in Chapter 4).  In the 
name of maintaining stability and prosperity in Hong Kong, incumbents relied on 
business elites to preserve the status quo and thereby impede attempts to develop a 
genuine democracy. This resistance to democratic development was manifested in 
three main areas: government composition, law making and constitutional changes to 
political structure. 
Table 6.3 shows the changes in the composition of LegCo and the method of 
selecting its members. This arrangement can be traced back to Youde’s proposal for a 
progressive yet conservative reform of LegCo in the 1980s. The intention to rely on 
business elites as stabilising forces to deter democratisation is clear from the number 
of members returned by functional constituencies. These members made up at least 
50% of the seats in LegCo, which played a critical role in endorsing government bills. 
Members elected from functional constituencies (such as accountancy, architecture, 
surveying and planning, commerce, engineering, finance, Heung Yee Kuk, importation 
and exportation, industries, insurance, and textile and garment production) were 
predominantly business elites. These members were elected because most registered 
voters belonged to corporations and organisations; individuals working in the above 
professions did not have the right to vote in the elections.  
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Table 6.3 Composition of LegCo after Handover 
Term (year) 400-
member 
selection 
committee 
Members 
returned by 
an election 
committee 
Members 
returned by 
functional 
constituencies 
Members 
returned by 
geographical 
constituencies 
through direct 
elections 
Total 
Provisional 
Legislative 
Council (1996) 
 
60 (100%) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
60 
First (1998) - 10 (16.7) 30 (50%) 20 (33.3%) 60 
Second (2000) - 6 (10%) 30 (50%) 24 (40%) 60 
Third  (2004) - - 30 (50%) 30 (50%) 60 
Fourth (2008) - - 30 (50%) 30 (50%) 60 
Fifth (2012) - - 35 (50%) 35 (50%) 70 
Sixth (2016) - - 35 (50%) 35 (50%) 70 
Source: Basic Law (2015), Annex II; Legislative Council of the HKSAR government (2015) 
 
As a result, the voting habits of LegCo’s elected members were always pro-
establishment and in line with government policy. The members returned by 
geographical constituencies through direct elections were the only democratic 
element of the election process. Hong Kong’s elections utterly failed to meet the 
criteria for competitive democracy. In addition, the election process was constrained 
by the use of proportional representation to elect LegCo members from geographical 
constituencies, according to the Basic Law (2015). In other words, the seats were 
scattered among various political parties, including pro-Beijing parties. This 
arrangement ensured that at least 50% of LegCo members were affiliated with the 
pro-establishment camp. As a result, it was impossible for the opposition either to 
become the ruling party or to effectively monitor the government by constitutional 
means.  
Some additional legal provisions were made in the Basic Law to ensure that 
business elites were able to resist the demands of the opposition, i.e. democrats. In a 
document entitled ‘Procedures for Voting on Bills and Motions in the Legislative 
Council’, under the Basic Law (2015) Annex II, the following stipulation was made.  
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The passage of bills introduced by the government shall require at 
least a simple majority vote of the members of the Legislative 
Council present. The passage of motions, bills or amendments to 
government bills introduced by individual members of the 
Legislative Council shall require a simple majority vote of each of 
the two groups of members present: members returned by 
functional constituencies and those returned by geographical 
constituencies through direct elections and by the Election 
Committee. 
In addition, several provisions were made in the Basic Law to prevent any drastic 
changes to the pro-business elite political structure in post-1997 Hong Kong. 
According to Annex II, Clause 3 of the Basic Law (2015), ‘amendments must be made 
with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Council and 
the consent of the Chief Executive’. Therefore, the oppositional forces, i.e. democrats, 
were largely prevented from initiating democratic reform via constitutional means, as 
any changes to the political structure threatened to compromise the socio-economic 
and political power of the business elites. The incumbents in Hong Kong and China 
effectively monopolised political power in Hong Kong with the help of local business 
elites. 
 
International Actors 
 
After the handover, the international bargaining situation changed dramatically. The 
United Kingdom no longer played an important role in shaping Hong Kong’s political 
system. Under the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the British government had no 
statutory power to monitor the post-handover Hong Kong. The Basic Law drafted and 
promulgated by the Chinese government in 1990 44  became Hong Kong’s ‘mini-
constitution’. Under Article 13 of the Basic Law, the Central People’s Government of 
the PRC was responsible for the foreign affairs of the HKSAR. Along with the principle 
of ‘one country, two systems’ (Article 5), this institutional arrangement signifies that 
                                                          
44 The Chinese government took 4 years and 8 months to draft the Basic Law. The drafting committee 
consisted of 36 members from mainland China and 23 members from Hong Kong. For details of the 
drafting process, see Lu’s (2009: 64-68) memoirs. 
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any conflict between the Hong Kong and Beijing governments is a matter of internal 
affairs. Therefore, since the handover, no international actors have been able to 
significantly influence the political situation in Hong Kong. 
 
Local Elites 
 
As discussed in the previous section, both the British government and the Beijing 
government were deeply committed to promoting business elites to stabilise post-
transitional Hong Kong society. The development of constitutional arrangements in 
Hong Kong was based on indirect elections and the importance of business elites in 
formulating functional groups for the selection of LegCo and Chief Executive after 
1997. After 1997, elites from the business sector took the opportunity to acquire 
power and exercise their influence within the government to advocate a conservative 
polity prioritising the interests of business elites.  
The above political arrangements helped the ruling elites in post-transitional 
Hong Kong to exercise their power effectively. After the handover, LegCo was merely 
responsible for endorsing bills initiated by the HKSAR government. Ironically, only one 
private members’ bill gained the support of LegCo members returned by both 
functional and geographical constituencies.45 Apart from this isolated case in 2006, 
individual members’ bills initiated by geographical constituencies were banned by 
functional constituencies and vice versa. Along with the strategies used by business 
elites to monopolise the LegCo and the ExeCo, as discussed in Chapter 4, Hong Kong’s 
new constitutional framework almost entirely prevented opposition forces from 
pursuing genuine democratic reform.  
The opposition generally lacked the capacity to challenge the system. Article 
14 of the Basic Law stipulated that the Central People’s Government was responsible 
for defending Hong Kong. Lu (2009: 63) recalled Deng’s argument that stationing a 
                                                          
45 The Smoking (Public Health) (Amendment) Bill proposed by Dr Leong Che Hung (representing the 
Medical Functional Constituency). 
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garrison of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in Hong Kong was vital to stabilise 
society. In other words, coercive state capacity was dominated by the ruling elites and 
the opposition was only able to use institutionalised channels to advocate changes to 
the political system. 
Finally, there was even competition between pro-Beijing elite factions in Hong 
Kong’s post-transitional society. Under the framework of ‘one country, two systems’, 
the Beijing government was not permitted to actively intervene in Hong Kong 
politics.46  Members of local elite factions were thus obliged to demonstrate their 
loyalty to the Chinese government to join the circle of ruling elites. Unsurprisingly, 
competition was not only restricted to ruling elites versus opposition elites; direct 
competition occurred between elites from indigenous factions, former pro-
Communist workers’ associations and political parties with a pro-establishment 
platform in LegCo elections. The individual pro-Beijing elites C. Y. Leung and Henry 
Tang competed during the Chief Executive Election in 2012, and several pro-Beijing 
political groups – the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong 
Kong, the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions and the New People’s Party – 
competed in the 2016 LegCo election by geographical constituency (see Case 2008; 
Wong 2014; Wong 2015).  
In sum, the Chinese government inherited the strategies used by former British 
ruling elites to manipulate business elites for political ends. The post-transition 
predominance of pro-Beijing business elites was responsible for the failure to establish 
a democratic political structure in Hong Kong. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that a conflict of interests between external actors led to the 
monopoly of political power by local business elites in post-transitional Hong Kong. 
                                                          
46 Based on evidence gathered during my informal meetings from 2013 to 2015 with various senior 
Chinese government officials affiliated with the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council 
and the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government of the HKSAR. 
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Like Singapore, Hong Kong is a disputed territory. During decolonisation and the 
transfer of sovereignty from Britain to China, the pace and direction of 
democratisation were mainly determined by negotiation between ruling elites from 
China and the United Kingdom. In advance of the expiry of the lease on the New 
Territories, negotiations were held from 1982 to 1984 to discuss the future of Hong 
Kong. These negotiations were significantly influenced by the international bargaining 
situation, which was in turn affected by numerous historical developments, such as 
the Chinese Civil War, the Vietnam War, China’s Cultural Revolution, Cold War 
sentiment and decolonisation. The major actors in the negotiation process sought to 
preserve their own interests in the process of transition. 
Empirical data suggest that the Chinese ruling elites sought to resume 
sovereignty over Hong Kong with the framework of ‘one country, two systems’. This 
allowed Hong Kong to retain political, economic, social and judicial systems distinct 
from those of China. In contrast, the British ruling elites sought to maintain the 
economic stability and prosperity of Hong Kong to uphold the interests of British 
investors. In terms of political interests, the British decision makers wished to prevent 
Communist China from intervening directly in Hong Kong’s affairs after the handover. 
Therefore, a non-democratic political structure was developed by the British ruling 
elites during the transitional period in the 1980s to empower pro-establishment 
business elites. The resulting institutional arrangements, such as indirect elections and 
functional constituencies made up of professional groups, were fully inherited and 
advanced by the Chinese government after the handover. 
The above political structure has prevented opposition forces from challenging 
the dominance of ruling elites in Hong Kong’s post-transitional society. They also lack 
the capacity to amend or challenge the current political system due to interlocking 
mechanisms imposed in the Basic Law, and military power is firmly controlled by the 
Central People’s Government of the PRC. Under the current institutional 
arrangements, Hong Kong is expected to remain a deviant autocracy for the 
foreseeable future. 
  
217 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
 
The recent challenges from the opposition in Singapore and Hong Kong against the 
ruling elites demonstrate that the study of deviant autocracies is relevant to both 
scholars of democratisation and democratic practitioners. Not only the start of the 
Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong, but also the result of the latest 2016 Legislative 
Council election indeed surprised the Chinese ruling elites as well as the local 
democrats. The extremists who embrace the idea of self-determination or 
independence of Hong Kong attained a surprising and ground-breaking victory for six 
seats in the Legislative Council with 15.5% or 280,000 support of the voters to replace 
the moderate democrats (Legislative Council Election 2016). In view of this latest 
development, this thesis can shed light on the emergent as well as the consolidation 
of deviant autocracies through the lens of neo actor-based analysis. The 
fragmentation of elite interests apparently is not only restricted to the competition of 
ruling elites versus opposition, but also competition within the opposition clearly 
played a role. The fragmentation of the opposition dispersed its power. As a 
consequence the power of the autocratic ruling elites in Hong Kong can then further 
be consolidated. Not only Hong Kong, but also Singapore can still be classified as 
deviant autocracies. 
Deviant autocracies are an understudied area. The literature review in Chapter 
2 discussed the development of studies on democratisation, including democratic 
consolidation, transitions to democracy, hybrid regimes, deviant democracies and the 
persistency of autocracies. This overview showed that understanding deviant 
autocracies has not yet received much attention. The aim of this thesis was to explain 
and understand deviant autocracies. To serve this purpose, Chapter 3 demonstrated 
the existence of deviant autocracies and mapped them using the latest empirical data. 
This part was based on large-N cross national statistical analyses. The emergence of 
deviant autocracies in the 1970s is an empirical puzzle for scholars of democratisation, 
218 
 
and specifically for the proponents of structural explanations. I argued that the 
development of a neo actor-based approach can help us to understand the selected 
outliers, Hong Kong and Singapore. This part of the study moved from quantitative to 
qualitative analyses. I conducted in-depth archival research of two cases, applying the 
process- tracing method.  
A new analytical framework, neo actor-based analysis, was developed in 
Chapter 4 to analyse the interactions between state capacity, international actors and 
local elites. The analytical framework was applied in the case of Singapore (Chapter 5) 
and Hong Kong (Chapter 6) to account for the absence of transition to democracy 
during the transitional period, and showed how different ruling elites contributed to 
the persistency of autocratic political structures in the post-transitional period. In view 
of the influence of international actors, the identified outliers are all former colonies 
of European powers and involved disputes during the process of decolonisation. This 
process involved various international actors during the transitional period together 
with international or regional events that shaped the international bargaining 
situation. The local elites then competed with each other to secure their interests in 
the process. The pro-establishment and interest-oriented business elites, in particular, 
were empowered by the colonial ruling elites to protect their interests after 
independence or the transfer of sovereignty. Hence, the ruling elites, mainly the 
business and professional elites, were able to dominate the state power in the post-
transitional period. They relied on their coercive capacity to provide institutional 
means to legitimate the exercise of authority, and opposition could hardly challenge 
the status quo within the political framework. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
the ruling elites in the post-transitional period also relied on sustaining a high level of 
economic development, delivering public goods, reinforcing patron-client and 
reciprocal relationships to solidify their control in authoritarian regimes and 
legitimising their authority. These measures can be used to effectively resist demands 
for democratisation and enhance the durability of the autocratic regime (also see 
Bellows 1967; Case 1996, 2005 and 2009; Chan and Kwok 1999; Croissant 2014; Chua 
1995, 2000 and 2010; Chua and Tan 1999; George 2000 and 2007; Hewison 1999a; 
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Khan 2005; Kuan 1991; Kwong 2007; Ortmann 2014a; Overholt 2001; Rao and Wang 
2007; Rodan and Jayasuriya 2009; So 2000; Thompson 2012). 
My thesis is opening up a new research agenda in the studies of 
democratisation, namely the study of deviant autocracies. This thesis also developed 
an analytical tool to examine the dynamics of international actors, local elites and 
state capacity to understand the rationale behind various major political elites, both 
internally and externally during the decision making process. This analytical tool can 
help us to explain the absence of democratic transition in cases classified as deviant 
autocracies. At the empirical level, this thesis contributes to our empirical knowledge 
of the cases of Hong Kong and Singapore with the declassified government documents 
via archival research. 
To conclude this thesis, this chapter is divided into four sections. First, I will 
summarise the major empirical findings from a comparative perspective, highlighting 
the findings of both large-N and small-N analyses. In the second section, I present the 
contributions of this thesis in four domains: theoretical, analytical, methodological 
and empirical. In the third section I discuss the potential limitations of the study and 
how to alleviate the problems. In the last part I highlight the agenda for future 
research in the area of deviant autocracies.  
 
7.1 Empirical Findings from a Comparative Perspective 
 
This thesis aimed to detect deviant autocracies. The large-N analysis in Chapter 3 
served two major purposes. The first was to replicate the major structural 
explanations in studying the transition to democracy. A significant body of literature 
has replicated the argument of the structural explanation, i.e. the positive effect of 
economic development on the transition to democracy. However, caution should be 
exercised in interpreting the findings in the literature, because previous studies used 
data sets that excluded most of the deviant autocracies identified in this thesis. In 
other words, they omitted the effect of deviant autocracies when explaining 
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democratisation. The results of this study, based on a data set covering 167 countries 
from 1960 to 2011, suggest that economic development still has a significant positive 
relationship with and is the most important predicator of the level of democracy. The 
second major empirical finding is that the number of cases categorised as deviant 
autocracies increased dramatically from three to eight cases by 1970. Even with the 
waves of democratisation among Southern European and Latin American countries in 
the 1980s (see Doorenspleet 2000; Huntington 1991), the total number of deviant 
autocracies has not diminished since the 1980s. By 2010, the number of outliers had 
increased to 11 cases, including Bahrain, Brunei, Equatorial Guinea, Hong Kong, 
Kuwait, Macau, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. 
From a theoretical perspective, identifying the deviant autocracies is beneficial 
for scholars to re-examine the major tenets of structural explanations. The following 
section summarises the major findings derived from the small-N analysis. 
 
International Actors 
 
The study of both the case of Singapore and the case of Hong Kong showed that the 
transitional period of decolonisation, together with disputes between various 
international actors combined with the Cold War situation, contributed to the 
emergence of deviant autocracies. The disputed transition dragged different 
international actors into the troubled waters. The international bargaining context 
affected the decision of the international actors during the transitional period and 
empowered the autocratic ruling elites.  
In both cases, the emergence of deviant autocracies was related to the 
troubled international situation due to the Cold War mentality and the precipitating 
threat of communist infiltration by the former ruling elites during the transitional 
period. The examined cases were subject to communist insurgence activities during 
the transitional period. In Hong Kong, especially in the 1960s, the leftist movement 
backed by the CCP in China significantly divided the society into pro-communist and 
pro-nationalist groups, which after the handover became pro-Beijing and pro-
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democratic fractions. Hong Kong has a long history of communist activities, such as 
the existence of the renowned communist-controlled newspaper, Wen Hui Po, since 
1948. Various leftist labour unions, such as the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions, 
actively escalated the anti-colonial riots in 1967. Consequently, in the negotiation with 
the Chinese government, the British ruling elites were eager to recruit and manipulate 
the pro-establishment business elites to fill important positions for post-handover 
Hong Kong to resist communisation. In contrast, the Beijing ruling elites strived to 
build social networks and reciprocal relationships with the local elites who had 
business links with mainland China to counteract the pro-British and pro-democracy 
forces. Those local elites became the backbone of the ruling elites in the post-
transitional society. In the same vein, Singapore in the 1950s was also fused by the 
danger of communist infiltration of the Chinese community via the Chinese schools 
and trade unions of the CCP in China and the MCP in Malaya. Under the menace of 
communism, the former colonial ruling elites had to ensure the post-transitional 
society was free from the control of communist or potential pro-communist elites. As 
a result, the business elites in Hong Kong took the opportunity to dominate the 
political powers due to the mistrust between the Chinese and British governments in 
the negotiation over the future of Hong Kong. Similarly, the local elites and the leader 
of the PAP in Singapore re-packaged themselves as anti-communist fighters in the 
transitional period, which enabled them to dominate the political powers of Singapore 
for half a century. 
 
Local Elites 
 
The business and professional elites were empowered during the transitional period. 
Singapore and Hong Kong had both been trading hubs for the colonial rulers since the 
nineteenth century. The British colonies in the Asia Pacific region, especially Hong 
Kong and Singapore, served various political, military and economic interests for the 
coloniser and the entire British colonial system. The transitional period involved the 
decision makers in settling the issues related to the transfer of sovereignty of the 
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colonies. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the business elites in Singapore were 
empowered by the British ruling elites as early as the 1940s, immediately after the 
process of de-colonisation began. The local elites were absorbed by the colonial rulers 
through co-optation. The local business elites were appointed by the Governor of 
Singapore to take up important positions in the government, such as membership of 
the Legislative Council, to ensure that the implemented policies would not pose any 
threat to British interests. During the transitional period, especially after the Rendel 
Constitution, the competition for power intensified between different elite fractions. 
The other group of professional elites, the PAP, rose to power after the 1959 election. 
The leader of the PAP was pragmatic, emphasising the survival of the nation and 
economic development. Since then, the PAP government has imposed various 
measures to limit individual freedom and political rights in the name of national 
interests to further consolidate the autocratic regime (see Chapter 5).  
Hong Kong’s pro-establishment business elites gained power due to various 
events in the region. The difference between the socio-economic and political systems 
of mainland China and British Hong Kong meant that Hong Kong inevitably became a 
shelter for refugees from China when there was internal turmoil and political 
instability, especially during the period of confrontation between the Chinese 
Nationalist Party and the Chinese Community Party in the 1940s and the Cultural 
Revolution in the 1960s and 70s. Hence, Hong Kong was regarded as a borrowed place, 
living on borrowed time (see Hughes 1976). Significant numbers of refugees fled to 
Hong Kong, including the business elites, who made a significant contribution to the 
city’s rapid economic growth (Lau and Liu 1984: 176; Young 1992: 25).  
Chapter 6 discussed how the Hong Kong ruling elites in the 1970s were eager 
to promote the economy to increase the bargaining power with the Chinese 
government regarding the future of Hong Kong. The migrant business elites and their 
decedents eventually become important stakeholders in promoting and maintaining 
the economy of Hong Kong. Their prime concern was retaining the status quo and 
avoiding any major changes that may jeopardise their vested interests. These business 
elites eventually became targets for both British and Chinese ruling elites to empower 
and counteract each other in safeguarding British and Chinese interests. They became 
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a significant pro-establishment force, resisting any attempt to democratise the 
political structure. Eventually, the ruling elites in Britain and China empowered the 
business elites with various institutional arrangements, to resist any drastic changes 
in Hong Kong after the return of sovereignty to China. Those arrangements basically 
reinforced the non-democratic nature of Hong Kong’s political system. 
The unprecedented economic growth and empowerment of the business and 
professional elites during the decolonisation and transitional period contributed to 
the domination of the elites in the political arena and reinforced the existence of 
deviant autocracies in Singapore and Hong Kong. Those elites played a critical role in 
hindering the democratic development of both cases. 
 The empowered business and professional elites are the opposite of critical 
democrats (see Blaug 2002; Qi and Shin 2011). The self-interested elites with 
significant political power that could impede democratisation and reinforce 
authoritarian governance to protect and safeguard their economic and political 
interests were the major reason for the emergence and consolidation of deviant 
autocracies. The empowerment of the pro-establishment elite was the result of the 
interaction between international actors influenced by the international bargaining 
situation.  
On the one hand, the business elites were opportunists who fully understood 
that the process of decolonisation after the Second World War would inevitably 
involve a power transition from colonial elites to local elites. An increasing number of 
elites, mainly Western educated, were appointed to take up senior government 
positions, for instance as members of the Legislative Council and Executive Council, 
providing an opportunity for them to become important stakeholders in the process 
of transition. On the other hand, the empowered local elites were skilful enough to 
present themselves as loyal and reliable to the colonial rulers and gained the trust of 
the colonial ruling elites. They gave the impression that they could safeguard British 
interests after the transition and independence. More importantly, it was believed 
that the resultant system would be immune to communism under the leadership of 
pro-establishment local elites.  
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State Capacity  
 
In terms of state capacity, the autocratic ruling elites made use of the institutional 
arrangement to dominate political power. In both cases, the constitution stipulated 
various measures to ensure the power of the ruling elites. Prior to the transitional 
period, the colonial political structure heavily relied on the co-optation of the business 
elites to ensure political stability and the prosperity of society. The business elites’ 
interests were represented in the non-democratic government institutions. As 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the colonial ruling elites appointed the business elites 
to take up important positions inside the government. During the transitional period, 
there were different levels of competition for interests among the international actors 
and local elites, influenced by the international bargaining situation. The British ruling 
elites in the process of decolonisation and transfer of sovereignty intentionally 
transferred the state power to the interest-oriented business elites who were 
perceived as being able to uphold British interests in the post-transitional society. 
Hence, the state apparatus was fully controlled by the PAP and pro-establishment 
business and professional elites in Singapore and Hong Kong, respectively. 
With their coercive power, the ruling elites in a post-transitional society can 
make use of legitimation, repression and co-optation to stabilise the autocratic regime. 
The small-N analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 showed that legitimation could be attained 
with gerrymandered electoral law, with ‘elections’ skewed towards the interests of 
the ruling elites. The opposition had no choice but to follow the rules set by the ruling 
elites, as they could hardly take power within the existing institutional arrangement. 
Repressive measures were also adopted to control society. In the case of Singapore, 
in particular, the Internal Security Act, the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance 
and the Societies Ordinance effectively deterred the opposition from challenging the 
authority of the PAP and its leaders. Similar measures in Hong Kong, such as the Public 
Order Ordinance, were reinforced to discourage any attempts to change the status 
quo. Both cases also suggest that the ruling elites also used co-optation to absorb 
elites into the government. This further reinforced the patron-client relationships (see 
Chapter 4) and ensured the interests of the ruling elites and those who were closely 
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linked with the ruling cycle. In short, the state power enabled the ruling elites to rule 
out any institutional means of introducing genuine democracy. In the absence of a 
transition to democracy, the autocratic regime became relatively stable. 
In short, the result of the small-N analyses suggests that examine the 
interactions of international actors, local elites and state capacity can enable us to 
explain and understand the deviant autocracies. Those factors are essential for one to 
understand other deviant autocracies in future, as they had also experienced similar 
international bargaining context, such as disputed decolonisation process and Cold 
War situation. Internally, the empowered ruling elites also strived to manipulate the 
state power to secure their interests. To avoid the danger of overgeneralisation, this 
thesis has no intention to generalise the findings to the ‘normal’ autocracies. The 
major difference between deviant autocracies and ‘normal’ autocracies lies in the 
independent explanatory factor, levels of economic development. For countries with 
low levels of development and low levels of democracy, the existing literature on 
persistency of autocracy discussed in Chapter 2 has already provided detailed 
descriptions of the theories, explanations and empirical evidence from previous 
studies. 
 
7.2 Contributions of My Thesis 
 
This thesis contributed to the theoretical discussion in the following ways. The first 
contribution is the opening up of a new research agenda for scholars concerning the 
transition, and the absence of transition, to democracy. An increasing number of 
scholars are calling for a systemic way of investigating deviant autocracies (see 
Doorenspleet 2012: 202; Seeberg 2014: 684). The quantitative data presented in 
Chapter 3 indeed supported the claim that the number of deviant autocracies has 
increased in recent decades. Nevertheless, the literature shows that structural 
explanations are still robust when explaining and predicting democratic transition and 
consolidation in comparative perspective. In addition, previous quantitative inquiries 
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have ignored the outliers in the data collection and analysis procedures. A more 
systematic way to study deviant autocracies is essential and necessary to understand 
and explain why they go against the odds. Given the paucity of studies on deviant 
cases of democratisation, especially deviant autocracies, this thesis contributes to the 
field by identifying an empirical puzzle and mapping the outliers with up-to-date, 
quantitative, cross-sectional data. To understand deviant autocracies, two small-N 
case studies on Hong Kong and Singapore were conducted based on the de-classified 
internal government archive documents to elucidate the decision-making elites and 
interactions between different local elites that contributed to the emergence of 
autocratic political structures.  
Another theoretical contribution of this study is to recognise and conceptualise 
the term deviant autocracies in the field of democratisation and autocracy. The idea 
of deviant autocracies refers to outliers that have a high level of economic 
development but a non-democratic political structure. Based on the findings, I argued 
that deviant autocracies can be understood at two levels. The first level is more of an 
operational level. As illustrated in Chapter 3, the existing cross-country dataset lacks 
quantifiable data on the identified deviant cases for direct comparisons. Consequently, 
previous quantitative analyses have largely failed to consider deviant autocracies, 
which is why this empirical puzzle of the emergence of deviant autocracies still 
remains largely intact in the literature. The second level is conceptual: the term 
deviant autocracies used here is different from the current categorisation of 
autocratic typologies (see Cheibub et al. 2010; Geddes 1999; Hadenius and Teorell 
2007; Kailitz 2013, Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius 2013). Instead of adding a new 
typology to the current classification of autocracies, this thesis highlights a new 
research domain for further research projects. The existence of deviant autocracies is 
very different from our current understanding of typical, structurally driven 
democratisation. Basically, economic development is commonly regarded as a catalyst 
for democratisation and professional elites are often perceived as the backbone 
supporting democratic movement. Examination of the socio-economic situation of the 
identified cases reveals that they all possess a high level of economic development 
with a significant proportion of highly educated people. According to the existing 
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structural explanations, these deviant autocracies should already have become 
democratic. Hence, the existence of these outliers should be considered seriously in 
future research projects on democratisation.  
In terms of the analytical contribution, with the increasing number of deviant 
autocracies, as illustrated in Chapter 3, an analytical tool is needed for researchers 
seeking to explain and understand those outliers. This thesis developed a neo actor-
based analysis to analyse two selected deviant autocracies, Singapore and Hong Kong, 
to investigate the concerns of the ruling elites in the decision-making process and how 
they may have affected the likelihood of transition to democracy. To better 
understand the elite decision-making process, Chapter 4 relied on the existing actor-
based approach together with the additional lens of elite theory, a model of the elite 
bargaining process and elite-structure paradigms to formulate a new analytical tool to 
examine the deviant autocracies during the transitional period. The specific focus on 
the transitional period is important in understanding the rise of deviant autocracies, 
because this period is normally associated with many structural and societal changes. 
Examining the process of change enables us to understand the rationale behind 
various major political elites, both internally and externally, during the decision-
making process. International actors and their interactions with the local elites are 
crucial in determining the direction of a country’s post-transitional political structure, 
whether moving towards democracy or authoritarianism. This tool is potentially useful 
for researchers to analyse other deviant autocracies in the future. 
Another contribution of this study is the research methodology, which 
involved the triangulation of quantitative and qualitative methods to map out and 
analyse the deviant autocracies. In Chapter 3, a large-N quantitative analysis was used 
to identify the deviant autocracies. The data indicate that the number of outliers has 
increased in recent decades, especially cases that go against the prediction of the 
structural explanations. To explain this empirical puzzle, Chapters 5 and 6 used a small-
N qualitative method with a neo actor-based analysis, using archival data to trace how 
the autocratic ruling elites managed to secure political power in Singapore and Hong 
Kong. The application of a neo actor-based analysis made it possible to scrutinise how 
the different actors contributed to the emergence of autocratic regimes among the 
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deviant autocracies. Historically, scholars supporting the structural approach and 
actor-based approach rarely communicated with each other (Doorenspleet 2005: 78). 
Quantitative analyses were generally conducted at a broader level to identify the 
possible factors that may explain democratic transitions, while qualitative approaches 
mainly focused on in-depth analyses of single case studies. The application of mixed 
methods is beneficial for scholars concerned about the transition to democracy and 
its absence. The use of triangulation in this study made it possible to detect and verify 
the empirical puzzle in Chapter 3 and closely examine the selected outliers. This study 
has taken the initial step in mapping and studying deviant autocracies. 
This thesis also made an empirical contribution. The use of the latest de-
classified archival data to study the cases in Chapters 5 and 6 can enhance our 
understanding of deviant autocracies. As discussed in Chapter 4, the application of 
archival research to analyse deviant autocracies can provide a meticulous lens to 
understand the obstacles hampering democratic development during the transitional 
period. The archival data used in Chapters 5 and 6 for the cases of Singapore and Hong 
Kong are from the National Archive stored in London, United Kingdom. The archive 
provides valuable data covering Hong Kong’s transitional period during the 
negotiations between the British and Chinese governments about its future in the 
1980s. In the case of Singapore, the archive data also provide a comprehensive 
account of the discussion among the major decision making elites about the 
distribution of political power prior to de-colonisation during the 1950s and 60s and 
after it became an independent sovereign state in 1965.  
In general, the archive data have merely been used by historians to describe 
and understand specific political events, whereas this thesis used this important 
source of data to engage with the literature on democratisation and explain the 
empirical puzzle of the emergence of deviant autocracies. Furthermore, the data used 
in the case of Hong Kong (Chapter 6) have only recently been de-classified by the 
British government. The talks between Britain and China were conducted in the early 
1980s. The British government’s 30-year rule stipulated in the Public Records Act 1958 
means that documents are only available to the public 30 years after their creation. 
The data used in Chapter 6 have recently been made available to the public and have 
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not yet been systemically analysed by researchers to explain democratic non-
transitions.  
More importantly, archival research can provide valuable data for studying 
deviant autocracies in future. The identified deviant cases, such as Bahrain, Brunei, 
Hong Kong, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates were 
former British colonies or protectorates. Analysis of the British internally de-classified 
documents offers an important insider’s account to facilitate understanding of the 
decision-making process among the ruling elites. It may offer clues for understanding 
the absence of transition to democracy among the deviant autocracies.  
In the process of identifying the deviant autocracies, this thesis involved a 
rigorous procedure of handling the missing data for large-N analyses in explaining 
democratic transitions and non-transitions. As discussed in Chapter 3, existing large-
N studies on structural explanations overlooked the outliers, especially deviant 
autocracies, and thus failed to include those cases in their analyses. More importantly, 
the existing cross-country data also ignored deviant autocracies, and thus failed to 
provide comparable data for quantitative statistical analysis. For example, the Polity 
dataset (Marshall et al. 2011) did not cover cases such as Hong Kong, Macau and 
Brunei. To complete the data set, a detailed data mining and coding process was 
conducted with reference to the Polity coding procedure to ensure the reliability and 
validity of the data (see Chapter 3). This procedure could provide valuable empirical 
data for quantitative analyses to detect deviant autocracies.   
 
7.3 Research Limitations 
 
With regard to research limitations, the first is related to the measurement of 
democracy and autocracy. This thesis relied on the existing Polity scores and adopted 
the minimalist definition of democracy. There are pros and cons to using this 
measurement. As discussed in Chapter 2, various databases are used to measure 
levels of democracy. However, they are all subject to either limited coverage or 
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restricted usage; they cannot be used to replicate the findings of structural 
explanations or to map out deviant autocracies. In general, Polity scores may not be 
very accurate for measuring consolidated democracies, but are no doubt useful and 
accurate indicators for detecting deviant autocracies when cross-checked with the 
political structure and electoral laws of the identified deviant autocracies. Without 
question, such cases fail to fulfil the criteria of a minimalist definition of a democracy. 
More importantly, many studies support the claim that Singapore and Hong Kong are 
non-democratic or autocratic (see Chan and Kwok 1999; George 2007; Kuan and Lau 
2002; Lau and Kuan 2000; Marshall et al. 2011; Mauzy and Milne 2002; Means 1996; 
Møller and Skanning 2013b; Reilly 2013; Rodan 2003; Rodan and Jayasuriya 2009; Roy 
1994; Sing 1996, 2004; Slater 2012). 
Another potential limitation is the generalisability of the analytical framework 
and small-N analysis findings. The deviant case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 show that 
the Cold War situation and decolonisation intensified the conflicts between various 
international actors and local elites. The business elites were empowered during the 
transitional period to protect the interests of the international actors in the post-
transitional society. Did these highly contingent events only happen in the selected 
cases? To what extent can the findings be generalised to other deviant autocracies? 
With reference to the deviant autocracies detected in Chapter 3, all of the cases had 
two historical elements in common: they were colonised by European powers and 
disputes over their decolonisation or transfer of sovereignty were fused with post 
Second World War anti-communist sentiment. These highly continental historical 
events also coincidently occurred in the context of other deviant autocracies. Hence, 
a neo actor-based analysis can also be used to analyse the interactions between state 
capacity, international actors and local elites to explain and understand other deviant 
autocracies. 
The last concern is related to the data collection method. The small-N analysis 
was heavily based on archive materials to process trace how the deviant autocracies 
emerged. One may question how the motivation of elites can be revealed without 
direct interaction with them. There are two perspectives to consider when addressing 
this issue. From a methodological point of view, the process tracing method together 
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with archive research is an ideal combination for studying and identifying the 
motivates of the actors (see Chapters 1 and 4). On a practical level, in-depth interviews 
cannot be conducted with the major decision makers from the 1950s and 1960s in the 
case of Singapore or the 1980s in the case of Hong Kong, because most of the 
important actors have passed away, including Lee Kuan Yew, Margaret Thatcher, Deng 
Xiaoping and Sir Edward Youde, to name a few. Hence, we can only rely on the official 
government records and memoirs of the elites to defragment and distinguish their 
viewpoints. 
Another issue is how to evaluate China’s interests in the case of Hong Kong. As 
it was one of the major international actors, information about China’s interests 
largely comes from the internal British government archive documents. As discussed 
in Chapter 6, the archive documents in China are restricted. Accessing the materials 
involves sophisticated administrative procedures and censorship. The disclosed 
materials are on non-sensitive topics and only available to local Chinese people with 
a valid identity card and reference letter or endorsement from the relevant Chinese 
government department. The Archives Law of the People’s Republic of China was only 
ratified in 1987, so the materials in the State Archives Administration of the People’s 
Republic of China are not ideal for analysing the situation in the 1970s and early 1980s 
during the transitional period of Hong Kong. In contrast, the documents from the 
National Archives in London provide a very detailed description of the meetings 
between British and Chinese officials. The official records include the minutes of 
official meetings and reports of unofficial meetings, such as banquets between 
officials. These documents precisely capture all of the details of the events, including 
the dialogues, the meeting venues and their decoration, trip schedules, personal 
biographies of the actors, non-verbal gestures, etc. They accurately reflect how the 
Chinese officials responded during the negotiations. To avoid the bias of solely relying 
on British documents to reflect Chinese interests in the issue of Hong Kong, I cross-
checked with other sources and materials to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the 
reports and minutes. I examined the memoirs of the Chinese government officials, 
including Lu Ping (2009), Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the State Council of 
the People's Republic of China from 1978 to 1997, and Sir Sze-yuen Chung (2001), 
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Senior Chinese Unofficial Member of the Legislative Council from 1974 to 1978 and 
Senior Chinese Unofficial Member of the Executive Council from 1980 to 1988, which 
confirmed that the British archive documents accurately reported the ideas and 
stance of the Chinese government officials during the meetings. 
 
7.4 What Next? Directions for Future Research 
 
The middle class politics in the deviant autocracies posit an interesting direction for 
the future research. Middle class actors are often perceived as the backbone for 
supporting democratic movements (see Lipset et al. 1993; Lipset 1994; Moore 1966). 
But in the cases of Singapore and Hong Kong, the highly educated professional and 
business ruling elites served as reactionary force at point of decolonisation and tend 
to promote a stable autocracy rather than democracy in the post-transitional society. 
On the contrary, in view of the recent challenges from the opposition, such as the 
Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and victory of the Workers’ Party in Singapore 
suggested that the new middle class actors seem to demand for democratisation. In 
future research, it will be interesting to investigate the intensification of elite 
competitions between the conservation elites, traditional and new oppositional forces, 
and its effect on persistency of deviant autocracies. 
Future research could apply the neo actor-based approach to study other 
deviant autocracies. This thesis conducted two small-N analyses to process trace how 
Singapore and Hong Kong became deviant autocracies in the first place. The analytical 
framework also highlighted the importance of interaction between state capacity, 
international actors and local elites during the transitional period. It will be 
theoretically beneficial to study all of the outliers systematically. Eleven deviant 
autocracies were detected in Chapter 3; using the analytical approach proposed in this 
thesis to study those cases would further enhance the generalisability and explanatory 
power of the model. More importantly, it would improve our understanding of the 
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absence of transition among the high-income countries, which is an understudied area 
in the study of democratisation and autocracy. 
Another direction for future research is to develop a new theory to 
conceptualise and draw inferences on the issues concerning deviant autocracies. The 
analytical approach developed in this thesis is a middle-range theory, and there are 
still many unanswered questions. As a new sub-field in the study of autocracy, how 
does it differ from the existing theoretical explanations of hybrid and autocratic 
regimes? How are failed transitions to democracy different from other kinds of 
autocracies? The development of a new theoretical model can be developed with 
reference to the emergence of deviant autocracies would make a significant 
contribution to our knowledge. 
Finally, future research on deviant autocracies can derive quantitative 
variables for large-N analyses. A lot of work needs to be done to identify, 
conceptualise and operationalise the factors that can establish causal explanations on 
the emergence and consolidation of deviant autocracies. The potential variables may 
relate to different types of former British colonies, elite fragmentation and the 
involvement of international actors in the transitional process. The conceptualisation 
and operationalisation of the above variables for large-N analysis may involve the 
combined efforts of various experts, including both normative and empirical scholars. 
In addition to quantitative analyses, mixed methods can be used to further understand 
the issues related to deviant autocracies (see Lieberman 2005; Morse and Niehaus 
2009). For example, qualitative data may serve as an explorative study to develop new 
variables for further quantitative investigation. To further investigate this research 
topic, a neo actor-based analysis could be used to study the transitional period of all 
of the deviant autocracies. After obtaining qualitative data from individual cases, the 
next stage is to evaluate the feasibility of identifying measureable variables for 
quantitative analysis. To implement this plan, we need to overcome technical 
problems such as the operationalisation and availability of data for mining and 
comparison. 
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Practical Implications of My Study 
 
Recent political confrontations in Singapore and Hong Kong indicate that the 
opposition has learnt how to maximise its bargaining power to challenge the ruling 
elites. In Hong Kong, democrats launched the Umbrella Movement that occupied the 
financial district to urge the incumbent rulers to provide genuine democratic elections. 
This civil disobedience movement, which involved several thousands of protesters, 
occupied the major roads in the city centre. Yet, despite protests and demonstrations 
over civil liberties and political rights occurring quite frequently in Hong Kong, the 
movement did not achieve its aims and the government used riot police to crack down 
on it. The opposition forces in Hong Kong are aware that the existing formal 
institutional arrangements are far from effective for expressing their demands for 
democratisation. In the future, they may use more radical and non-institutional means 
of challenging the ruling elites. 
The opposition in Singapore also continues to exert pressure on the ruling 
elites within the existing institutional framework. Dr Chee Soon Juan, leader of the 
opposition Singapore Democratic Party, has been jailed several times in the past 15 
years for confronting leaders of the governing People’s Action Party. At a seminar in 
Hong Kong on 6 November 2014, Dr Chee and his core party members explained that 
they have learnt how to play the role of opposition. They abide by laws and regulations 
when criticising Singaporean government officials and policies to avoid arrest or 
suppression. Not surprisingly, another element of the opposition, the Workers’ Party, 
has managed to survive in the stunted parliamentary general elections despite the 
repressive measures imposed by the ruling elites. 
This study was conducted amidst the intensified struggle between the ruling 
elites and various oppositional forces in Singapore and Hong Kong. The opposition 
elites seem to have realised that traditional ways of struggling for democratisation are 
far from effective in societies with high levels of economic development. They are 
willing to change strategies to challenge the autocratic regimes. Thus, it is time for 
scholars of democratisation and comparative politics to take the study of deviant 
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autocracies more seriously. Further research on this understudied area will not only 
add to the knowledge and enhance the theory in the field, but will also provide useful 
strategies for democratic practitioners. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: List of Major Actors – Singapore 
 
Major Actor  
(Highlighted in the 
Archival Documents) 
Affiliation/Position 
A. M. MacKintosh Head of South East Department at the Colonial Office, 
1952 to 1955 
Ahmad bin 
Mohammed Ibrahim 
Advocate and Solicitor, Singapore; 
State Advocate-General of the State of Singapore, 1959 to 
1965 
Alan Lennox-Boyd Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1954 to 1959 
Anthony Gann Assistant Principal, Colonial Office 
Cecil Francis Smith Managing Director of Sime Darby & Co., Ltd. 
Dato Seth (aka Dato 
Seth bin Mohamed 
Said) 
State Secretary of Johor, 1953 to 1956; 
Malay Rulers’ Representatives on the Federation of Malaya 
Constitutional Conference 
David Marshall First Chief Minister of Singapore, 1955 to 1956; 
Labour Front, 1954 to 1957; 
Founder of Workers’ Party of Singapore, 1957 to 1963 
Dr. Goh Keng Swee Core member in the People’s Action Party; 
Minister for Finance, 1959 to 1965; 
Minister for the Interior and Defence, 1965 to 1967; 
Minister for Finance, 1967 to 1970; 
Minister for Defence, 1970 to 1979; 
Minister for Education, 1979 to 1980; 
Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, 1973 to 1984 
Dr. Toh Chin Chye Chairman of the People’s Action Party, 1954 to 1981; 
Reader in Physiology, University of Singapore, 1958 to 
1964; 
Member of the Singapore Parliament, 1959 to 1988; 
Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, 1965 to 1968; 
Minister for Science and Technology, 1968 to 1975; 
Minister for Heath, 1975 to 1981 
E. N. Larmour Singapore Governor’s Secretary 
G. W. Tory United Kingdom High Commissioner to Malaya, 1957 to 
1963 
G.A.P. Sutherland Manager of the Chartered Bank, Singapore 
George Douglas-
Hamilton (aka The 
Earl of Selkirk) 
United Kingdom Commissioner for Singapore and South 
East Asia, 1959 to 1963 
Gerald Templer High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya, 1952 to 1954 
H.S. Lee President of Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce; 
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Chairman, Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce of 
Malaya 
Harold Wilson Prime Minister of United Kingdom, 1964 to 1970 and 1974 
to 1976 
Henry Gurney High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya, 1948 to 1951 
Iain Macleod Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1959 to 1961 
Ian Buchanan Watt Principal, Colonial Office, 1946 to 1955 
J. B. Johnston Head of the Far Eastern Department of the Colonial Office, 
1956 to 1957 
J. D. Higham Head of Eastern (later South East Asia) Department, 
Colonial Office, 1949 to 1952. 
J. J. Paskin Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonial Office 
J. V. Rob British High Commissioners to Singapore, 1965 to 1967 
J.D. Hennings Colonial Office 
James (aka Jim) 
Griffiths 
Secretary of State for Colonies, 1950 to 1951 
Lee Kuan Yew Leader of People’s Action Party, 1954 to 1992; 
Member of Legislative Council/Parliament, 1955 to 1991; 
Prime Minister of Singapore, 1959 to 1990; 
Senior Minister of Singapore, 1990 to 2004; 
Minister Mentor of Singapore, 2004 to 2011 
Lim Ching Siong Co-founded People's Action Party with Lee Kuan Yew in 
1954; 
Accused of involved Hock Lee bus and Chinese Middle 
School riots in 1955 and 1956; 
Detained by the Lim Yew Hock’s government, 1956 to 
1959; 
Detained by the Lee Kuan Yew’s government, 1963 to 1969 
Lim Choon-Mong Leader of Progressive Party 
Member of Legislative Assembly, 1955 to 1959 
Lim Yew Hock Singapore Progressive Party; 
Labour Party of Singapore; 
Labour Front; 
Member of the Legislative Council and Assembly from 
1948 to 1963; 
Second Chief Minister of Singapore, 1956 to 1959 
Malcolm MacDonald United Kingdom Commissioner-General for South East 
Asia, 1948 to 1954 
Nazir Ahmed Mallal 
 
Advocate and Solicitor of the Colony of Singapore and 
Federation of Malaya; 
Founder of Progressive Party in 1947; 
Member of Legislative Council of Singapore, 1948 to 1955 
Oliver Lyttelton Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1951 to 1954 
Ong Eng Guan Core member of the People’s Action Party; 
Minister of National Development, 1959 to 1960; 
Formed United People’s Party in 1963; 
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Member of the Legislative Assembly, 1959 to 1965 
Ong Piah Teng Respected member of the older section of the Chinese 
community; 
Managing Director of United Chinese Bank (later changes 
its name to United Overseas Bank (UOB)), 1935 to 1945; 
Director of Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce 
P. C. H. Holmer Deputy British High Commissioner to Singapore 
R. Jumabhoy Legislative Councillor and Unofficial Member of the 
Executive Council in Singapore 
R.W. Calderwood Director of Special Branch, Singapore to Commissioner of 
Police 
Sir Berkeley Gage British Ambassador to Thailand, 1954 to 1957 
Sir Franklin Gimson Singapore Governor, 1946 to 1952 
Sir Gilbert Laithwaite Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, 1955 to 1959 
Sir J. Nicoll Singapore Governor, 1952 to 1955 
Sir John Fearns Nicoll Singapore Governor, 1952 to 1955 
Sir Robert (aka Robin) 
Black 
Singapore Governor, 1955 to 1957 
Sir Robert Scott Commissioner General of United Kingdom in South East 
Asia, 1955 to 1959 
Sir Thomas Lloyd Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
1951 to 1957 
Sir Thomas Stamford 
Raffles 
British Colonial Official; 
Founding of British Singapore 
T. C. Jerrom Principal, Colonial Office 
Tan Chin Tuan Managing Director of Oversea-Chinese Banking 
Corporation, 1942 to 1972; 
Deputy President of Singapore Legislative Council, 1951 to 
1955; 
Unofficial Member of Legislative Council, 1948 to 1955 
Tan Chye Cheng (aka 
C. C. Tan) 
Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court, Singapore; 
Member of the Legislative Council, 1948 to 1955; 
Founder of Progressive Party in 1947 
Tengku Long (aka 
Sultan Hussein 
Mohamed Shah) 
Sultan of Johor, 1824 to 1835 
Thio Chan Bee First Asian principal of the Anglo-Chinese School. 1952 to 
1960; 
Member of Legislative Council of Singapore, 1948 to 1955 
Tunku Abdul Rahman Chief Minister of Federation of Malaya, 1955 to 1957; 
Prime Minister of Malaysia, 1957 to 1970 
W. L. Blythe Colonial Secretary of Singapore, 1950 – 1953 
William Allmond 
Codrington (aka W. A. 
C.) Goode 
Last Singapore Governor,  1957 to 1959; 
First Yang di-Pertuan Negara of Singapore, June 1959 to 
December 1959 
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Appendix B: List of Major Actors – Hong Kong 
 
Major Actor 
(Highlighted in 
Archival Documents) 
Affiliation/Position 
A. E. Donald 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State (Asia and the Pacific) for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1980 to 1984 
A. J. Coles Private Secretary to Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher 
Allen Lee 
Unofficial member of the Legislative Council; 
Leader of the Young Professionals Delegation 
Anthony Crosland 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
1976 to 1977 
Chiang, Kai-shek President of Republic of China 
Chou, Enlai 
Premier of the People’s Republic of China, 1949 to 1976; 
Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China, 1956 to 
1966 and 1973 to 1976 
Chow Liang, Saline 
Shuk-yee 
Un-official member of the Legislative Council; 
Hong Kong & Kowloon Trades Union Council 
Christine Loh 
Chairperson of the Hong Kong Observers; 
Director of Philipp Brothers and Phibro Energy 
Daniel Koo 
The Chairperson of Shui Hing Company Limited; 
General Committee member of the Hong Kong General 
Chamber of Commerce; 
Vice Chairman of the Chinese General Chamber of 
Commerce of Hong Kong 
Deng, Xiaoping 
Leader of People’s Republic of China, 1978 to 1992; 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission 
Donald C. Jamieson 
Canada’s Higher Commission to the United Kingdom, 1983 
to 1985 
E. Bolland Head of the Far Eastern Department, Foreign Office 
E. N. Larmour 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs 
Edward Heath Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 1970 to 1974 
Francis Leslie Pym 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
1982 to 1983 
Frank Cooper 
Assistant Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence 
(Hong Kong), 1964-1968 
General Worsley Senior British Army officer 
H. L. Jenkyns 
Department of Economic Affairs, Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs 
Hilton Cheong-Leen 
Chairman of the Urban Council, 1981 to 1986; 
Unofficial member of the Legislative Council, 1973 to 1978 
Huang, Hua 
Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China, 1976 to 
1982 
Humphrey Atkins Lord Privy Seal, 1981 to 1982 
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Ji, Pengfei 
Vice Premier, State Council, People’s Republic of China, 
1980 to 1982; 
Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, 1983 
to 1990 
Ji, Shaoxiang  Xinhua News Agency - Hong Kong Branch 
Jonathan D. Stoddart Counsellor in the U.S. Embassy, 1966 to 1969 
K. M. Wilford 
Assistant (and later deputy) Under-Secretary of State, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1969 to 1975 
Lau, Wong-fat  Chairman of Heung Yee Kuk, 1980 to 2015 
Lee, Kuan Yew 
Prime Minister of Singapore, 1959 to 1990; 
Senior Minister of Singapore, 1990 to 2004; 
Minister Mentor of Singapore, 2004 to 2011 
Liao, Chengzhi 
Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the 
State Council, People’s Republic of China, 1978 to 1983 
Lord Belstead 
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
1982-1983 
Lord Thomson Newspaper proprietor 
Lydia Dunn 
Appointed member of the Executive Council and 
Legislative Council; 
Executive Director of John Swire & Sons Limited; 
Director of Swire Pacific Limited 
Mahathir Mohamad Prime Minister of Malaysia, 1981 to 2003 
Margaret Thatcher Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 1979 to 1990 
Mildred Neville Catholic Institute for International Relations 
Wu, Wueqian 
Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, 1982 to 
1988 
Murray MacLehose Hong Kong Governor, 1971 to 1982 
P. F. Ricketts 
Second Secretary, Near East and North African 
Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1981 to 
1983; 
Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, 1983 
to 1985 
R. B. Crowson 
Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office 
Richard Luce 
Under-Secretary (and later Minister) of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, 1979 to 1982 
Robert ‘Robin’ Black Hong Kong Governor, 1958 to 1964 
Robert Adley, MP Member of Parliament, the United Kingdom 
Robin Butler Prime Minister's Office 
Roland Moyle, MP Member of Parliament, the United Kingdom 
Senhor de Freitas-
Cruz 
The Portuguese Ambassador 
Sir Alexander 
Grantham 
Hong Kong Governor,1947 to 1957 
Sir Arthur N. 
Galsworthy 
Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Affairs, 1956 to 1969 
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Sir David Trench Hong Kong Governor, 1964 to 1971 
Sir Edward Youde Hong Kong Governor, 1982 to 1986 
Sir Geoffrey Howe 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
1983 to 1989 
Sir Hilton Poynton 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1959 
to 1966 
Sir Leslie Monson 
Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs 
Sir Percy Cradock British ambassador to Beijing, 1978 to 1983 
Sir S. Y. Chung 
Senior Unofficial Member of the Legislative Council and 
Executive Council, 1980 to 1988 
Sir Y. K. Pao A successful business elite in Hong Kong 
T.A.K. Elliott Western Department, Foreign Office 
W. S. Carter 
Head of the Hong Kong Department, Commonwealth 
Office 
Yao, Guang 
Chinese negotiator and Vice-Minister of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, 1982 to 1986 
Zhao, Ziyang Premier of the People’s Republic of China, 1980 to 1989 
Zhou, Nan 
Vice-Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic 
of China 
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